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Near the beginning of the twentieth century, the three prevailing powers in South 
America—Argentina, Brazil, and Chile—engaged in a naval arms race centered around the 
revolutionary “dreadnought” warship type, which were larger, more heavily armed, and faster 
than all previous battleships. In 1907, the Brazilian government, the first mover in this arms race, 
contracted with British shipbuilders for two dreadnoughts designed to be the most powerful in 
the world. The Brazilians hoped that the prestige of these new warships would spearhead their 
ambitious attempt to become the regional hegemon and an international power, but a plethora of 
skeptical British and American media outlets quickly bought into conspiratorial suspicions that 
the country had ordered the ships as a proxy for a great power, a move that would have disrupted 
a fragile naval balance among some of the world’s great powers. Once it became clear that Brazil 
was keeping the ships, Argentina’s decision to respond with two dreadnoughts, themselves the 
most powerful in the world, was seen as a necessary countermove required by the time’s 
prevailing naval doctrine. Notably, the method by which Argentina conducted its dreadnought’s 
bidding process was subjected to criticism from shipbuilders after the dissemination of their 
unique designs. The Argentine dreadnoughts induced the Chilean government to seek their own 
cornerstones of maritime strength, but their two dreadnoughts were taken over by the United 
 
  
Kingdom after the outbreak of the First World War. A third Brazilian dreadnought, larger than 
the previous two and designed to carry the largest number of guns in a capital ship’s main battery 
that the world had ever seen, was sold to the Ottoman Empire in 1913 and later seized by the 
British after the beginning of the same conflict. The five dreadnoughts that eventually reached 
South America, the British having sold one of the Chilean dreadnoughts back to the country in 
1920, were never actively employed against a foreign power. As time went on, the major naval 
powers had commissioned more dreadnoughts to stronger and larger designs, something which 
ensured that the South American dreadnoughts could no longer affect the great power’s naval 
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Introduction 
The sun did not appear over Newcastle-upon-Tyne on 10 September 1908, for it was 
raining. Still, the miserable weather did not deter a large group of people from traveling to the 
city’s large shipyard, located in the ward of Elswick and owned by the major arms manufacturer 
Armstrong Whitworth, to attend the launch of Brazil’s newest warship. Several of the people 
closely involved in the ship’s construction—including high-ranking officers from a Brazilian 
naval commission created to oversee the ship’s construction; Francisco Régis de Oliveira, the 
Brazilian minister to the United Kingdom; Andrew Noble, Armstrong Whitworth’s chairman; 
and the company’s board of directors—took advantage of a specially chartered train that brought 
them from Armstrong’s offices directly to the launching site. Fortunately for them, the rain 
slackened in the afternoon, exactly when they would have to be outside for the launching 
ceremony.1 
Upon arrival, these people would have seen a visibly incomplete ship that was 
nonetheless still composed of a substantial nine thousand tons of steel, hammered and crafted 
into a hull nearly five hundred and fifty feet long, and placed perpendicular to the River Tyne to 
facilitate a stern-first launch. It was held out of the water by temporary wooden cribbing 
designed to be knocked away when the ship was ready to be released, and temporary lines had 
been rigged above the ship’s truncated superstructure to run flags along the length of the ship. 
Around the scheduled launching time of 2:30 pm, the wife of the Brazilian minister 
stepped onto a raised platform to christen the ship. Surrounded by about a dozen people, she 
 
1 On 11 September, the British Meteorological Office reported a high of 53°F (12°C) and constant rain over the 
preceding twenty-four hours in North Shields, located a few miles northeast of Newcastle upon Tyne and the 
Elswick Shipyard. Daily Weather Reports: 1st to 31st December 1908 (London: Meteorological Office, 1908), 45. 
The Times gives the additional detail that the rain slackened and picked up again later in the day. “Launch of a 
Brazilian Battleship,” Times (London), 11 September 1908, 8b. 
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traded a bouquet of flowers for a bottle of champagne, grabbed it by the neck, and swung it 
through the air. It shattered upon hitting the bow of the ship, and she formally named it for 
Brazil’s most populous state, Minas Geraes.2 With this ceremony complete, the hull slid along 
two parallel and well-greased tracks into the waters of the River Tyne, being arrested by chains 
before it impacted the river’s far bank.3 
Figure 1.1: Minas Geraes’ launch into the River Tyne, 10 September 1908. 
 




2 Minas Geraes, both the ship and state, was spelled with a second “e” until Portuguese-language orthographic 
changes in the mid-twentieth century depreciated it in favor of an “i,” i.e. “Minas Gerais.” In concert with primary 
sources, this paper uses the former. 
3 The preceding paragraphs are drawn from “The Brazilian Battleship,” Times (London), 10 September 1908, 4b; 
“Launch of a Brazilian Battleship,” Times (London), 11 September 1908, 8b; “The Minas Geraes,” Navy 
(Washington) 2, no. 9 (September 1908): 38. Details of the raised platform come from figure two. 
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Figure 2.2: Christening of Minas Geraes. 
 
Source: Tyne and Wear Archives and Museums, DF.CLR-8-29. Public domain. 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:DF.CLR-8-29_The_Launch_of_the_Minas_Geraes.tif. 
 
The Brazilian government’s 1907 naval construction program included an order for three 
“dreadnought” battleships: Minas Geraes, São Paulo, and Rio de Janeiro.4 The superior 
armament of this warship type upon its introduction only one year earlier had made all previous 
battleships obsolete—so much so that the older ships would soon come to be known as “pre-
dreadnoughts.”5 The potential of these ships in bolstering military strength and national prestige 
 
4 The program was authorized in 1904 and heavily revised in 1907. “The Brazilian Battleship,” Times (London), 10 
September 1908, 4b; David Topliss, “The Brazilian Dreadnoughts, 1904–1914,” Warship International 25, no. 3 
(1988): 242–46. 
5 Robert J. Blyth, “Introduction,” in The Dreadnought and the Edwardian Age, eds. Robert J. Blyth, Andrew 
Lambert, and Jan Rüger (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2011), 3. Dreadnoughts had been pioneered by the eponymous 
HMS Dreadnought, which was commissioned into Britain’s Royal Navy in December 1906. The key innovation of 
this warship type was their “all-big-gun” design, a change from previous design practices that called for a few large 
guns and many medium guns. This had been made practical by technological improvements, as newly designed 
heavy guns were able to be fired much faster than those of even a decade earlier. Moreover, mounting uniform main 
batteries on ships theoretically simplified fire control, as it gave naval officers the knowledge that each gun, if aimed 
in the same direction and at the same elevation, would fire shells that would travel roughly equal distances. Norman 
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was quickly and widely recognized, and Brazil was the first of several countries to catch what 
one writer later called the “dreadnought mania.”6 These nations scrambled to acquire their own 
dreadnoughts as the warship type became increasingly inflated symbols and took on leading 
roles in seaborne defenses.7 As historian Robert O’Connell writes, dreadnoughts were “perceived 
to be the ultimate weapons of their day … among the states that owned them, dreadnoughts were 
generally considered the final guarantee against seaborne aggression.”8 The potential power 
embodied in these ships led to naval scares and arms races breaking out around Europe, 
including a vastly expensive duel between the United Kingdom and Germany which was a 
possible cause of the First World War.9 Unlike those two countries, however, Brazil did not 
possess the shipbuilding facilities and technology needed to construct dreadnoughts, and so they 
ordered them from Armstrong Whitworth, the United Kingdom’s preeminent shipbuilder. Two 
 
Friedman, Battleship Design and Development 1905–1945 (New York: Mayflower Books, 1978), 98; Robert K. 
Massie, Dreadnought: Britain, Germany and the Coming of the Great War (New York: Random House, 1991), 
468–72; Sidney Graves Koon, “Dreadnoughts—What Are They?,” Engineering Magazine 40 (October 1910–March 
1911): 521–22. Dreadnought was also the first capital ship in any navy to utilize steam turbines for propulsion, 
although several subsequent dreadnoughts, including Brazil’s, carried the tried and tested triple-expansion engines. 
Massie, Dreadnought, 474–75; Norman Friedman, The British Battleship: 1906–1946 (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval 
Institute Press, 2015), 64.  
6 Gerald Ellis Cronin, “South American Sea Power,” Navy (Washington) 5, no. 7 (1911): 29. See also 
“Dreadnoughts The Issue in England,” Philadelphia Inquirer, 30 May 1909, 4; “World Warship Mad,” Washington 
Post, 24 December 1911, 7. A nation’s prestige was boosted to only greater heights if it could claim the “pride” of 
owning one of the largest and most powerful ships in the world. Koon, “Dreadnoughts—What Are They?,” 536. 
7 T.G. Otte, “Grey Ambassador: The Dreadnought and British Foreign Policy,” in Blyth, Lambert, and Rüger, 
Dreadnought and the Edwardian Age, 73–74. 
8 Robert O’Connell, Sacred Vessels: The Cult of the Battleship and the Rise of the US Navy (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1991), 4. 
9 Martin Daunton, “‘The Greatest and Richest Sacrifice Ever Made on the Altar of Militarism’: The Finance of 
Naval Expansion, c. 1890–1914,” in Blyth, Lambert, and Rüger, Dreadnought and the Edwardian Age, 49. Other 
naval scares and arms races included Greece and the Ottoman Empire, Russia and the Ottoman Empire, France and 
Italy, and Italy and Austria-Hungary, although the intensity of the Greco–Ottoman race was far higher than the latter 
three. Paul G. Halpern, The Mediterranean Naval Situation, 1908–1914 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1971), 184–86, 190–91, 200–08, 307–08; David Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War: Europe, 1904–
1914 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), 9, 89, 138–39. 
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dreadnoughts would be constructed immediately, while the third would follow once the first had 
vacated its slipway.10 
 Brazil was the third country in the world to have these innovative new vessels under 
construction, behind only the United Kingdom and the United States. If that held true, Brazil 
would possess a dreadnought before many of the world’s traditional powers, including Germany, 
France, and Russia.11 As such, the ships became subject to special attention; for examples, their 
dreadnoughts were unusually represented in the 1911 Encyclopædia Britannica with both a 
photograph and diagram, and a large model of the ship was constructed and displayed at the 
1908 Franco–British Exposition.12 
This warship order was an extraordinary move, to say the least. Neither Brazil, 
Argentina, or Chile—the three most powerful and wealthy countries on the South American 
continent—had ever possessed a capital ship that surpassed all of those owned by the major 
naval powers of the world, likely as much for cost as for lack of any military need for them. “It is 
a curious anomaly,” Scientific American declared in a 1908 cover story, “that the most powerful 
 
10 Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War, 19; Topliss, “Brazilian Battleships,” 246. 
11 Siegfried Breyer, Battleships and Battle Cruisers, 1905–1970, trans. Alfred Kurti (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 
1973), 320; Robert Scheina, “Brazil,” in Conway’s All The World’s Fighting Ships, 1906–1921, eds. Robert 
Gardiner and Randal Gray (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984), 404, hereafter cited as Conway’s 1906–21. 
Shipyard strikes would, however, delay the completion of Minas Geraes long enough for Germany to slip ahead. On 
the strikes, see Topliss, “Brazilian Battleships,” 246; on the German ship’s launch date, see N.J.M. Campbell, 
“Germany,” in Gardiner and Gray, Conway’s 1906–21, 145. 
12 Encyclopædia Britannica, 11th ed. (1910–11), s.v. “ship”; “The Brazilian Battleship ‘Minas Geraes’,” 
Engineering 86 (11 September 1908): 352; “Brazil’s Mighty Leviathans For England’s Navy,” New York Herald, 30 
June 1908, 3–4; “The Minas Geraes,” Navy (Washington) 2, no. 9 (September 1908): 38. The model of Minas 
Geraes at the Franco–British Exposition attracted a fair amount of mentions and commentary, and one magazine’s 
round-up of the event called it “perhaps the gem of the whole collection” of ship models at the event. It was also the 
only ship model listed in the article to have a printed photograph. Atlas, “Models and Machinery at the Franco-
British Exhibition,” Model Engineer and Amateur Electrician 19, no. 382 (20 August 1908): 171. The National 
Maritime Museum holds a similar, if not the same, shipbuilder’s model of Minas Geraes, on loan from BAE 
Systems. Created in 1908, it was constructed in 1:48 scale and measures nearly thirteen feet, or four meters, long. 
Sir W. G. Armstrong Whitworth & Co. Ltd, “Minas Geraes (1908); Warship; Battleship,” c. 1908, National 
Maritime Museum, SLR1387, http://collections.rmg.co.uk/collections/objects/67346.html. 
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fighting ship afloat should belong to a South American republic.”13 From the perspective of 
Brazil’s governing elites, navies were one of a limited number of ways in which a nation could 
demonstrate its power in places far from their shores. They believed that the modernization of 
their dilapidated and aging navy with some of the world’s most technologically advanced 
warships would elevate the nation’s profile and help put it in a position of international strength, 
on par with Brazil’s size and location.14 Admiral Huett Bacelar, head of the Brazilian naval 
commission charged with overseeing Minas Geraes’ construction, said as much after that ship 
was launched. The luminaries present at the ceremony had quickly retreated to the shipyard’s 
molding loft, an enormous room where ship plans were laid out in full scale, reaching it by 2:45 
p.m. After several toasts and a speech from Sir Andrew Noble, Armstrong’s chairman, Bacelar 
spoke about what Minas Geraes and the rest of Brazil’s naval construction program symbolized. 
He described the new warship as a crucial step in advancing Brazil’s nascent industrialization. 
The fleet his country had under construction, including the two dreadnoughts and over a dozen 
smaller warships, would be “no mere expression of ostentatious power, nor of any sentiment still 
less justifiable,” he said. “It was a logical consequence of national progress, for Brazil had 
always endeavored to keep her armaments abreast of her material development.”15 
Despite Bacelar’s words and several other public statements from the government of 
Brazil, the timing, factors, and circumstances involved made these ships the subject of much 
attention in the naval powers of Western Europe and the United States. “Never has the Navy of a 
minor power loomed so large on the international horizon as that of Brazil during the past year,” 
 
13 “Brazilian Battleship ‘Minas Geraes’—Most Powerful Fighting Ship Afloat,” Scientific American 99, no. 24 (12 
December 1908): 428. 
14 Joseph Love, The Revolt of the Whip (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), 14; Robert Scheina, Latin 
America: A Naval History, 1810–1987 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1987), 80. 
15 “Launch of a Brazilian Battleship,” Times (London), 11 September 1908, 8b. 
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proclaimed the 1908–09 edition of Britain’s Navy League Annual. “The reason is that this nation 
has had the audacity to order (not merely to ‘project;’ this is done monthly by many insignificant 
powers) three warships equal in fighting value to anything afloat or building.”16 Several British 
and American politicians, journals, and newspapers used Brazil’s “fourth”-rate status in the 
perceived global hierarchy to express conspiratorial suspicions that the country, acting as a 
proxy, had ordered the ships for a great power.17 When the ships were subsequently handed over 
in international waters, they would disrupt the existing naval balances of power and raise 
diplomatic tension. As Winston Churchill stated in October 1913: 
The simultaneous building by so many powers great and small of capital ships, and their 
general naval expansion, are causes of deep anxiety to us. Germany may fall behind in 
the race she has herself provoked, and we may yet be left to face a great preponderance of 
loose Dreadnoughts, wh[ich] at v[ery] short notice, a diplomatic grouping or regrouping 
may range against us.18 
 
The attention lavished by Western naval powers on these ships altered popular 
calculations of the world’s naval power calculations. The resulting hysteria created an 
environment where yellow journalism ran amok, and the vociferous announcements of the 
Brazilian government were discounted amid enquiries into the state’s strategic need and ability 
to pay for such ships. These views glossed over the potential of the purchases for international 
‘soft’ diplomatic power, given the Brazilian government’s aspirations to move up in the world’s 
ranks, and the numerous opportunities where such authority could be employed in South 
 
16 Alan H. Burgoyne and Gerard Fiennes, “The South American Republics,” in Navy League Annual 1908–1909, ed. 
Alan H. Burgoyne (London: The Navy League, 1908), 96–99. 
17 “Fourth rate” comes from “A Craze for Dreadnoughts,” Mill Valley Independent, 18 June 1909, 6. The piece 
originally appeared in the Toledo Blade, and was printed in the Independent alongside several other editorials, all 
under the header “opinions of great papers on important subjects.” 
18 Otte, “Grey Ambassador,” in Blyth, Lambert, and Rüger, Dreadnought and the Edwardian Age, 74. 
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America, but incisively questioned the nation’s ability to maintain the ships over their intended 
service lives.  
As compared to Brazil, Argentina and Chile both possessed modern fleets thanks to an 
expensive multi-year naval arms race between the two that had concluded only a few years 
before.19 Unfortunately for them, the new dreadnought design meant that those ships would find 
themselves wholly outclassed in any conflict. The Argentine legislature, governing over a 
country that bordered Brazil and fearing a blockade of its economically prosperous River Plate, 
therefore faced what a British diplomat called the “political question of the year” in how to 
respond to Brazil’s challenge.20 The pervading doctrine of the time was clear, both to the 
Argentine government and the same international observers who had criticized Brazil’s 
purchase: only dreadnoughts could counter dreadnoughts, and as such Argentina would need 
dreadnoughts of its own if the naval balance of power in South America was to be preserved.21 
The legislature appropriated funds for two dreadnoughts at the end of 1908, and ordered them 
from the United States at the beginning of 1910.22 Both were designed to be larger and more 
powerful than the Brazilian ships.23 Argentina’s dreadnoughts, named Rivadavia and Moreno, 
were subject to less speculation than their counterparts in Brazil because of the accepted strategy 
for countering rival dreadnoughts. However, the purchase proved to be divisive inside Argentina, 
as several bills that would have directed that the ships be sold were introduced in the Argentine 
 
19 George Rauch, Conflict in the Southern Cone (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999), 184–87. 
20 Claud Russell to Sir Edward Grey, “Argentine Republic: Annual Report, 1908,” 6, The National Archives, 
Foreign Office 118/287 (hereafter cited as TNA and FO, respectively). On the importance of the River Plate, see “A 
Message From Garcia,” Boston Evening Transcript, 4 June 1910, 3. 
21 “The Status of South American Navies,” Engineer 107 (22 January 1909): 90.  
22 On the appropriation bill, see Russell to Grey, “Argentine Republic: Annual Report, 1908,” 3, TNA, FO 118/287; 
“Dreadnoughts for Argentina,” Sydney Morning Herald, 21 December 1908, 7. On the order, see Seward Livermore, 
“Battleship Diplomacy in South America: 1905–1925,” Journal of Modern History 16, no. 1 (1944): 33–38. 
23 Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th ed. (1910–11), s.v. “ship.” 
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legislature.24 Although all were defeated, contemporary reports indicate that several countries 
would have been interested in any such sale.25 These dreadnoughts also proved controversial for 
the lengthy and convoluted bidding process used to acquire them. The Argentine Navy had 
issued vague specifications when calling for tenders to construct a dreadnought, and upon 
receiving a variety of designs, they took the best aspects from each and restarted the bidding 
process with specifications which matched the best aspects from the earlier submissions. They 
then did this a second time. This unusual acquisition process drew strong protests from the 
shipbuilders involved; one naval designer later wrote in the Times that “it is exceedingly 
probable that a serious leakage of ideas and practice of our ships was disseminated through the 
world by the Argentine government.”26 The Chileans, who shared a border with Argentina 
measuring in the thousands of miles, followed suit by ordering two dreadnoughts of their own in 
1911. The armament competition was fought fiercely, but to the disappointment of the United 
States and Germany the Chilean Navy’s long history with the British Royal Navy all but ensured 
that the ships would be ordered in the United Kingdom.27 
Meanwhile, Brazil’s third dreadnought Rio de Janeiro was subjected to a “torturous and 
complicated” design history as the Brazilian government confronted the steadily increasing size 
and power of foreign dreadnoughts.28 These new battleships, called “super-dreadnoughts,” 
featured far heavier displacements and armament than their namesake, and they quickly 
 
24 Livermore, “Battleship Diplomacy,” 46–47. 
25 “Argentine Pride Outweighs $6,000,000 Profit Greece Offers for Moreno,” New-York Tribune, 27 April 1913, 3; 
Press Association/Telegraph, “Turkey and Greece; Purpose of Dreadnoughts,” Poverty Bay Herald, 2 January 1914, 
3. 
26 Livermore, “Battleship Diplomacy,” 35–38; J.H. Biles, “The Argentine Battleships,” Times (London), 25 
February 1910, 4c. 
27 Scheina, Latin America, 84–85. 
28 Peter Brook, Warships for Export: Armstrong Warships, 1867–1927 (Gravesend, UK: World Ship Society, 1999), 
136. See also Topliss, “Brazilian Dreadnoughts,” 254. 
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condemned even the Minas Geraes-class to obsolescence.29 Several competing factors were also 
at play: politics, such as an unwillingness to build a ship smaller than Brazil’s previous 
dreadnoughts; money, in that the country’s rubber and coffee booms were slowing; and 
Armstrong, who worked to hold the Brazilians to their contractually obligated third dreadnought. 
Eventually, a final design emerged. Once again, Brazil would possess the largest dreadnought 
ever, and this time it would feature fourteen twelve-inch guns in its main battery, more than any 
other battleship ever built.30 The ship, which like the Minas Geraes class would not hold the title 
of ‘largest dreadnought’ for very long, was under construction when the Brazilians sold it to the 
Ottoman Empire in December 1913, who were involved in their own naval arms race with 
Greece.31 Brazil’s naval dreams remained unquenched, however, as they ordered a new 
dreadnought in 1914.32 They were only ended due to the beginning of the First World War, 
which removed their ability to acquire major warships from the warring nations.33 Chile’s naval 
hopes were also put on hold due to the conflict, as their super-dreadnoughts Almirante Latorre 
and Almirante Cochrane were still under construction when the First World War broke out, and 
 
29 The first super-dreadnought was Britain’s Orion class, laid down in 1909. Topliss, “Brazilian Dreadnoughts,” 
255. This class displaced around 22,000 long tons and carried 13.5-inch guns in their main battery. All of these were 
available for broadside fire, referring to when as many as possible of a ship’s main guns were trained to one side of 
the ship and fired. Those statistics can be weighed against the earlier Dreadnought, which displaced around 18,000 
long tons and mounted an equal number of 12-inch guns. Only ten of its guns, however, could be used in a 
broadside. Siegfried Breyer, Battleships and Battle Cruisers, 1905–1970, translated by Alfred Kurti (Garden City, 
NY: Doubleday, 1973), 110, 126; Antony Preston, “Great Britain,” in Gardiner and Gray, Conway’s 1906–21, 21, 
28. Between the two ships were five years, a 22.5% increase in displacement, and an over 80% increase in broadside 
weight—that is, the total weight of the shells fired in a single broadside. Preston, “Great Britain,” in Gardiner and 
Gray, Conway’s 1906–21, 21, 28; R.A. Fletcher, Warships and Their Story (London: Cassell and Company, 1911), 
317. 
30 Topliss, “Brazilian Dreadnoughts,” 247, 281–82. 
31 Ibid., 283–84; Jonathan Grant, Rulers, Guns, and Money: The Global Arms Trade in the Age of Imperialism 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 160–61, 182. 
32 “Dockyard Notes,” Engineer 117 (20 February 1914): 216–17. 
33 Work on the new dreadnought, which was to be named Riachuelo, ended with the outbreak of war and would be 
formally canceled in 1915. Brook, Warships for Export, 152–53. 
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so the British purchased them for use in the Royal Navy.34 They purchased one back from the 
British in 1920 and briefly considered a larger acquisition of Britain’s early battlecruisers.35 
Despite the volume generated by these ships, it is far from clear that a sale would have 
been able to affect the naval calculations of major powers for any significant amount of time. 
The great powers quickly surpassed the South American dreadnoughts by constructing an ever-
greater number of ships of increasing size, firepower, and protection. Between 1911 and August 
1914, when the former Rio de Janeiro was completed, the United Kingdom alone commissioned 
thirteen new dreadnoughts and super-dreadnoughts and had several more under construction.36 
Ordering or possessing one or two dreadnoughts could therefore only change the naval calculus 
of nations with far smaller fleets.37 
In the end, the dreadnoughts that made it to South America had little substantive 
international impact over the course of their approximately four-decade-long service lives. None 
were sold, and the Argentine, Brazilian, and Chilean dreadnoughts only ever fired shots in anger 
against internal foes during revolts or civil wars; none were fired at an international enemy.38  
 
34 “British Navy Gains,” New York Times, 7 December 1918, 14. 
35 Philip Somervell, “Naval Affairs in Chilean Politics, 1910–1932,” Journal of Latin American Studies 16, no. 2 
(1984): 389–90. 
36 Breyer, Battleships, 121–36. Rio de Janeiro was taken over by the British in August 1914, after the beginning of 
the First World War. Preston, “Great Britain,” 37. This ship total does not include battlecruisers, which traded 
armament or armor for a higher top speed. Richard Hough, Dreadnought: A History of the Modern Battleship (New 
York: Macmillan, [1964] 1975), 102. The differences between battlecruisers and battleships are tabulated in 
Friedman, Battleship Design, 168–69, which lists armor weights as percentages of the total displacement in British 
capital ships. 
37 Scheina, Latin America, 87. 
38 Almirante Latorre, having been taken over by the British Royal Navy and renamed HMS Canada, saw service in 
and fired shots in anger during the First World War. Having been sold back to Chile, the ship was used for neutrality 
patrols during the Second World War. R. A. Burt, British Battleships of World War One (Annapolis, MD: Naval 
Institute Press, 1986), 240. Brazil’s dreadnoughts were not deployed overseas during either of the world wars, 
although they were sent to the United States to be modernized with the intention of using them in the first, while 
Argentina remained neutral for nearly all of both world wars, entering on the side of the Allies only months before 
the end of the second conflict. M.J. Whitley, Battleships of World War Two: An International Encyclopedia 
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998), 21–29. 




The English-language historiography of the South American dreadnought race is thin in 
quantity and depth. Military and maritime histories on the period (c. 1904–14) focus on the 
industrialized world powers and their preparations for what became the First World War, 
especially the United Kingdom and the Germany. These countries had their own naval arms race 
which ratcheted up in tension and cost after the introduction of dreadnoughts in 1906, and 
several historians have pointed to it as a contributing, if indirect, cause of the later conflict.39 
These works tend to gloss over the smaller regional arms races happening around the globe, 
including in South America; they either briefly summarize it or narrowly focus on the ships’ 
design and specifications, omitting their impacts on the region. 
The exceptions, including Jonathan Grant’s Rulers, Guns, and Money: The Global Arms 
Trade in the Age of Imperialism and Robert Scheina’s Latin America: A Naval History, 1810–
1987, have noted that the South American race was one of several ideologically and prestige-
fueled armament races around the globe, and that the dreadnoughts they ordered were quickly 
superseded by technology and their high maintenance costs. 
There are other outliers are worthy of mention as well. Seward Livermore’s “Battleship 
Diplomacy in South America: 1905–1925,” published in 1944, examined the attempts of 
American diplomats to steer the lucrative Argentine warship contracts to companies in the 
United States. David Topliss, in “The Brazilian Dreadnoughts, 1904–1914,” wrote a tightly 
focused design history of all of Brazil’s dreadnoughts, working primarily from the records of 
 
39 Michael Epkenhans, “Dreadnought: A ‘Golden Opportunity’ for Germany’s Naval Aspirations?,” in Blyth, 
Lambert, and Rüger, Dreadnought and the Edwardian Age, 91. 
     
13 
 
British shipbuilders and the country’s Foreign Office. Finally, the free online encyclopedia 
Wikipedia provides a series of accessible introductions to the topic.40 
Other related materials include monographs by Zachary Morgan and Joseph Love on the 
1910 Revolt of the Lash, where the broadly black and mulatto crews aboard the Brazilian 
dreadnoughts rebelled only months after the ships had been delivered to protest the navy’s 
continued use of the lash despite its long ban in the regular population. 
Given the thinness of secondary sources, this thesis—which is primarily examining 
American and British reactions to the South American dreadnought race—will rely heavily on 
primary sources. These include documents and communications sourced from the national 
archives of both countries, contemporary journals and newspapers, and other miscellaneous 
contemporary records. Secondary sources aside from those mentioned above include works that 
examine the impact of the dreadnought battleship, broadly scoped and encyclopedic listings of 
warships from around the world, and examinations of the diplomatic and political situations 
faced by various countries during the time period.
 
40 Wikipedia’s articles on the South American dreadnought race are collected into four “featured topics.” They 
include a broad overview of the arms race and ten additional articles about the individual ships and ship classes 
involved. “Wikipedia:Featured topics/South American dreadnought race,” Wikipedia, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Wikipedia:Featured_topics/South_American_dreadnought_race&oldid=7
40095679. The author of this thesis has significantly contributed to most of these Wikipedia articles, and thanks 
Jason Long for being the primary author of “HMS Agincourt (1913)” and “HMS Eagle (1918),” which will perhaps 
be better known to readers of this paper as Brazil’s Rio de Janeiro and Chile’s Almirante Cochrane, respectively. 
  
Background: The South American context 
The saga of South America’s dreadnoughts has its roots in the mid-nineteenth century, 
when Paraguay embroiled itself in a war against Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay. All the 
participating countries bolstered their military capabilities during the conflict, and the Brazilian 
Navy especially benefited from an influx of armored vessels.41 Although these were quickly seen 
as “small and weak” in comparison to similar foreign warships, the fleet was quickly reinforced 
with heavier vessels in the aftermath of the war, as Brazil continued expanding its navy while at 
loggerheads with Argentina over the fate of a thoroughly decimated Paraguay and its territory.42  
The Argentine government ordered a small number of warships through the 1870s, 
primarily in case of a war against Brazil.43 Two monitors and two gunboats, for example, were 
purchased for use on the rivers extending north of the River Plate, the large estuary on which 
Buenos Aires, the Argentine capital, was sited. At the end of the 1870s, Argentina began to look 
beyond its rivers and coastal waters, and therefore procured Almirante Brown, a large central 
battery ironclad (launched in 1880), causing a brief scare that there would be a Brazilian–
Argentine naval arms race.44 
These fears were misplaced, however—instead, the arms race would be fought between 
Argentina and Chile, fueled by decades-long border tensions between the two nations in the 
Patagonian region, located in the southernmost part of South America.45 Only once, in 1878, had 
 
41 Scheina, Latin America, 27; Hugh Lyon, “Brazil,” in Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships: 1860–1905, eds. 
Robert Gardiner, Roger Chesneau, and Eugene Kolesnik (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1979), 405, 
hereafter cited as Conway’s 1860–1905. 
42 The New International Encyclopedia, 16th ed. (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1916), s.v. “Navies.” 
43 Georg von Rauch, “Cruisers for Argentina,” Warship International 15, no. 4 (1978): 297. 
44 Grant, Rulers, 118; Lyon, “Argentina,” in Gardiner, Chesneau, and Kolesnik, Conway’s 1860–1905, 401.  
45 James L. Garrett, “The Beagle Channel Dispute: Confrontation and Negotiation in the Southern Cone,” Journal of 
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 27, no. 3 (1985): 85–87. 
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the two countries come close to war over the issue, after Chilean forces seized several Argentine 
ships which had been issued licenses for and attempted to remove guano from the Patagonian 
coast. While Argentina deployed three of its vessels to oppose the Chilean action, the Chileans 
had already withdrawn by the time the Argentines arrived.46 The successful resolution of this 
crisis, limited naval resources, and other national priorities—namely Argentina’s Conquest of the 
Desert against the indigenous Patagonian population and Chile’s War of the Pacific against Peru 
and Bolivia—led to a decrease in tensions.47 
Figure 2.1: The Chilean protected cruiser Esmeralda. 
 
Source: Graphic 30, no. 775 (4 October 1884): 380. Public domain. 
Chile emerged victorious from the War of the Pacific in 1884, a conflict in which the 
Chileans had faced numerically inferior odds and where the country’s sea power had played a 
decisive role in neutralizing Peru.48 During the conflict, they ordered what would become the 
world’s first protected cruiser, Esmeralda, which was completed on 15 July 1884.49 The ship 
 
46 Rauch, “Cruisers for Argentina,” 297. 
47 Scheina, Latin America, 43, 45–46. 
48 Robert Scheina, Latin America’s Wars, vol. 1, The Age of the Caudillo, 1791–1899 (Dulles, VA: Brassey’s, 
2003), 376–86. 
49 Grant, Rulers, 122; Brook, Warships, 52–53. 
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type was named for the arched armored deck that protected a ship’s most vital areas, including 
its propulsion plant and magazines.50  
Constructed by Britain’s Armstrong shipbuilders, the corporation’s founder and 
namesake hailed Esmeralda as “the swiftest and most powerfully-armed cruiser in the world,” 
and opined that its design would usher in the end of the ironclad era. For the price of one of those 
ships, several protected cruisers could be constructed and sent out as commerce raiders, 
operating similarly to the Confederate Alabama during the United States’ civil war.51 Armstrong, 
probably hoping for orders from the Royal Navy, pointedly noted that it was fortunate his 
company had sold Esmeralda to a country unlikely to ever find itself at war with the British, as 
he “could conceive no more terrible scourge for our commerce than she would be in the hands of 
an enemy. No cruiser in the British navy was swift enough to catch her or strong enough to take 
her.”52 Nearer to Chile, the United States’ Army and Navy Journal published what it stated was 
an account of a conversation with an American naval officer, who expressed his belief that the 
ship could stand off San Francisco and drop shells into the city while being in no danger from the 
shorter-ranged shore-based batteries in the Golden Gate. “Chili [sic] has today the finest, fastest, 
and most perfectly equipped fighting war ship of her size afloat,” he said, referring to Esmeralda. 
“She could destroy our entire Navy, ship by ship, and never be touched.”53 Indeed, not quite a 
year after Armstrong finished constructing Esmeralda, the Chilean government sent the vessel 
 
50 Brook, Warships, 44; “Ecuador Buys a Cruiser,” New York Times, 2 December 1894, 9. 
51 “Home,” Graphic 30, no. 775 (4 October 1884): 347. 
52 “The ‘Esmeralda’,” Record (Valparaiso) 13, no. 183 (3 December 1884): 5. 
53 “We Cannot Fight the Chilean Navy,” Army and Navy Journal 23, no. 1 (1 August 1885): 16. This perspective 
was only one of several published during this time which intended to sound alarms about the underfunded and 
underequipped state of the United States Navy. William F. Sater, Chile and the United States: Empires in Conflict 
(Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1990), 51–52. 
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on an unusual and statement-making voyage to Panama, where it showed the Chilean flag 
alongside the great powers of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States.54 
Argentine–Chilean arms race, 1887–1902 
With Chile’s protected cruiser commissioned into its navy, the country was able to lay 
claim to possessing the most powerful navy in the Americas: their fleet was centered around 
Esmeralda, two well-maintained 1870s central-battery ironclads, and two 1860s armored 
frigates. Moreover, they could staff them with foreign-trained officers and highly trained and 
disciplined sailors.55 Presumably with the War of the Pacific fresh in his mind, Chile’s President 
Jose Manuel Balmaceda was unwilling to relinquish this qualitative advantage over its rival 
Argentina. “Chile should be able to resist on its own territory any possible coalition,” he said. “If 
it cannot succeed in attaining the naval power of the great powers, it should at least prove, on the 
base of a secure port and a fleet proportionate to its resources, that there is no possible profit in 
starting a war against the Republic of Chile.”56 
This resolve would soon be tested, as the advantages Chile’s protected cruiser conferred 
upon the country were merely fleeting: nearly a dozen nations had commissioned Armstrong to 
build similar ships by the time Esmeralda was completed.57 The new warship type had proved to 
be extremely lucrative for the company; Nathaniel Barnaby, a former Director of Naval 
 
54 Carlos Tromben, “Presencia Naval. El Cruero “Esmeralda” En Panamá [Naval Presence: The Cruiser Esmeralda 
in Panama],” International Journal of Naval History 1, no. 1 (April 2002): n.p. Some historians have stated that 
Esmeralda was ordered to block an annexation of Panama by the United States, which had sent marines and several 
warships to the area. Tromben argues that primary sources in Chile do not agree with this interpretation. See, for 
example, Sater, Chile and the United States, 52. 
55 Grant, Rulers, 121–23; Scheina, Latin America, 43–46;  
56 Sater, Chile and the United States, 52. 
57 Marshall J. Bastable, Arms and the State: Sir William Armstrong and the Remaking of British Naval Power, 1854–
1914 (New York: Routledge, 2017), 176. 
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Construction at Britain’s Admiralty, would later write that it “made the fortune” of Armstrong.58 
Argentina was one such customer: its own protected cruiser, Patagonia, would be launched in 
1886, and they already possessed Almirante Brown, the single largest warship in either country’s 
navy. Still, their other major warships were comparatively smaller and less seaworthy than their 
Chilean counterparts, and Chile could count on its core of experienced seamen.59 
To maintain its naval advantage, the Chilean government voted in 1887 to spend over 
three million pounds to expand its navy with modern warships. This disbursement represented a 
dramatic increase in the Chilean naval budget, which nearly doubled when comparing the 
average three-year percentages of the country’s military expenditure (1885–87 versus 1888–90). 
In 1889, they ordered an ironclad battleship and two protected cruisers from a French shipyard, 
and two torpedo boats from the United Kingdom. Losing out on the largest and most lucrative 
warships came as a surprise to the British, who had expected to win based on its extensive 
commercial ties (especially in nitrates). Historian Jonathan Grant writes that the Chilean 
president may have ordered the admiral to purchase the ships in France but speculates from 
British diplomatic documents that the French bribed both the admiral sent abroad to order the 
warships and the Chilean envoy to the United Kingdom and France.60 
In any case, the order for these warships was intended to significantly alter the naval 
balance of power in the Southern Cone, and therefore kindled a lengthy naval arms race and an 
on-again, off-again series of war scares.61 The battleship, named Capitán Prat, displaced nearly 
 
58 Brook, Warships, 53. 
59 Scheina, Latin America’s Wars, 1:376; Lyon, “Argentina,” in Gardiner, Chesneau, and Kolesnik, Conway’s 1860–
1905, 401–02. 
60 Grant, Rulers, 124–25. 
61 Such as in 1895, when the New York Times reported on “disquieting reports and rumors” in Buenos Aires and 
Washington D.C. “Two Republics May Fight,” New York Times, 19 May 1895, 21.  
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seven thousand tons and was praised by contemporary publications as having a “most interesting 
character” for its strong mix of an 18.3 knot top speed, an armament of 9.4 inch guns, and 
“sufficient” armor, including a belt that was 11.8 inches wide at its thickest point.62 The warship 
was one of the first in the world to use electricity to power its turrets and ammunition hoists, 
which carried shells to the guns.63 This naval expansion came alongside a plan to modernize the 
Chilean army with new rifles, carbines, sabers, and artillery, with plans to purchase enough of 
each to arm a force of eighty thousand soldiers.64 The Argentine government answered in the 
years after Chile’s warship orders by contracting for their own: two small coastal defense ships, 
Independencia and Libertad, and two protected cruisers, Veinticinco de Mayo and Nueve de 
Julio.65 
In January 1891, a civil war broke out in Chile between the country’s president and 
congress. The congress, which had tried to remove the president from office just a month prior, 
had the backing of most of the navy, while the president had the backing of most of the army and 
hoped to take possession of the warships then being constructed and nearing completion in 
France.66 
Crucially, the congressionalists were able to convince the United Kingdom, France, and 
Germany to remain neutral in the conflict. This meant that the presidential faction would be 
unable to take possession of several naval guns and shells from Armstrong in Britain, the two 
protected cruisers would remain in France for the duration of the conflict, and that the final 
 
62 The Stateman’s Year-Book, 32nd ed. (1895), s.v. “Chile”; individual statistics from Lyon, “Chile,” in Gardiner, 
Chesneau, and Kolesnik, Conway’s 1860–1905, 411. 
63 Godfrey L. Carden, “Chile-Argentina to Fight at Sea,” Collier’s Weekly 28, no. 13 (28 December 1901): 9, 17. 
64 Grant, Rulers, 123. In addition to the naval side of the Argentine–Chilean arms race, both countries made 
significant purchases to augment their armies as well. These acquisitions are tracked in Grant, Rulers, 119–33. 
65 Scheina, Latin America, 46. 
66 Grant, Rulers, 126–27. 
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installment of a German loan would not be disbursed.67 Without these, the presidential fleet was 
unable to contest the congressionalist faction’s naval superiority. The former’s most effective 
warships were a pair of torpedo boats that had left British shipyards shortly before the civil war 
broke out; most of their other torpedo boats were equipped with obsolete spar torpedoes. The two 
newer vessels carried modern Whitehead self-propelled torpedoes, but the primitive state of 
torpedo technology of the time limited their success to the sinking of Valparaiso, a 
congressionalist central battery ironclad. This was the first instance of a warship sinking another 
with a self-propelled torpedo, although it came with the significant caveat that the ship was at 
anchor and its crew little prepared to defend their vessel.68 
By holding naval supremacy, the congressionalists were able to escape Valparaiso at the 
beginning of the conflict, hold Iquique (a major nitrate port, which helped finance their war), 
attack isolated garrisons up and down Chile’s lengthy coast, and obtain and receive shipments of 
armaments for their army.69 They would go on to win the civil war, and with that came an 
increase in importance for the navy, which had carried the congressionalists to victory in the 
conflict and whose commander soon became the new president of the country.70 
With the new government established, the Chileans moved quickly to counter 
Argentina’s naval acquisitions by asking Armstrong for designs for a new protected cruiser. In 
need of work to ensure that no shipyard employees would be laid off, Armstrong decided to lay 
down a protected cruiser to one of those designs in August 1892; as anticipated, Chile purchased 
 
67 Ibid. 
68 H.W. Wilson, Ironclads in Action: A Sketch of Naval Warfare from 1855 to 1895 (London: Sampson Low, 
Marston, and Company, 1896), 2:16–29; “The Torpedo in War,” United Service Magazine 28, no. 903 (February 
1904): 438. 
69 Sater, Chile and the United States, 56. 
70 Scheina, Latin America, 47. 
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the ship off the stocks two months later, naming it for the ironclad sunk during the civil war. The 
Argentine government purchased a protected cruiser in the same month; Armstrong had laid it 
down on speculation eleven months earlier.71 Named Buenos Aires, the ship was paid for in part 
by contributions from the country’s citizens.72 During the ship’s trials, it underwent a six-hour 
natural draught test where it achieved a speed of 23.2 knots, making it the fastest cruiser in the 
world.73 
Chile countered with a new Esmeralda and four torpedo boats in May 1895. This 
Esmeralda was another powerful warship, being defined by one historian as “the first armored 
cruiser to be built for any navy,” and the contemporary Naval Annual called it “one of the most 
powerful cruisers in the world.”74 Another historian, however, believes that Esmeralda should be 
classified as a lesser “belted” cruiser due to design faults present after its conversion from a 
protected cruiser while under construction.75 In any case, the new ship and subsequent armored 
cruisers were distinguished from protected cruisers by their belt of armor along their sides, as 
opposed to the previous practice of carrying an armored deck and no side armor.76 This 
 
71 Brook, Warships, 80–83. 
72 Scheina, Latin America, 47. 
73 “The Argentine Cruiser Buenos Aires,” Engineer 82 (31 July 1896): 106. These results, ran on 2 November 1895, 
were so pleasing that the Argentines declined to run a planned forced-draught trial. In addition to a full description 
in the article, the ship was given a full-page illustration on page 114. 
74 For the “first armored cruiser” quote, see: Adrian J. English, Armed Forces of Latin America (London: Jane's 
Publishing Company, 1984), 146. J.R. Perrett, a ship designer at Armstrong, would have supported English’s 
contention, writing in 1914 that the ship was the “introduction of the armoured belt in cruiser design” and that “its 
adoption [later] became universal.” J.R. Perrett, “Some Notes on Warships Designed and Constructed by Sir W.G. 
Armstrong, Whitworth, & Co., Ltd,” Mechanical Engineer 34, no. 867 (4 September 1914): 212. For the “most 
powerful” quote, see E. Weyl, “The Progress of Foreign Navies,” in The Naval Annual, ed. T.A. Brassey (London: 
William Clowes and Sons, 1896), 55. Hereafter cited as Weyl, “Progress,” in The Naval Annual (1896). 
75 For the question of whether Esmeralda was a “belted” cruiser and details on what set it apart from later armored 
cruisers, see Brook, Warships, 101–02. Brook quotes William White, the Director of Naval Construction at the 
United Kingdom’s Admiralty and has been acclaimed by other historians as being a “great warship designer with 
wide knowledge of every aspect of shipbuilding and engineering,” as saying that Esmeralda would “on paper” look 
like a “formidable rival,” but that its listed top speed was obtainable only for short bursts, and its armor belt was of 
“fictitious protection.” For White’s background, see Ian Johnston and Ian Buxton, The Battleship Builders: 
Constructing and Arming British Capital Ships (Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Seaforth Publishing, 2013), 103. 
76 Brook, Warships, 99. 
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Esmeralda was paid for in part by selling the old Esmeralda for about US$1,500,000 to Japan, 
where it was renamed Izumi.77 The older vessel, barely ten years old, had been surpassed by 
rapidly changing naval technology—before being sold, the Chileans had inquired with 
Armstrong about the possibility of modernizing the ship with a new propulsion system and 
armament.78 Japan’s chief concern, however, was that Izumi arrive as soon as possible so that it 
could be employed in the First Sino-Japanese War.79  
At this point in time, the Chilean Navy still held what one historian has called a “quite 
apparent” superiority over their potential foes in Argentina—but in terms of completed major 
warships, their tonnage totals were nearly even.80 The Argentine government changed this 
calculation in a major way on 14 July 1895, when they paid the “extraordinary” price of 
£750,000 pounds sterling (18,807,500 francs) to acquire Giuseppe Garibaldi, a powerful 
armored cruiser under construction in Genoa for the Italian Navy.81 The first of four installments 
was due on the day the ship was purchased, and the last would be paid upon the ship’s delivery 
into Argentine service, which would be hurried by the progress already made in building it.82 
 
77 Scheina, Latin America, 48; Charles R. Flint, “Fifty Years a Trader,” System: The Magazine of Business 40, no. 2 
(1921): 218. Esmeralda’s sale to Japan was accomplished via the Ecuadorian government, where it caused 
significant repercussions. To remain formally neutral in the Sino-Japanese War, Chile sold Esmeralda to Ecuador, 
and although there was some speculation in press outlets that the ship was intended for use against the Peruvian 
Navy, the ship was only under the Ecuadorian flag from Chile to the Galapagos Islands, where it was handed to the 
Japanese. This arrangement had the personal approval of Ecuadorian president Luis Cordero, and Cordero’s political 
opponents used it and accusations of bribery to bring down the government. After a short armed conflict, Cordero 
was forced to leave the country. George Lauderbaugh, The History of Ecuador (Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood, 
2012), 79–80; Encyclopædia Britannica, 11th ed. (1910–11), s.v. “Ecuador,” “Ecuador Buys a Cruiser,” New York 
Times, 2 December 1894, 9; “Speculations About the Sale; The Esmeralda Could Easily Be Transferred from 
Ecuador to Japan,” New York Times, 3 December 1894, 5. 
78 Brook, Warships, 55. 
79 Flint, “Fifty Years a Trader,” 218. 
80 Rauch, “Cruisers for Argentina,” 298. 
81 Scheina, Latin America, 48; G.S. Laird Clowes, ed., Naval Pocket-Book (London: W. Thacker, 1908), 124. 
Ansaldo, the Genoan shipbuilder, was only given permission to sell the ship on the condition that they construct and 
complete another armored cruiser for Italy within their contract’s originally specified timeframe. “New Cruisers for 
the Japanese Navy,” Marine Engineering 9, no. 3 (March 1904): 101. 
82 von Rauch, “Cruisers for Argentina,” 298. 
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Giuseppe Garibaldi was named for the Italian nationalist, and Argentina unusually retained his 
last name from the Italians in recognition of his exploits in South America.83 With a 
displacement of about 6,800 tons and carrying two ten-inch guns, Garibaldi was launched on 27 
June 1895 and was ready for its sea trials by 17 October of the same year, a feat which The 
Naval Annual called a “quick piece of work with a ship of this size.”84 The ship was accepted 
into Argentine service on 12 October 1896 and left quickly, arriving in Argentina in December 
1896.85 It was the first Argentine ship that, on paper, could provide an equalizer to Chile’s naval 
power by matching up with Capitán Prat on a one for one basis, against which it had the 
advantage of speed and disadvantage of less armor.86 Naval historian Robert Scheina writes that, 
between Esmeralda and Garibaldi, it is difficult to tell who was responding to who. The orders 
were all made around the same time, and both had been subject to lengthy negotiations before 
the ships were acquired or ordered.87 
 
83 Ansaldo laid down a total of four similarly designed cruisers named Giuseppe Garibaldi. The first, described here, 
was sold to Argentina and renamed Garibaldi. The second was sold to Spain and renamed Cristobal Colon, which 
was sunk during the Spanish–American War. The third, described later, was also sold to Argentina, where it was 
renamed Pueyrredon. The final one was kept by the Italian Navy and retained its original name. Office of Naval 
Intelligence, Notes on Naval Progress, General Information Series no. 18 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1899), 93.  
84 Weyl, “Progress,” in The Naval Annual (1896), 54. On Garibaldi’s main battery, one online source with a 
comprehensive year-by-year summary of the ship’s service history notes that it carried 250-millimeter guns until 
1899, when the ship returned to Italy to be re-gunned with the 254-millimeter guns of its sister ships. “Crucero 
Acorazado Garibaldi (1896),” Historia y Arqueologia Marítima, Fundación Histarmar, 
http://www.histarmar.com.ar/Armada%20Argentina/Buques1900a1970/CrucAcGaribaldi.htm. While this is not 
explicitly confirmed in other sources used in this thesis, a short aside in The Naval Annual of 1899 does state that 
Garibaldi was being refitted in Genoa with its main armament removed. J.R. Leyland and T.A. Brassey, “Progress 
of Foreign Navies,” in The Naval Annual, ed. T.A. Brassey (London: William Clowes and Sons, 1899), 58. 
85 The dates in this sentence are drawn from von Rauch, who also backs up the date of the speed trials (17 October 
1895). Scheina, however, notes in an appendix that Garibaldi was accepted on 12 October 1895 and arrived in 
Argentina in December 1895—not 1896. This paper follows von Rauch, given that The Naval Annual confirms that 
Garibaldi’s trials, which are generally ran before a ship is accepted into service, occurred before Scheina’s 1895 
dates. Scheina, Latin America, 298; von Rauch, “Cruisers for Argentina,” 299; Weyl, “Progress,” in The Naval 
Annual (1896), 54. 
86 von Rauch, “Cruisers for Argentina,” 298; Lyon, “Argentina,” 297–98. For a description of Garibaldi, see “The 
Argentine Cruiser ‘Garibaldi’,” Engineering 62 (10 July 1896): 45. 
87 Scheina, Latin America, 48. 
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Figure 2.2: The Argentine armored cruiser Garibaldi, c. 1895. 
 




Chile moved quickly to respond to Garibaldi by purchasing Ministro Zenteno off the 
stocks in August 1895. Yet another protected cruiser being built by Armstrong, the vessel had 
been ordered by Brazil but was sold after they fell behind on paying the first installment.88 They 
also began negotiating with Armstrong for an armored cruiser in September, perhaps recalling an 
 
88 Brook, Warships, 83–84. 
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earlier recommendation from Armstrong to purchase a purpose-built 7,000-ton armored cruiser 
instead of modifying Esmeralda.89 
In the following year (March 1896), Armstrong laid down the armored cruiser O’Higgins 
for Chile. Like Garibaldi, O’Higgins was completed very quickly—the ship was launched in 
May 1897 and underwent its trials in April 1898. This happened even though there was a seven-
month engineering strike at the shipyard where it was being constructed, and a separate strike 
that affected the trials. Chilean stokers, training to take over the vessel when accepted by the 
Chilean Navy, were forced to fill in for firemen on strike during O’Higgins’ speed trials; they 
reportedly experienced “no difficulty” despite their unfamiliarity with the ship’s Belleville 
boilers.90 Designed by Phillip Watts, O’Higgins mounted a main battery of four eight-inch and a 
dozen secondary guns on a hull that displaced 8,500 tons.91 It would be the largest warship 
purchased during the arms race, surpassing Capitán Prat’s 6,900 tons.92 Although individually 
powerful, O’Higgins was the last major warship Chile would purchase for the next five years.93 
About a month after Chile’s order for O’Higgins, the Argentine government purchased 
another armored cruiser from the Italians. Named San Martin, the ship was a near-sister to 
Garibaldi, differing primarily in their main armament: San Martin carried four eight-inch guns, 
while Garibaldi carried two ten-inch.94 As before, Scheina writes that the exact series of 
intended actions are difficult to discern, given that San Martin’s purchase and O’Higgins’ order 
 
89 Scheina, Latin America, 48; Brook, Warships, 102–06. 
90 “Speed Trials of the Chilean Cruiser O’Higgins,” Engineer 85 (20 May 1898): 472; “The Chilean Cruiser 
‘O’Higgins,” Engineering 65 (27 May 1898): 662. This was not always the case with Chilean stokers, who suffered 
mishaps with Capitan Prat and Esmeralda (the source does not specify whether this refers to the older protected or 
newer armored Esmeralda). Rauch, Conflict, 148. 
91 Brook, Warships, 103–07; “The Chilean Cruiser ‘O’Higgins,” Engineering 65 (27 May 1898): 662. For additional 
details on O’Higgins’ gun mountings, see “Elswick Naval Mountings, No. III,” Engineer 89 (2 February 1900): 112. 
92 Lyon, “Chile,” 411. 
93 Scheina, Latin America, 298. 
94 “The Argentine Cruiser ‘General San Martin’,” Engineering 66 (15 July 1898): 74–75. 
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were placed so close together and that there would have been some amount of time spent 
negotiating beforehand.95 
Beginning in late 1897, the possibility of war between Chile and Argentina grew ever 
fiercer, driven by rumors of an anti-Chilean alliance between Argentina and Peru. While there 
was no such arrangement, the prospect of it—and Argentina’s lack of urgency in peacefully 
resolving negotiations on the southern borders between it and Chile—led Chile to prepare for 
war and reach for a solution to keep Peru out of any conflict.96 
The war scare grew sharply in intensity in May 1898, when the Chilean government 
learned that the Argentines were planning to purchase an additional Garibaldi-class cruiser from 
Italy. While the Chileans expressed anger at this move, believing that it was an inappropriate 
action to take while the two countries continued negotiating their southern border, the Argentine 
president replied that additional naval acquisitions were needed to soothe the Argentine public 
after Chile’s naval buildup. Not long after, the Chileans discovered that Argentina was also 
negotiating for a second armored cruiser, which would bring their total to four and put them in a 
position of decisive naval superiority over the Chileans.97 
These cruisers would be named Pueyrredon and General Belgrano, respectively.98 
Pueyrredon was completed within two months of being launched in July 1898, a truly 
remarkable turnaround time, accomplished after the Argentine government invested an 
 
95 Scheina, Latin America, 48. 
96 Robert N. Burr, By Reason of Force: Chile and the Balancing of Power in South America, 1830–1905 (Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press, 1965), 222–24. 
97 Ibid., 224–25. 
98 In addition to purchasing two different Italian cruisers named Giuseppe Garibaldi, described in footnote 82, 
Argentina also purchased two cruisers named Varese, which became San Martin and General Belgrano. These were 
constructed by Orlando, based in Livorno (Leghorn), rather than Ansaldo. Office of Naval Intelligence, Notes on 
Naval Progress, 93. 
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additional £30,000 over the shipyard’s asking price for the ship.99 Like San Martin, these ships 
differed in small respects from Garibaldi, their ostensible sister. Pueyrredon carried Belleville 
water-tube boilers, as opposed to the cylindrical boilers used on the original Garibaldi and 
Niclause boilers used on some of the Italian vessels of the class, and both Pueyrredon and 
General Belgrano carried additional six-inch guns in their secondary armament.100 Pueyrredon 
arrived in Argentina in September 1898, and General Belgrano followed two months later.101 
The arrival of these warships led to a sudden and dramatic change in the strategic naval 
calculations of both nations. The Argentine Navy now had a grand total of about 36,390 tons of 
armored warships, including the four Garibaldi-class cruisers, two Independencia-class coastal 
defense ships, and the 1880 central battery ironclad Almirante Brown. Chile had just 22,900 
across three ships, Capitán Prat, Esmeralda, and O’Higgins, only the latter of which was 
possibly superior on a one-for-one basis against the Garibaldis. If pressed, the Chileans could 
summon an additional 5,300 tons of armored warships: the twenty-five-year-old Almirante 
Cochrane, the remaining one of two central battery ironclads possessed by the country, and the 
famed if obsolete ironclad Huascar, captured from Peru in the War of the Pacific. Both were 
dated and of “limited fighting value” in 1898. In modern protected cruisers, the two countries 
were evenly matched, with Argentina’s three ships at 11,510 tons matching up against Chile’s 
four and 12,410.102 All in all, the Argentines had a clear naval superiority over their Chilean 
 
99 Scheina, Latin America, 49, 298; von Rauch, “Cruisers for Argentina,” 303–04. 
100 An Engineering contributor was skeptical that the boiler changes were beneficial, given that the final two 
members of the ship class reverted to cylindrical boilers. N. Soliani, “The Japanese Cruisers ‘Kasuga’ and 
‘Nisshin’,” Engineering 79 (21 April 1905): 504; Lyon, “Argentina,” in Gardiner, Chesneau, and Kolesnik, 
Conway’s 1860–1905, 403. More information about Niclause (also “Niclausse”) boilers is available in Mark 
Robinson, “The Niclausse Water-Tube Boiler,” Engineer 88 (22 September 1899): 307–08. 
101 Scheina, Latin America, 298. 
102 von Rauch, “Cruisers for Argentina,” 309. This paper counts the ships rather differently from von Rauch, adding 
General Belgrano into Argentina’s count and moving Esmeralda from the protected cruiser to armored ships 
category, matching how it was classified by contemporary publications like The Naval Annual even if there are 
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rivals: they possessed both more and newer ships than the Chileans, even if the latter’s ships 
were individually larger, and the seamen training gap had sharply narrowed.103 As early as 1895, 
the New York Times believed that Argentina would have been favored to win in any military 
conflict against Chile. If anything, their calculus would have shifted only farther onto the 
Argentine side three years later.104 
Facing down this threat, the Chileans sent Argentina a stark demand in September 1898 
for a firm answer to their request for British arbitration over the border question: “peace or 
war.”105 Wishing to avoid the latter, Argentine negotiators derived a compromise where their 
southern borders would be submitted to arbitration, while their dueling claims to the Puna de 
Atacama would be set aside for a later date. Chile signed onto this proposal on 22 September, 
and in November the presidents of the two countries hammered out a compromise that would 
likely end in a United States-drawn border, an outcome that was so positive that the Argentine 
and Chilean presidents symbolically met in the Strait of Magellan to declare that there would be 
“eternal peace” between the two countries. The agreement remained acceptable to both even 
after the American representative gave most of the disputed lands to Argentina but did not last.106 
 
legitimate questions about the true effectiveness of its armor belt. Lyon, “Argentina,” in Gardiner, Chesneau, and 
Kolesnik, Conway’s 1860–1905, 403; Lyon, “Chile,” in Gardiner, Chesneau, and Kolesnik, Conway’s 1860–1905, 
412; C.N. Robinson and John Leyland, “British and Foreign Armoured and Unarmoured Ships,” in The Naval 
Annual, ed. T.A. Brassey (London: William Clowes and Sons, 1899), 270, 276. The central battery ironclads of 
Argentina and Chile were showing their age by this point in their service lives, and the two countries dealt with this 
in different ways. Chile’s Almirante Cochrane had been rebuilt and modernized in 1889 but was converted to a 
gunnery training ship between 1897 and 1900, during which its armament was replaced with a lower number of 
smaller guns. This would have lessened the ship’s utility in battle, and likely contributed to von Rauch’s decision to 
list it as having “little fighting value.” Argentina’s Almirante Brown, on the other hand, was refitted in 1897 and 
1898 to carry a larger number of smaller but much more modern quick-firing weapons. Lyon, “Argentina,” in 
Gardiner, Chesneau, and Kolesnik, Conway’s 1860–1905, 402; Lyon, “Chile,” in Gardiner, Chesneau, and Kolesnik, 
Conway’s 1860–1905, 410. 
103 Rauch, Conflict, 148–49. 
104 “Two Republics May Fight,” New York Times, 19 May 1895, 21. 
105 “Chile Offers Peace or War,” New York Times, 5 May 1898, 7. 
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Over the next two years, Chile faced strong diplomatic headwinds, especially at the 
International American Congress, where deteriorating relations with Peru, Bolivia, and Chile led 
to potentially dangerous—from Chile’s point of view—conference proposals that in the end were 
only narrowly averted. By the beginning of 1902, an agreement that was intended to forestall 
conflicts was instead condemned in Argentina and Chile as “capitulation to the ‘enemy’.” 
Shortly thereafter, the Chilean congress voted to devote £3 million pounds to the expansion of 
their navy, and the naval race was back on.107 
By that time, however, both countries had been maneuvering for additional naval 
expansion for several months. Argentina began this round of the arms race by contracting for two 
more armored cruisers from Ansaldo on 23 December 1901, named Mariano Moreno and 
Bernardino Rivadavia.108 These would be built as improved versions of the Garibaldi class, 
coming in at nearly one thousand tons more displacement than the original Garibaldi purchased 
by Argentina. Despite the additional size and slightly increased length, they were broadly similar 
to the earlier members of the class.109 Unlike the previous Argentine members of the Garibaldi 
class, Mariano Moreno and Bernardino Rivadavia were ordered from scratch, as opposed to 
purchasing them while under construction for another nation—although the contract carried the 
familiar contractually obligated cash premium to Ansaldo if the ships were delivered in a short 
time period (in this case, twelve months) without delays.110  
 
107 Ibid., 240–43. 
108 Kathrin Milanovich, “Armored Cruisers of the Imperial Japanese Navy,” in Warship 2014, ed. John Jordan 
(London: Conway, 2014), 83–84. 
109 Soliani, “The Japanese Cruisers,” 504. 
110 Ibid.; Scheina, Latin America, 49. The chapter about Argentina in Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships 
1860–1905 would appear to agree with Scheina in stating that the ships were “ordered [by Argentina] from Ansaldo 
in 1901,” but the same book’s Japan chapter (written by a different author) claims that the ships were laid down for 
Italy, even receiving Italian names before the sale. Lyon, “Argentina,” in Gardiner, Chesneau, and Kolesnik, 
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Figure 2.3: The British battleship Swiftsure, purchased from Chile in 1903. 
 
Source: Bain News Service via the Library of Congress, no known restrictions on publication. 
https://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2014696954/. 
 
To counter these ships and Argentina’s growing naval superiority, Chile decided to 
acquire battleships, larger vessels that would in theory be more powerful than the many armored 
cruisers possessed by or under construction for Argentina. They first inquired with the United 
States to see if they would sell their three Indiana-class battleships for the price of one modern 
battleship. Scheina writes that this offer “showed a degree of desperation,” as even though the 
ships were only a few years old, the class had been designed for coastal defense and their 
problems in the open ocean had been widely recognized. Still, the United States declined to sell, 
 
A contemporary Engineering account catalogues all the Garibaldi cruisers, including their original names, and does 
not mention an Italian order for Moreno and Rivadavia. Soliani, “The Japanese Cruisers,” 504. 
     
31 
 
as their navy wished to retain as many battleships as possible until it could build and commission 
more of the type.111 
Instead, the Chilean government committed to purchasing two new capital warships 
based on plans drawn up by Edward Reed, the former Chief Constructor of the Admiralty. The 
Chilean Navy engaged Reed, who was traveling the country for what he said were health 
reasons, in late 1901 and asked him to sketch out designs for two fast battleships. Reed, working 
with the head of the Chilean Navy, came back with an ambitious plan for ships that would 
displace eleven thousand tons, sail at a maximum speed of nineteen knots, and mount a main 
battery of four ten-inch guns. Reed was compelled to keep the ships small, both to limit the total 
cost and allow the ships to be serviced by Chile’s largest drydock, located in Talcahuano. Reed 
went home to the United Kingdom in February 1902. After some modifications to the plans to 
accommodate Chile’s desire for additional 7.5 inch guns in the design’s secondary armament, the 
Chileans ordered one battleship each from Armstrong and Vickers on 26 February 1902, splitting 
the order in an effort to get the ships as quickly as possible.112 To pay for them, the Chilean 
government used part of the country’s sovereign gold reserve and redirected money from a loan 
that was originally given for improving Santiago’s sewage system—indicators of the arms race-
induced financial stress Chile found itself in, and the difficulty they were having in obtaining 
additional foreign loans.113  
 
111 Scheina, Latin America, 50. 
112 Brook, Warships, 130; R.A. Burt, British Battleships 1889–1904 (Barnsley, UK: Seaforth Publishing, 2013), 
294–95. Originally published 1988, revised and re-published in 2013. Burt includes an excerpt from a speech Reed 
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historiography. 
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Named Constitucion and Libertad, the design of these ships was criticized in the 
contemporary press, and not without some merit. As predicted in the Times, rough seas severely 
hampered the utility of the battleships’ secondary armament. This was in part a consequence of 
Chile’s desire for additional 7.5-inch guns, which forced Reed to locate most of those guns on 
the main deck rather than the upper. Still, the 11,000-ton displacement meant that they displaced 
about a third more than Argentina’s Garibaldi cruisers, and the extra space was used to carry 
heavier armament and armor while being able to steam at approximately the same speed.114 
The Chilean government also purchased Chacabuco during this time, another protected 
cruiser laid down on speculation by Armstrong, and three destroyers.115 Chacabuco appears to 
have waited for some amount of time before finding a buyer; launched in July 1899, it only 
underwent armament and speed trials in January 1902 after being purchased by Chile earlier that 
same month. Its genesis was even older, as it was slightly modified from a design which had 
originally been constructed for Japan in the early 1890s.116 
On the other side of the seesaw, the Argentine government moved to order two fifteen-
thousand-ton battleships from Ansaldo, to be delivered in fourteen months, and purchased six 
Nembo-class destroyers then under construction for the Italian Navy.117 The battleships, which 
 
114 Contemporary commentators also questioned whether the ships would be able to achieve their trial speed of 
twenty knots when in service, a concern which proved to be unfounded. Brook, Warships, 129–32. 
115 Rauch, Conflict, 184. 
116 Brook, Warships, 91–92. Rauch, Conflict, 184 describes Argentina’s order for Mariano Moreno and Bernardino 
Rivadavia as a response to Chacabuco, but the Argentine ships were ordered one month earlier. 
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dated to 19 April. This person wrote that the president of Argentina signed a contract with “an Italian firm of 
shipbuilders” (i.e. Ansaldo) for two fifteen-thousand-ton battleships on “the 28th ult.,” which refers to the end of 
March 1902. “Argentina; The Chilean Question,” Economist, 17 May 1902, 777. Scheina positions the battleship 
order as a response to Chile’s two battleships, like the others—but dates it to May 1901, even though the Chilean 
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were possibly scaled up designs from Italy’s Regina Margherita-class battleships, would have 
been among the largest in the world, and their main armament of twelve-inch guns would be 
larger than the ten-inch armed Chilean battleships.118 The planned delivery time was intended to 
get the battleships to Argentina in time to oppose their Chilean equals.119 
End of the arms race 
By the middle of 1902, Argentina was in a far stronger position vis a vis Chile for a litany 
of reasons. From a demographic perspective, Argentina’s population was larger and growing 
faster than Chile’s. By 1906, the former would have about five million people, far more than the 
latter’s estimated three million.120 From an economic perspective, a modern cross-country 
comparison of historical gross domestic product per capita puts Argentina far ahead of Chile 
throughout this period.121 Finally, from a military perspective, Argentina’s navy was both larger 
and of superior quality, while there were serious military questions about the true effectiveness 
of the Chilean Navy. On one side, Argentina could boast a mostly homogenous squadron of 
Garibaldi-class cruisers, which could steam at roughly the same speeds and mounted much of 
the same armament. On the other, most Chile’s warships had been built to unique designs, 
 
vessels were not designed by that date. This may have been a typo for 1902. Also contrary to other sources is 
Scheina’s contention that it is not known whether these ships were ordered or if it was only an inquiry intended as a 
shot across Chile’s bow. Scheina, Latin America, 50–51. 
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Chesneau, and Kolesnik, Conway’s 1860–1905. 
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complicating logistics and maintenance while making it more difficult to coordinate them in 
battle. In 1901, a leading Chilean naval journal decried this state of affairs, calling the country’s 
navy a “heterogeneous conglomeration of vessels which cannot respond to the tactical or 
strategic needs of the nation, and completely inferior to the Argentine fleet in regards to strength 
and quality.”122 Moreover, the experienced crews Chile had relied on to make up for quantitative 
inferiority had been diminished by the requirements of the country’s extreme naval expansion of 
the preceding decade. The number of navy personnel increased from about 1,700 in 1883 to over 
3,000 in 1894 and over 5,000 by 1901, with the new positions being filled in large part with new 
recruits.123 
Importantly, both Argentina and Chile were suffering under heavy foreign debt incurred 
in their zeal to obtain more and greater armaments, despite a Chilean cabinet member’s 
questionable protestation to the British minister that “its financial resources were intact.”124 
Between 1890 and 1902, the Argentine government spent US$258 million on its army and navy, 
a massive amount of money that came in no small part from foreign loans.125 The American 
ambassador in Argentina cabled home that these large debts were forcing the two countries to 
back away from their antagonistic arms race. “Both countries are largely in debt and confronted 
with a deficit,” he wrote, and adding that “neither is able to make a foreign loan without paying a 
high rate of interest and giving guarantee to meet the additional expense which their war policy 
is incurring.”126 Both the president of Argentina and the American ambassador to the country 
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123 Rauch, Conflict, 146–47. 
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would later credit the end of the arms race to the problems these debts created for each country’s 
international credit.127 
It was at this juncture that the United Kingdom—the primary trading partner to both 
Argentina and Chile, along with their principal creditor—stepped in.128 Their stake in averting a 
conflict in the region was clear to W.H.D. Haggard, a British diplomat, who wrote only a few 
years later that a conflict in the area would be a “national calamity,” since Britain’s extensive 
grain and meat imports from Argentina would be interrupted.129 Moreover, British companies 
had major stakes in Chile’s extensive and lucrative nitrate deposits.130 As of May 1902, there 
was £123 million in foreign capital invested in Argentina, and while Chile’s equivalent total was 
lower, it was still “considerable.”131 The British government’s efforts to end the arms race were 
led by Gerald Lowther, its new minister to Chile.132 Lowther joined tense negotiations in Chile’s 
capital with the president of the country, its foreign minister, and the Argentine ambassador to 
Chile, who was in close contact with his government via a telegraph line to Buenos Aires. 
Between them, they hammered out the Pacts of May, signed by Argentina and Chile on 28 May 
1902, ratified by their legislatures in July and August, and exchanged on 22 September. The 
three pacts that made up the agreement set spheres of influence for both countries, and the third 
pact focused exclusively on limited Argentina and Chile’s naval strength, with clauses that 
compelled them to: 
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• Halt any warship acquisitions in progress, a clause directed at the battleship orders 
and Argentina’s two latest armored cruisers 
• Reduce their fleet sizes until a “just balance” was established, something that would 
be accomplished in one year 
• To not acquire any naval armament in the next five years without giving eighteen 
months’ notice, a clause that applied to warships but explicitly excluded coastal 
fortifications or submarines, which were viewed as useful only in defense.133 
These restrictions were codified in the Naval Limitations Treaty of 9 January 1903 and 
adhered to by both parties. Argentina’s fifteen-thousand-ton battleships were canceled before 
construction ever began on them, and on 29 December 1903, they sold their final two armored 
cruisers to Japan, where they were renamed Nisshin and Kasuga. Both were utilized in the 
Russo-Japanese War.134 
In the same month, Chile’s battleships were sold to the United Kingdom, where they 
were renamed Swiftsure and Triumph. The British declined to purchase the ships when offered 
for £1,100,000, believing that their design made them impractical for service in the Royal Navy, 
but they reconsidered their position after Japan and Russia made offers of £1,600,000 and 
£1,870,000 (respectively). To avoid any worrying changes in the balance of naval power in the 
world, a theme that would be echoed a few years later with Brazil’s dreadnought order, the 
British decided to purchase the two battleships for £1,875,000.135 Playing the great game cost the 
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British treasury nearly £700,000 over the original asking price, and the outlay forced them to 
cancel plans to order a Minotaur-class armored cruiser and Lord Nelson-class battleship.136  
Brazil’s coup, revolts, and naval decline 
In 1875, fresh out of the Paraguayan War (1864–70), the Brazilian Navy boasted over 
sixty vessels, nineteen of which were armor-plated.137 They continued adding to this fleet with 
two steel-hulled ironclad battleships, Riachuelo and Aquidabã, in the mid-1880s.138 They would 
be the most powerful warships in the Americas for about a decade, when the United States 
finally commissioned battleships into its navy.139 Sharing a similar appearance, Riachuelo 
displaced several hundred more tons than Aquidabã and had two funnels to Aquidabã’s one. 
Both were armed with four 9.2-inch guns and a secondary armament of 5.5-inch guns.140 The 
striking power of these warships led Hilary A. Herbert—a staunch US naval proponent, member 
of the House of Representatives’ Naval Affairs Committee, and future Secretary of the Navy 
under President Grover Cleveland—to exclaim, perhaps hyperbolically: 
At sea, against any of our vessels or all of them, she [Riachuelo] could choose absolutely 
her own distance for battle. It is humiliating to say it, but if all this old navy of ours were 
drawn up in battle array in mid-ocean and confronted by the Riachuelo it is doubtful 
whether a single vessel bearing the American flag would get into port. And if in the 
melee and the chase which followed some ship by leaving its fellows should escape into 
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port, the Brazilian could follow and destroy it under the guns of any fort we have. We 
have not even a safe harbor of refuge for a fleeing vessel.141 
 
This period of superiority did not last long, as the Brazilian Navy was subsequently 
hamstrung by domestic conflicts. In 1889, military officers deposed the long-time emperor Pedro 
II, an action that set off much unrest over the following decade. Importantly, this included a 
major naval revolt in 1893–94, where a number of politicians and most of the navy’s experienced 
officers took control of the naval units in Rio de Janeiro and turned their guns on the army-led 
republican government.142 They failed to win the war, and lost their largest warship (Aquidabã) 
to a torpedo fired by a government-controlled torpedo boat.143 Losing the conflict led to a 
backlash against the rebel service, what one historian has called a “decade of isolation,” after it 
was re-integrated into the newly born republic.144 At least one attempt to bolster the navy during 
this time fell victim to the more powerful army, which had “no faith” in the navy’s loyalty to the 
republic.145 A Brazilian naval officer would later state that the navy had suffered because of its 
pervasive “anti-Republican sentiment,” alongside general monetary problems then affecting the 
entire government, although there is evidence that Brazil’s commitment to its navy was less than 
full-throated even before the rebellion.146 
 These complications severely impacted the navy’s importance, funding, and readiness.147 
Indicative of this decline, the navy was able to fill only 45 percent of its manning requirements in 
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1896, down from 98 percent just a few years earlier.148 Meanwhile, the Brazilian Navy’s 
combined tonnage quickly fell behind the fleets of its far less populous counterparts in the 
Southern Cone. Thanks to Argentina’s and Chile’s naval arms race, the Chilean Navy possessed 
about 36,900 long tons in total warship tonnage; Argentina followed with about 34,400, and 
Brazil came last with 28,700.149 These tonnage figures, though a quick way of comparing navies 
during this time, hide another problem Brazil’s navy faced: its once-modern warships were by 
now generally older than their foreign counterparts, and were quickly being rendered obsolescent 
by rapid improvements in naval technology. These advances were one reason why Chile had sold 
the protected cruiser Esmeralda, built shortly before Brazil’s ironclad battleships and once 
proclaimed as “the swiftest and most powerfully-armed cruiser in the world,” barely more than a 
decade after it was built.150 By the turn of the century, Brazil’s only modern armored vessels 
were two coast-defense ships, Deodoro and Floriano, both launched in 1898. Scientific 
American regarded them as diminutive vessels of a type “built only for second-rate naval 
powers,” featuring a low speed but heavy armament and armor for their size.151 Size was an 
important qualifier, as while Deodoro and Floriano were indeed well-armed, their displacement 
was a mere 3,100 tons—not much more than half that of Riachuelo, and less than half of 
Argentina’s Garibaldi class.152  
The Brazilians hoped to alleviate some of this technological gap by modernizing and 
refitting Riachuelo and Aquidabã, the latter of which was raised after being sunk in the naval 
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revolt. They did this first in the 1890s, when both ships were sent to Europe, where they had 
heavy “tower-like military masts” fitted. These were unsuccessful additions, and their removal in 
1904 meant that the ships were more stable and their belt armor would no longer be submerged 
beneath the waterline—an extremely useful feature in keeping a fighting ship afloat in battle.153 
Aquidabã then blew up and sank in 1906, taking 212 people (including four rear admirals) with 
it.154  
As the new century passed, the neglect of Brazil’s navy was readily apparent to foreign 
observers, and British diplomats stationed in the country were unstinting in their criticism. In 
1906, Britain’s acting consul-general in Rio de Janeiro cabled home that the Brazilian Navy was 
“markedly inferior” in both quantity and quality to Argentina, and that the entire “existing Navy 
of Brazil may be said to be entirely obsolete and out of date.”155 Another diplomat added that the 
fleet was “composed … of old units which have been lying for years in the Bay in a sorry state,” 
and Haggard, the newly installed British minister to Brazil, added in his 1906 annual report that 
the force was still “very weak,” and their ship’s “usual fate has been to lie and rot.”156 Conditions 
improved slightly in the years after 1906 as the navy brought on European-trained officers and 
began limited exercises, but the force’s material condition remained old.157 In 1909, Milne 
Cheetham, the British chargés d'affaires in Rio de Janeiro when Haggard was absent, called out 
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the navy’s “feebleness” and its ships as being “very poor,” and an anonymous Brazilian naval 
officer in the Times characterized the majority of his “antiquated” ships as “fit for scrapping.”158  
José Paranhos, the Baron of Rio Branco and Brazil’s esteemed foreign minister from 
1902 to 1912, summed up his dismay at the state of affairs: “In such conditions, you … 
understand how upset I am and all the worries I have. All that still protects us is the moral force 
and old prestige that is still left from already old times, when there was still foresight in this 
land.”159
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Brazil’s dreadnought ambitions 
In the first decade of the twentieth century, Brazilian politicians and aristocrats, led by 
the Baron of Rio Branco, began an ambitious attempt to turn their nation into an international 
power and the regional hegemon, capable of enforcing an end to border disputes and dissuading 
imperialist foreign aggressors.160 They believed that their goal was achievable because the 
country was flush with export revenue stemming from its rubber boom and coffee economy. At 
the time, it was producing upwards of three-quarters of the world’s coffee, and the country was 
“growing rich at a remarkable rate,” in the words of the Christian Science Monitor.161 On top of 
this new-found wealth, Brazil’s governing elites trusted that the turmoil, instability, and domestic 
conflict of recent years had come to an end, giving them the stability they needed to build up 
their nation.162 
Increasing the strength of the Brazilian military, especially the navy, was a crucial step in 
achieving Rio Branco’s goal.163 As historian James F. Siekmeier writes, “Throughout history … 
a more powerful navy was a sine qua non [an essential condition] for building a more powerful 
nation.”164 Chronologically, any military expansion would build upon other recent international 
prestige-boosting events, including the visit of the United States Great White Fleet in 1906, 
Senator Rui Barbosa’s acclaimed performance at the Hague Convention of 1907, and an 
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anticipated state visit from the King of Portugal, although he would be assassinated before he 
could make the journey.165  
The Brazilian government made informal contact with the Brazil-based agents of the 
British shipbuilder Armstrong Whitworth as early as November 1903, when the Brazilians 
received a list of proposals for coast defense ships and armored cruisers from Armstrong. Some 
of these designs were based on the ex-Chilean Swiftsure and the Norwegian Norge. The 
discussions continued into August 1904, when Armstrong sent two additional armored cruiser 
designs. However, when it came to the question of how the new Brazilian Navy should be built 
out, the country’s political and military establishments were divided along two widely different 
schools of thought. One faction desired a navy centered around a small number of large and 
heavily armed warships, which would incidentally further Brazil’s international diplomacy in 
areas like showing the flag abroad. The other wanted a larger number of smaller warships, able 
to negotiate Brazil’s extensive green water holdings with ease.166 
The small-ship faction initially proved victorious, as on 14 December 1904, the National 
Congress of Brazil allocated funds for the acquisition of twenty-eight warships, including three 
battleships, three armored cruisers, six destroyers, twelve torpedo boats, three submarines, and a 
transport ship.167 The Brazilians sent out invitations to bid to construct these warships quickly, 
and asked interested shipbuilders to submit their proposals to Rothschilds, Brazil’s powerful 
financial backers, by February 1905. Rothschilds duly forwarded the tenders on 9 February, and 
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Armstrong and Vickers, the only two private naval gun manufacturers in Britain, partnered to 
submit a joint bid for the battleships (Armstrong) and armored cruisers (Vickers). This maneuver 
ensured that all the other shipbuilders in the country would be unable to construct the ships. By 
July 1905, however, the Brazilian Navy decided against purchasing any armored cruisers and 
asked Armstrong to offer a new sole tender for the battleships and come up with new battleship 
designs.168 
A year passed as the Brazilian Navy selected a design and haggled over small details, and 
on 23 July 1906, the navy minister Júlio César de Noronha, a proponent of the small-ship 
philosophy, signed a £4.8 million contract with John Meade Falkner, a director at Armstrong and 
future chairman of the company, for three thirteen thousand ton battleships.169 These ships, 
which were enlarged to over fourteen thousand tons shortly after the contract’s signing, would 
have carried the unusual main armament of twelve ten-inch guns and steam at a maximum speed 
of nineteen knots.170 
Noronha’s warships were, however, doomed. First, the small-ship faction lost a number 
of its adherents in a January 1906 powder magazine explosion aboard Aquidabã, one of Brazil’s 
two ironclad battleships acquired in the mid-1880s. Aquidabã had been carrying several high-
ranking members of a commission tasked with examining the locations proposed for a new naval 
arsenal, and three rear-admirals and most of the officers onboard were among the over two 
hundred people killed. Noronha was present but unhurt, as he had been traveling on the cruiser 
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Barroso.171 Second, even though seven thousand tons of construction material had been gathered 
by the end of 1906 and two of the battleships’ keels were laid, the Royal Navy’s Dreadnought 
caused the newly elected Brazilian government of Afonso Pena—influenced by its new navy 
minister Alexandrino Faria de Alencar—to discard the previous administration’s naval order in 
favor of three warships of the new “dreadnought” type.172 Alencar, a senator, admiral, and large-
ship adherent, held a dream of making Brazil “the naval power in South America.”173 
Dreadnought was the first battleship to feature an all-big-gun armament of twelve-inch 
guns, as opposed to the older practice of mounting two to four large and upwards of eight 
medium guns. It also utilized the first steam turbines mounted inside a capital warship to reach a 
top speed of twenty-one knots, three knots faster than the previous standard.174 Dreadnought 
“was so daringly modern, so imposing to the eye and so threatening of men that she impressed 
the whole world,” as one widely published American newspaper editorial put it, and its 
revolutionary potential was such that another publication said that its “advent made every one of 
the older ships obsolete … for the Dreadnought could choose her range and blow any ship afloat 
out of the water.”175 Contemporary sources speculate that the Brazilian Navy was also influenced 
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by the results of the Russo-Japanese War and the decisive Japanese victory at the Battle of 
Tsushima, where British naval analysts judged that the fleet’s largest guns decided the battle.176 
The Brazilian legislature officially sanctioned Alencar’s efforts in December 1906 by 
allowing the administration to modify the naval modernization program as they saw fit, just so 
long as the cost of the modifications not surpass that of the original planned outlay.177 Armstrong 
began disassembling months of work on 7 January 1907, and Alencar signed a new contract with 
them on 20 February for the purchase of three dreadnoughts, of which two would be built 
immediately.178 As a condition of the sale, the Brazilian government sent Armstrong £1.7 million 
as a security deposit, or what Haggard called “caution money.”179  
Alencar’s new naval program, which replaced the one passed in 1904, called for a total of 
twenty-six new warships at a cost of £8 million.180 This would represent an extreme expansion in 
the capability and size of the Brazilian Navy; Alencar estimated that the navy’s total gross 
displacement would jump from 14,000 to 93,594 tons.181 Beyond the flagship dreadnoughts, the 
program now called for three scout cruisers, fifteen destroyers, three submarines, and two 
auxiliary vessels. Scout cruisers were smaller than armored cruisers with less armament and 
more speed, while destroyers were larger than torpedo boats.182 Two of these cruisers and ten 
destroyers would be built first, with the rest to follow. Ideally, the dreadnoughts, scout cruisers, 
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and destroyers would deploy in up to two separate fleet units, where one dreadnought would be 
escorted by one cruiser and five destroyers. In battle, the scout cruiser would serve as the fleet’s 
primary reconnaissance platform and help drive off enemy destroyers, while the destroyers 
would screen the larger ships. Neither would have to deal with enemy torpedo boats, as for most 
countries, the small vessels would not be able to make a long-distance voyage to Brazil.183 
Figure 3.1: The Brazilian cruiser Bahia, ordered alongside the dreadnoughts. 
 
Source: Brazilian Navy via Flickr. CC BY-SA 2.0. 
https://www.flickr.com/photos/mboficial/34864419556/. 
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The Brazilian government also contracted with Vickers in August 1909 for a large 
floating drydock, which would be named Affonso Penna.184 Measuring about 550 feet long and 
able to hold vessels that had a one hundred foot beam and a thirty foot draft, the drydock was 
specifically intended to hold the Minas Geraes-class dreadnoughts so that the Brazilian Navy 
could conduct routine maintenance and make repairs to its new ships.185 Affonso Penna was one 
of the largest such floating drydocks in the world at its completion, being surpassed only by two 
such docks in Germany.186 Mesrs. Smit and Company, based out of Rotterdam and which had 
specialized tugboats for transporting floating drydocks, towed it from the United Kingdom to 
Brazil from 4 July to 29 September 1910, where it was stationed in Guanabara Bay in the 
channel between the islands of Governador and Boqueirão. Boqueirão contained the Brazilian 
Navy’s major arsenal in Rio de Janeiro.187  
Possessing this docking facility was crucial for the future viability of the dreadnoughts, as 
in the words of a British naval officer assessing the state of South American navies in 1908, the 
new ships would “soon be useless” without one. While Brazil had existing land-based naval 
facilities, particularly in Rio de Janeiro, the dreadnoughts would be unable to utilize them: they 
were too small to accommodate a dreadnought and were in any case, according to the same 
officer, “handicapped by the presence of ancient machines, docks, and ships which are of little 
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use for modern vessels, and are expensive to remove.”188 The Brazilian Navy eventually 
commissioned a French firm to address the inadequacies in their land-based infrastructure.189 
The Brazilian Navy would name their dreadnoughts Minas Geraes and São Paulo, 
respectively; the third dreadnought would become Rio de Janeiro. The names honored the most 
powerful states of Brazil, which not coincidentally were the three major coffee-producing states 
within the country.190 The beginning of construction on these dreadnoughts made Brazil the third 
country in the world to have such vessels under construction.191 Suddenly, professional naval 
journals began listing Brazil alongside acknowledged naval powers like the United Kingdom, 
Germany, Japan, and the United States.192 “By good fortune and the enthusiastic co-operation of 
her British suppliers,” maritime historian Richard Hough would later write, “Brazil thus found 
herself at the head of the hastily-formed international queue for Dreadnoughts.”193  
In a 1909 report to the president of Brazil, Alencar stated that his changes saved the 
Brazilian treasury almost £1 million, and that Minas Geraes’ cost-per-ton came in lower than the 
original Dreadnought.194 As time passed, however, several of his planned ships fell by the 
wayside. The two dreadnoughts, two cruisers, and ten destroyers were launched or delivered by 
1910, and the third dreadnought, three submarines, and one of the two auxiliary ships were built 
later; all the rest would eventually be canceled.195 
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International reactions to Brazil’s dreadnoughts 
In 1909, a writer for the Philadelphia Inquirer opined that historians looking back on the 
twentieth century would call its first decade the “Dreadnought Era.”196 Another contemporary 
commentator remarked that the world had been consumed by “dreadnought mania.”197 
These were not hyperbolic assessments, as the warship type rapidly became a symbol of 
national prestige and a primary concern in international diplomacy, politics, and naval strategy in 
the years preceding the First World War. The rise of the dreadnought in these areas stemmed 
from the contemporary perception of the power that they embodied. A dreadnought’s main 
batteries gave any navy the overwhelming offensive advantage of being able “to strike first and 
to strike with crushing effect,” something which represented a “revolution” in how nations 
prepared for future wars at sea.198 This worked both ways. In a sort of precursor to the mutually 
assured destruction doctrine, dreadnoughts could also be the cornerstone upon which a country’s 
maritime defenses were built, so long as the range of their guns could match and deter those 
carried by a dreadnought of a foreign power. As one historian has written, “dreadnoughts were 
generally considered the final guarantee against seaborne aggression.”199 It did not take long for 
press outlets to start using dreadnoughts, and the armament they mounted, as a convenient 
method for comparing navies against each other.200 
These conditions fostered a tense and charged political climate which fed into global 
reactions to Brazil’s contract signing, especially in naval journals and major newspapers. “Never 
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has the Navy of a minor power loomed so large on the international horizon as that of Brazil 
during the past year,” proclaimed the 1908–09 edition of Britain’s Navy League Annual. “This 
nation has had the audacity to order (not merely to ‘project’; this is done monthly by many 
insignificant powers) three warships equal in fighting value to anything afloat or building.”201 
Similarly, the long-running magazine Engineer frankly stated that “few, if any, foreign ships in 
recent years have attracted so much attention as the Dreadnoughts from Brazil.”202 The 
international press began reporting on the order in March 1907, while details of the full purchase 
were widely reported in July and August.203 
To compare dreadnoughts to others from their own or other nations, press outlets from 
the era typically examined armament, speed, armor, and size. These traits were related by what 
naval historian Norman Friedman calls the “squeeze”—on a given displacement, emphasizing 
one factor, like armament, could only come at the expense of one or both other factors, which in 
this scenario would be speed and armor.204 
 These “on paper” measurements led several press outlets and journals to anoint Minas 
Geraes as “the most powerful warship ever built for any navy” and “the most powerfully armed 
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the displacement, a trend rapidly employed in the years after Dreadnought appeared, but it became a serious 
constraint in battleship design once again during the interwar period thanks to the tonnage limits imposed by the 
Washington and London naval treaties. Norman Friedman, Battleship Design and Development, 1905–1945 (New 
York: Mayflower Books, 1978), 20–22, 168–69, 172–73. 
    
52 
 
warship afloat,” devoting particularly high praise to its “outstanding” armament.205 This came in 
part because of Minas Geraes’ specifications when contrasted against Britain’s Dreadnought. 
Brazil’s new warships were designed to displace around 19,500 long tons, carry twelve twelve-
inch guns in six twin turrets, have nine-inch belt armor, and steam at twenty-one knots with triple 
expansion engines. Ten of the guns could fire on a broadside.206 Dreadnought, on the other hand, 
displaced about eighteen thousand tons, carried ten twelve-inch guns (only eight of which could 
fire on a broadside), had eleven-inch armor, and steamed at the same twenty-one knots with 
steam turbines. Later British battleships designed and laid down contemporaneously with Minas 
Geraes mounted the same ten main guns.207 
Armament was frequently the chief determiner of a ship’s perceived power, especially in 
non-specialist press, and so mounting a higher than average firepower at the expense of one or 
more other attributes was a deliberate choice made by several minor navies of the time. In the 
case of Minas Geraes, the attribute that suffered was armor.208 What was novel about the 
Brazilian design was that it called for “superfiring” turrets, where one turret was placed above 
and behind another turret. This arrangement allowed more turrets to fit on a shorter hull, but at 
the time was wholly untested in Britain.209 
 
205 “On paper” and “most powerful warship” come from “Launch Greatest Warships,” New York Times, 11 
September 1908, 5; “outstanding” and “powerfully armed” come from “The Brazilian Battleship ‘Minas Geraes’.” 
Scientific American 102, no. 12 (19 March 1910): 241. 
206 “The Brazilian Battleship ‘Minas Geraes’,” Engineering 86 (11 September 1908): 352; Breyer, Battleships, 320–
21. Broadsides were the areas perpendicular to the middle of the ship where the majority of a battleship’s guns could 
be fired. Triple expansion engines were installed instead of the newer steam turbines because the Brazilian Navy 
was more familiar with the former. “Trials of the Sao Paulo,” Navy (Washington) 4, no. 5 (July 1910): 29. 
207 Breyer, Battleships, 115, 119–126. See also the introduction’s footnote 28. In fact, the next six post-Dreadnought 
British battleships mounted ten 12-inch guns. This changed only with the Orion class super-dreadnoughts, 
commissioned in 1912 with ten 13.5-inch guns. 
208 Friedman, Battleship Design, 21. 
209 J.R. Perrett, “Some Notes on Warships Designed and Constructed by Sir WG Armstrong, Whitworth, & Co, 
Ltd,” Mechanical Engineer 34, no. 867 (4 September 1914): 212. The use of superfiring armament in the Minas 
Geraes design was questioned due to a pervading belief that guns in the upper turrets would interfere with, if not 
injure, the crew operating the lower turret. This theory was tested and disproved during Minas Geraes’ trials. See the 
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Figure 3.2: Diagram depicting the Minas Geraes class’ main armament. 
 




The press played a key role in driving speculation about the Brazilian dreadnoughts. 
Military-focused journals were quick to declare that such ships were for sale if even one payment 
in a series of scheduled installments was missed, and within these articles, “ingenious 
paragraphs” would be “inserted to show that if any Government refuses to buy, a rival will cut in 
and secure the ship and turn the balance of power.” This had the effect of driving higher bids 
and, presumably, higher journal sales.210 For the two Minas Geraes-class dreadnoughts, the press 
entertained the possibilities that Brazil was planning to sell the warships as soon as they were 
completed and left Britain or had been recruited to serve as a proxy for a traditional naval power 
to protect their identity. The predicted destinations of the dreadnoughts were most frequently 
cited as Britain, Germany, the United States, and Japan; these can be viewed as stemming from 
two separate schools of thought. With Britain and Germany locked in a major naval arms race, 
rumors that the Brazilian vessels would go to one or the other were inevitably linked. There were 
 
chapter on “Constructing and testing the dreadnoughts” along with “The New Brazilian 
Battleships,” Times (London), 22 January 1910, 16f. Still, the innovativeness of this feature was rather undercut by 
the addition of two wing turrets, which were situated near the side of the ship. See figure 3.2. These quickly fell into 
obsolescence because of the stress their location placed on ship’s hulls and their inability to fire to both sides of the 
ship. Superfiring, on the other hand, was used on all full-sized battleships finished during or after the First World 
War. Friedman, Battleship Design, 132–34. 
210 “The Brazilian Dreadnought and the Naval Missions,” Economist, 3 January 1914, 6. 
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similar suspicions between the United States and Japan, which naval analysts believed were 
natural rivals for dominance over the Pacific Ocean.211  
One of the first shots was fired in an American naval journal. Writing at the tail-end of 
1907, the anonymous Berlin correspondent for the Navy, the journal of the Navy League of the 
United States, noted that there was “little doubt” in the country that the ships were destined for 
Britain. Colonial undertones appeared as well: “It appears somewhat improbable,” the 
contributor wrote, “that a minor naval power such as Brazil actually intends to saddle herself 
with such leviathans.” In their view, Brazil’s current navy could adequately defend its coast 
against any likely adversary.212 The same individual returned to the subject months later to 
debunk theories that Germany would purchase the ships after they left British waters, since the 
High Seas Fleet was built on inter-ship homogeneity. Instead, he again speculated that Britain 
was the real conspirator.213 
None of the rumors subsided until the ships were delivered and commissioned into the 
Brazilian Navy, especially conjecture that the British would be unable to avoid acquiring them. 
These views persisted in part because some British Members of Parliament (MP) fretted over the 
naval balance of power between Britain and Germany.214 This fear caused them to inquire about 
the Brazilian dreadnoughts with the aim of ensuring that the warships would not be purchased by 
a nation hostile to Britain, particularly Germany, which would disrupt the Admiralty’s carefully 
laid plans.215 In the midst of a multitude of Brazilian dreadnought-related press rumors in July 
1908, MP Arthur Lee, a future First Lord of the Admiralty, emphasized the danger he thought 
 
211 Fiennes, “Dreadnoughts for Sale or Hire,” 210. 
212 “British–Brazilian Warships,” Navy (Washington) 2, no. 1 (January 1908): 11–12. 
213 “The German Fleet,” Navy (Washington) 2, no. 6 (July 1908): 14. 
214 E.g. “Lord Fisher on British Naval Supremacy,” Times (London), 28 April 1908, 11d. 
215 “Naval Policy,” Times (London), 24 March 1908, 6e; “Battleships for Brazil,” Times (London), 12 May 1908, 4d. 
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Britain could be in. “A sudden and unexpected addition of three dreadnoughts to the fighting 
strength of any first-class naval power,” he stated, “would completely upset the balance upon 
which our shipbuilding programmes were constructed.”216 
In response, Reginald McKenna, the First Lord of the Admiralty, stated with care that the 
government had a “considerable interest” in the ships’ eventual disposition and that while “it did 
not seem likely that Brazil could be launching into a navy of such a size that would require three 
boats of this magnitude … the Government had not the slightest reason to suppose that the ships 
were being built with any hostile purpose to this country.”217 
The British held that “considerable interest” because of dangerous possibilities like those 
entertained by Gerard Fiennes, a British journalist, naval expert, and future author of books on 
sea power. Fiennes projected that by March 1912, the addition of Brazil’s three dreadnoughts to 
Germany’s navy would give it near-parity in dreadnoughts with Britain. If Austria-Hungary’s 
three projected dreadnoughts joined with Germany, the combined forces would have one more 
dreadnought and forty-two more heavy guns than Britain. Integrating the Brazilian ships would 
be a challenge, as they had significant design differences from both navy’s standard practices—
especially for the Imperial German Navy, which would have to find a way to design and 
manufacture ammunition for the British-made guns—but Fiennes theorized that if war seemed 
near, the ships would be too difficult to resist.218 “‘Dreadnoughts for sale or hire’ in the hands of 
 
216 “The Warships for Brazil,” Times (London), 14 July 1908, 8c. 
217 “The Brazilian Ships,” Times (London), 12 July 1908, 8d. 
218 Fiennes, “Dreadnoughts for Sale or Hire,” 210–12. Of note, however, is a critique of this specific article by Milne 
Cheetham, the British chargés d'affaires in Rio de Janeiro when Haggard was absent. Cheetham thought the notion 
that Brazil ordered the ships to sell later was ludicrous: “The navy has always been prominent in Brazilian history, 
and I think it is fantastic to suppose that the iron-clads were ordered to be realized later, or with the idea that the 
fleets of the world would be so evenly balanced in the future that the desire for a Brazilian alliance, or the 
acquisition of her ships, would enable Brazil to exact important political advantages in the event of an imminent 
naval conflict.” Cheetham to Grey, 23 August 1908, no. 80, TNA, FO 420/247. 
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minor States are … no inconsiderable menace to the country which lives by sea power,” he 
would later write.219 Newspapers like the London Express therefore concluded that Britain, 
“driven by naval necessity,” would purchase the ships before they left the country.220  
By 1909, however, the British frontbench in Parliament remained unworried about the 
Brazilian dreadnoughts. In March, McKenna publicized fresh details of Germany’s dreadnought 
program, most notably that the Germans would have four more than previously thought. 
Considering this news, Members of Parliament once again debated the merits of obtaining the 
Brazilian ships. McKenna officially denied that the government would attempt any purchase.221 
“If we need more ships … it would be better to build them ourselves,” he stated to the House of 
Commons, “but we don’t require any more at present.”222 When asked if the Admiralty had 
contingency plans in case the Brazilian ships were sold to another nation, McKenna replied to 
cheers that “our present superiority in strength in 1909–10 is so great that no alarm need be 
created.”223 
Across the Atlantic Ocean, newspapers and journals ascribed, as the Brazilian minister to 
Britain later called it, “ulterior designs” to Brazil’s plans.224 In a widely cited report, the New 
York Herald declared in July 1908 that the ships would be destined for the United States or, as 
emblazoned in the headline, for Japan. “As regards the destination of the battleships, one thing 
seems regarded as certain,” their naval correspondent breathlessly wrote: 
 
219 Gerard Fiennes, “Foreign Navies and the War,” in The Navy League Annual, ed. Robert Yerburgh (London: John 
Murray, 1916), 64. 
220 “Mysterious Warships,” Auckland Star, 12 September 1908, 5. 
221 “The Brazilian Battleships,” Times (London), 23 March 1909, 6d; “House of Commons,” Times (London), 23 
March 1909, 12a; “The Brazilian Battleships,” Times (London), 25 March 1909, 7b; “The Naval Scare,” Sydney 
Mail, 24 March 1909, 24. 
222 “England's Power on the Sea Safe,” New York Herald, 25 March 1909, 9f. 
223 “The Brazilian Battleships,” Times (London), 25 March 1909, 7b. 
224 “Brazil; Rapid Brazilian Construction,” Navy (Washington) 3, no. 4 (April 1909): 39. 
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They will not leave here under the Brazilian ensign and that they will not pass to any 
Power likely to be hostile to Great Britain. They are not required nor desired for the 
British navy, but it is generally stated that if a friend of Great Britain does not buy them 
Great Britain will. The friend will not be France and will not be Russia, which has not yet 
succeeded in paying for the Rurik, which fine cruiser is for sale. They will not, it is 
obvious, be allowed to go to Germany. They differ too much from the Italian design to be 
destined for Italy. 
 
By a process of exclusion, therefore, it seems obvious that their destination is with us or 
Japan.225 
 
Presumably related rumors added that any transfer to Japan would be facilitated by a secret 
agreement with Brazil, but only one month later, contributors to the New York Times alleged that 
the dreadnoughts were destined for the United Kingdom or Germany—the latter at a going rate 
of $30 million.226 London’s Daily Express claimed to have “definite” evidence that British 
authorities would purchase the Brazilian dreadnoughts.227 New York’s The Sun thought the 
British would never let the ships go to Germany, but would allow a transfer to Japan.228 The 
problem with this scenario, however, was that the British would have no way to disallow a 
transfer to any power once the dreadnoughts left the United Kingdom. To solve this, London’s 
The Spectator advocated for a British–Brazilian treaty which would give the British the first 
option to purchase the ships at a cost premium should the Brazilian Navy decide to sell them 
within the first five years of their service lives. “Treaties, however, are always uncertain,” the 
magazine continued. “Perhaps a wiser plan would be, in calculating the force which would give 
 
225 “Giant Ships for England or Japan,” New York Herald, 1 July 1908, 9a. Other outlets picked up on this line of 
reporting, such as “Japan To Acquire Brazil Warships,” Christian Science Monitor 9 July 1909, 8, or republished the 
Herald’s reporting, such as “Brazil Japan’s Catspaw?,” Washington Post, 2 July 1908, 3. 
226 “Germany May Buy English Warships,” New York Times, 9 August 1908, C8. 
227 “Brazil’s Ships for Britain; Now Reported That New Dreadnoughts Are for England, Not Japan,” New York 
Times, 17 July 1908, 1. 
228 “Brazil, Japan, and Great Britain,” Sun (New York), 1 July 1908, 6.  
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us absolute security, to reckon purchasable capital ships as part of the force which we must 
always be prepared to defeat.”229 
If they were sold to Japan, a treaty-bound ally of the United Kingdom, International 
Marine Engineering noted that the Minas Geraes class’ offensive capabilities could increase the 
broadside weight of the Japanese Navy’s battle line by nearly one-third, although The Engineer’s 
critical analysis of their defensive features led them to believe that they were “not suitable for 
European conditions” because of their armor, which was thinner than contemporary European 
dreadnoughts.230 Fiennes, the British naval expert, predicted that a Japanese or American 
acquisition of the Brazilian ships would upset the naval balance of power in the Pacific.231 
Outside the established naval powers, Hüseyin Hilmi Pasha, the Grand Vizier of the Ottoman 
Empire, declared that his country could purchase them.232  
Other newspapers and journals tried to shoot down these ubiquitous contentions. The San 
Francisco Chronicle opined that the Japanese government would be “fools” to arm for war 
against the United States at a time when there were vulnerable European colonies close by, ripe 
for the taking. Others pointed out the economic ties binding Brazil to the United States, which 
they believed would prevent the former from committing “commercial suicide” to cavort with 
Japan, the United States’ most likely future foe.233 Brazil’s largest customer for the product was 
 
229 “News of the Week,” The Spectator 101 (18 July 1908): 78. At the end of 1912, the British Foreign Office 
reached out to the Ottoman ambassador in the hope of obtaining a very similar arrangement—that if the Ottomans 
decided to sell Reşadiye, a modified King George V class super-dreadnought, in the first four years of its service life, 
the British would be given the first crack at purchasing it. Halpern, Mediterranean Naval Situation, 333–34. 
230 “The Brazilian Battleships,” International Marine Engineering 13, no. 8 (1908): 362–63; “The Status of South 
American Navies,” Journal of the American Society of Naval Engineers 21, no. 1 (1909): 256–57 (reprinted from 
Engineer). 
231 Fiennes, “Dreadnoughts for Sale or Hire,” 211. 
232 “Brazil’s Dreadnoughts,” Christian Science Monitor, 12 July 1909, 12. 
233 “Mystery of the Brazilian ‘Dreadnoughts’,” Literary Digest 37, no. 30 (1908): 102–03.  
    
59 
 
the United States, which consumed nearly five hundred thousand tons of coffee beans in 1907, 
and the principal source of the Brazilian government’s revenue was coffee.234 
Figure 3.3: Minas Geraes at speed, c. 1909–10. 
 
Source: “The Brazilian Battleship ‘Minas Geraes’,” Scientific American 102, no. 12 (19 March 
1910): 240. Public domain. 
 
Curiously, little of this coverage referred to the fiasco of Brazil’s coffee ‘valorization’ 
scheme, where Brazil’s three major coffee-producing states planned to buy up massive surpluses 
in their major cash crop at above market value in the expectation that prices would rise. When 
problems arose in the arrangement, two backed out, but the state of São Paulo continued, taking 
out massive loans to do so. Unfortunately for them, the price of coffee did not rise—in fact, it 
 
234 Haggard to Grey, “Brazil: Annual Report, 1907,” 5, TNA, FO 118/281. 
    
60 
 
fell—and in 1908, Brazil’s federal government was forced to offer São Paulo a multi-million-
pound guaranteed loan to cover their commitments.235 
Contemporary commentators skeptical of Brazil’s intentions instead focused their 
questions on the country’s strategic need for such ships, principally based on its “insignificant” 
status in the global hierarchy.236 W.H.D. Haggard, the British minister to Brazil and a consistent 
critic of Brazil’s naval expansionism, attributed the battleship orders to the nation’s “vanity” and 
“jealousy” in relation to its southern neighbor; to him, the entire venture was a “pure waste of 
money.”237 Advocate of Peace, an American pacifist magazine, similarly blasted Brazil for 
carrying on with “a showy and pretentious naval policy seemingly for the sheer indulgence of 
national pride,” when the country had no immediate military threats.238 The New York Times 
summarized the feelings of Western naval powers, writing that when “the orders were placed for 
[these dreadnoughts], there was much speculation as to the destiny of the vessels, as no naval 
expert could understand how a second-rate power like Brazil needed such formidable engines of 
war which would represent absolutely the latest stages of naval construction and armament.”239 
The American monthly magazine World’s Work insightfully outlined the problems these ships 
introduced to international diplomacy: 
The question that is puzzling diplomats the world over is why Brazil should want 
ferocious leviathans of such size and armament and speed as to place them ten to fifteen 
 
235 Hutchinson, “Coffee ‘Valorization’ in Brazil,” 529–31. After its catastrophic beginning, the São Paulo 
government’s valorization program was saved by rising coffee prices, and by 1912 they had paid down a major 
portion of the loans. “The Industries of Brazil—Coffee Growing,” Times (London) South American Supplement, 29 
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a healthy profit. “Brazilian Coffee Corner at an End,” New York Times, 17 January 1913, 4. 
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years in advance of any other nation besides Great Britain. And even the English 
Dreadnoughts are as cruisers compared to the Brazilian boats. 
 
… England’s reasons for building the Dreadnoughts … are well defined—the 
maintenance of sea power—and are understood throughout the world. But why the 
Brazilian boats? Although Brazil has denied that these are meant for England or Japan, 
naval men of all nations suspect that they are meant for some government other than 
Brazil's. In the event of war, the government which would first be able to secure these 
vessels … would immediately place the odds of naval supremacy in its favor. England, 
no matter how many Dreadnoughts she has, would be compelled to buy them to keep 
them from some lesser power. They bring a new question into international politics. They 
may be leaders of a great fleet which minor government are said to be preparing to build; 
or, to put it more accurately, to stand sponsors for. Some Machiavellian hand may be at 
work in this new game of international politics and the British Admiralty is suspected. 
But every statesmen and naval student may make his own guess.240 
 
The Brazilian government responds 
Fearful of losing the prestige that would be garnered by possessing the dreadnoughts, the 
Baron of Rio Banco and his foreign diplomats invested much time in vigorously combating the 
proliferation of any rumor-mongering.241 In July 1908, for example, Rio Branco protested to a 
British diplomat that “there was no question … of the vessels being transferred to a foreign 
power.”242 In a separate telegram, responding to the allegation that Brazil would sell its 
dreadnoughts to Japan, Rio Branco expressed his belief that the United States and Brazil were on 
“excellent” terms, and added that “every sensible person will understand that an honest and 
respectable government would not lend itself to play the part attributed to Brazil by the inventor 
of the news.”243 The country’s ambassador to the United States was rather more blunt with a 
 
240 “The Mystery of the Great Brazilian Battleships,” World's Work 17, no. 1 (1908): 10867–68. 
241 Grant, Rulers, 154. 
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243 “The Reported Purchase of Battleships,” Navy (Washington) 2, no. 8 (August 1908): 39. A variation on the 
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reporter from the New York Times, telling them that the idea was “too absurd to deserve 
denial.”244 
A primary messaging strategy adopted by the Brazilian government, including its naval 
representatives in the United Kingdom, was that of national defense. “There is not the slightest 
truth … that these warships, when completed, will be sold to the British or to the German 
Government, or to any other power,” the Brazilian minister to Britain combatively stated in 
1908. “They are intended for our own use. Brazil has an extensive seaboard, and needs a 
relatively strong navy to protect it.”245 He continued on much the same course in March 1909, 
writing to the Times of London that Brazil had “no need to sell” the dreadnoughts.246 One month 
later, he spoke before a number of individuals after the launch of São Paulo: 
There are not wanting persons of some repute who have ventured to declare that Brazil 
has no need of such mighty battleships for her own protection, attributing to the Brazilian 
people ulterior designs, which cannot be justified either in the past history of Brazil or in 
her pacific developments of to-day. Brazil is not, as many people seem to imagine, a vast 
deserted country. On our soil there lives, especially along the extensive coast-line, an 
industrious, orderly, and progressive population, claiming for its accumulated labor that 
protection and guarantee for its security that it has enjoyed in the past, and under which it 
may dwell in safety, develop, and progress. We are not constructing a large fleet as a 
luxury, or, as it were, ‘the pageants of the sea,’ for the gratification of ostentatious 
display or inordinate ambition. We are only resuming our way along the path once 
trodden by us in the past, which we are again following in view of the necessities of the 
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Perhaps the most robust defense issued as part of this messaging strategy was put forward 
in an editorial published by the Jornal do Commercio, among the most respected newspapers in 
Brazil, which rebutted an article published by the Brazilian Review, a journal located in Rio de 
Janeiro.248 This piece opined that Brazil would only ever take possession of one of its ordered 
dreadnoughts, and even proffered that the ship “seems likely to be somewhat of a marine white 
elephant”: 
Of all the foolish uses money can be put, to spend it on armies and navies is the worst of 
all, especially in South America, where there is virtually nothing to fight about. The 
megalomania that Brazil has been suffering from for some years has reached dangerous 
proportions indeed when it indulges in such pranks and threatens the peace of the 
continent.249 
 
Three days later, the Jornal do Commercio’s editorial emerged with some especially pointed 
criticism. The United States’ ambassador to Brazil believed that this messaging came from the 
government, and therefore translated and sent the article to his superiors in Washington, D.C. 
The editorial argued that the purchase was not “a precipitate action, proceeding under the 
influence of any given political school of thought for the moment in power,” but rather “the 
result of an aspiration long manifested by the entire country [the defense of Brazil’s coastline].” 
It continued: 
[I]t is not the manifestation of megalomania imagined by the functionary who directs the 
Brazilian Review, but it is a witness to the stable political course imposed by our 
economy and geographical conditions, and whose origin is not to be found in the caprice, 
more or less ridiculous, which is attributed to it, but in the depths of the sound opinion of 
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the nation which wishes to be strong in order to protect itself and will be so because it 
ought to be.250 
 
Behind the scenes, however, Rio Branco’s emphasis on defending Brazil’s coastline was 
a red herring. Dreadnoughts were far from ideal vessels for a country looking to defend a lengthy 
coastline; for Brazil, their expense and manning requirements precluded the possibility of 
possessing enough ships to even begin to patrol from the mouth of the Amazon to Rio Grande do 
Sul. Indeed, contrary to the public statements put out on behalf of the Brazilian government, the 
foreign minister’s long-term strategy was to employ the new vessels not for defense, but as 
cudgels in regional diplomacy.251 For example, it was in Brazil’s interests to ensure the mouths 
of rivers entering the River Plate remained open to ships trying to reach Mato Grosso and other 
Brazilian territory. Rio Branco’s vision was tangibly demonstrated soon after the warships were 
delivered when one of Brazil’s new destroyers was deployed to Paraguay, too shallow for a 
dreadnought to reach, during its civil war.252 Historian Jonathan Grant writes that “[Rio 
Branco’s] plan was to make Brazil strong, at least on paper, to impress the rest of South 
America, and to enable him to solve without conflict the numerous boundary questions [in the 
region].”253 
Constructing and testing the new warships 
Armstrong laid down Minas Geraes on 17 April 1907, and Vickers began constructing 
São Paulo on 24 September of the same year.254 On 22 January 1908, seven hundred of the 
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Elswick shipyard’s shipwrights, joiners, and drillers went on strike, delaying all the ships under 
construction there, including Minas Geraes. These trades were so integral to the shipyard’s work 
that the Elswick shipyard manager J.R. Perrett felt compelled to lay off an additional eighteen 
hundred employees. This meant that more than half the shipyard’s workforce was either striking 
or left idle, with only fitters, plumbers, coppersmiths, sheet iron workers, and pattern makers 
being retained. While Minas Geraes’ machinery had been subcontracted out to other companies 
and therefore remained on schedule, Armstrong’s work was left “practically at a standstill,” 
according to Perrett. The strike ended on 1 June, and by the time of Perrett’s July report, much of 
the ship’s armor plating had arrived from Armstrong’s steel works in Openshaw. In the end, the 
strike delayed Minas Geraes’ launch from early April to 10 September, or by about four 
months.255 
Vickers trailed behind with São Paulo, with more than a year and a half’s gap between its 
keel laying and launch on 19 April 1909.256 The ship weighed 10,400 tons when it was launched, 
 
Documentação da Marinha — Histórico de Navios, Diretoria do Patrimônio Histórico e Documentação da Marinha 
(DPHDM), Departamento de História Marítima. (This document, and the entire Consulta ao Histórico de Navios 
series of ship histories produced by DPHDM, was last available online in 2016. “Histórico de Navios On-Line,” 
DPHDM, 5 April 2016, via the Internet Archive, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20160405132800/http://www.sistemas.dphdm.mar.mil.br/navios/Cons.asp.) This paper 
assumes the September date, as Johnston, Buxton, and Topliss confirm each other and were working directly from 
the records of British shipbuilders. 
255 Johnston and Buxton, Battleship Builders, 121–24; Topliss, “Brazilian Dreadnoughts,” 246. Every other month, 
Perrett wrote up a report for Armstrong’s Board, some of which have been transcribed by Johnston and Buxton. On 
21 January, one day before the strike began, Perrett wrote that there were 4,998 people working for the shipyard; 
two months later, that number had decreased to 2,467. 
256 Scheina, “Brazil,” in Gardiner and Grey, Conway’s 1906–21, 404. The strike lasted from 22 January to 1 June 
1908. Topliss, “Brazilian Dreadnoughts,” 246. See also “The Brazilian Battleship ‘Minas Geraes’,” Engineering 89 
(21 January 1910): 69, for a short defense of the building time of these ships. 
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a record, and took forty-seven seconds to slide into the water.257 Both it and Minas Geraes were 
christened by the wife of Brazil’s minister to the United Kingdom.258 
Figure 3.4: Cover of Armstrong’s ornate event booklet put together for the launch of Minas 
Geraes, characteristic of such materials it put together for warships built for foreign nations.259 
 
 
Source: Tyne & Wear Archives and Museums, 450/1/1, via Wikimedia Commons. CC 
BY-SA 3.0. Inset artwork by Charles de Lacy. 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Minas_Geraes_invite.jpg. 
 
257 “The Brazilian Battleship ‘Sao Paulo’,” Engineering 87 (23 April 1909): 557. Photos of the ship before being 
launched, including its bow launching cradle, were printed on page 557 and featured on 560. 
258 “Launch Greatest Warships,” New York Times, 11 September 1908, 5; “Launch Brazil's Battleship,” New York 
Times, 20 April 1909, 5; “Brazil Dreadnought Launched,” Christian Science Monitor, 20 April 1909, 2. 
259 Johnston and Buxton, Battleship Builders, 228. 
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After being launched, the ships were fitted out with equipment that was not required 
before releasing the hulls into the water. For instance, Minas Geraes weighed nine thousand tons 
at its launch—less than half of its designed displacement. It was only after being launched that it 
received its electrical wiring and was moored next to a 150-ton crane for the installation of its 
superstructure, armament, machinery, and the rest of its armor plating. Perrett reported several 
times in 1908–09 that Minas Geraes’ fitting out was proceeding quickly in all areas except for 
where they were waiting on approval of design alterations from the Brazilian Navy, which he 
called out as a frustrating hindrance, and electrical work.260 
The final stage of construction was marked by sea trials, where the new ships were put 
through a series of challenges to ensure that they were fit for service in the Brazilian Navy. 
Minas Geraes’ steaming trials began on 14 September 1908, with some assessments being 
delayed for several days by fog. First, the ship’s ability to steam for forty-eight consecutive 
hours at a speed of ten knots was tested, along with its coal consumption, which would determine 
its ultimate range. These concluded on 16 September. After two days spent waiting for an end to 
foggy conditions, the shipyard they measured Minas Geraes’ ability to steam at three-quarters 
power for thirty hours. As designed, this should have driven the ship through the water at 20 
knots, but the ship only made an average of 19.35 knots in several runs over a measured mile. 
This performance could perhaps be chalked up to a very rough sea state; during these runs, spray 
generated by the ship cutting through large waves occasionally reached as high as sixty feet 
above the waterline. Finally, after another fog-related delay, this one lasting six days, Minas 
Geraes was put through another succession of tests on 29 September. These included artificially 
limiting the steam pressure being used, where the ship was able to surpass its contractually 
 
260 Johnston and Buxton, Battleship Builders, 123–24. 
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guaranteed top speed despite the restrictions; a forced-draught trial that resulted in a top speed of 
21.432 knots; stopping and starting distances; and determining turning radius. In the end, Minas 
Geraes’ steaming trials were “most satisfactory.”261 
Figure 3.5: Minas Geraes’ gun trials featured the heaviest broadside ever fired. 
 
Source: “The Brazilian Battleship ‘Minas Geraes’,” Scientific American 102, no. 12 (19 
March 1910): 240. Public domain. 
 
From the perspective of the press, however, the most interesting part of Minas Geraes’ 
trials when the ship’s armament was tested. One standout moment, especially for publications 
which targeted non-specialist audiences, came when ten of Minas Geraes’ twelve twelve-inch 
 
261 “The Brazilian Battleship ‘Minas Geraes’,” Engineering 89 (21 January 1910): 67. 
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guns were trained to one side and fired at the same time. Each gun used 285-pound bags of 
cordite to send off their 850-pound shells, and with 8,500 tons of shells and 500,000 foot-tons of 
potential energy ripping through the air, it was the heaviest broadside ever fired off the deck of a 
warship up until that time.262 
Another item of note, this one to specialist audiences, came in testing the ship’s 
armament arrangement. Superfiring turrets, which is defined by the positioning of one gun turret 
above another such that the upper guns can be trained out above the lower turret (see figures 3.2 
and 3.6), had already been adopted for the United States’ South Carolina-class battleships, then 
under construction. However, the practice of mounting so many large guns on one ship 
the hallmark of a dreadnought—was still a new phenomenon, and some naval experts believed 
that the blast from the upper guns would injure crewmen operating the lower turret only a few 
feet below. As such, the tests of Minas Geraes’ superfiring guns attracted much attention from 
several nations. The trials proved both that this theory was false; indeed, Scientific American 
reported that “the crew could safely stay in the lower [turret] without experiencing the slightest 
ill effects of the tremendous blast some five feet about their heads.” In addition, it disproved 
another objection to superfiring turrets: that the flash from firing guns in turrets so close together 
would unduly affect aiming.263 This way of arranging a battleship’s main battery quickly became 
the norm for all future full-sized ships of the class.264 
 
262 “The Brazilian Battleship ‘Minas Geraes’,” Scientific American 102, no. 12 (1910): 240–41. 
263 Ibid., 241; “The New Brazilian Battleships,” Times (London), 22 January 1910, 16f; “The Brazilian Battleship 
‘Minas Geraes’,” Engineering 89 (21 January 1910): 67. The latter two pieces were authored anonymously but were 
likely authored by the same individual, having been published one day apart and sharing some identical language.  
264 Friedman, Battleship Design, 132–34. 
    
70 
 
Minas Geraes was completed and handed over to Brazil during a formal ceremony on 5 
January 1910, making for a construction time of about two and a half years.265 This time was not 
far off contemporary British dreadnoughts, like the Bellerophon class, and it actually bested 
them if the strike time was subtracted.266 
Figure 3.6: Minas Geraes class line drawing, highlighting its armament’s firing arcs. The use of 
superfiring turrets along the centerline gave eight turrets wide arcs of fire, but the two wing 
turrets were far more limited and could cause damage when firing directly ahead or astern. 
 
 
Source: “The Brazilian Battleship ‘Minas Geraes’,” Engineering 89 (21 January 1910): 65. 
 
265 “The Minas Geraes,” Times (London), 6 January 1910, 4d; “The Brazilian Battleship ‘Minas Geraes’,” 
Engineering 89 (21 January 1910): 69–70. 
266 Preston, “Great Britain,” in Gardiner and Grey, Conway’s 1906–21, 22. 
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São Paulo took just under three years to complete, being delivered only in August 1910 
and departing the United Kingdom on 16 September.267 Unsurprisingly, then, its trials happened 
months after Minas Geraes was handed over; they covered much of the same territory without 
significant differences. Lasting for a total of twelve days, the ship demonstrated in its own forty-
eight-hour economy trial that it would have a theoretical range that was nearly thirty percent 
more than was contracted for. It also successfully navigated its own trial of three-quarters power 
for thirty hours. Artificially limiting the steam pressure did not prevent the new warship from 
essentially reaching its guaranteed top speed (coming in at exactly 20.99 knots), and rough 
weather did not prevent the ship from making 21.623 knots at full forced-draught power.268 The 
gun trials saw the record for broadside weight broken again through the addition of São Paulo’s 
secondary armament; Admiral Huett Bacelar, the head of the Brazilian naval commission 
charged with overseeing the dreadnought’s construction, pressed the firing key that started the 
crescendo of twenty-one guns. The trials also replicated the superfiring test, and several 
Brazilian and British officers stationed in the lower turret while the upper guns were fired could 
report that they “suffered no inconvenience.”269 
The scout cruisers Bahia and Rio Grande do Sul, ordered under the same naval program 
as the dreadnoughts, were launched by Armstrong on 20 January and 20 April 1909, 
respectively.270 The two Brazilian ships were based on the British Adventure class and proved to 
 
267 Scheina, “Brazil,” in Gardiner and Grey, Conway’s 1906–21, 404; Topliss, “Brazilian Dreadnoughts,” 289. 
268 “Trials of the Sao Paulo,” Times (London), 3 June 1910, 7c; “Trials of the Sao Paulo,” Navy (Washington) 4, no. 
5 (July 1910): 29. 
269 “Brazil,” Journal of the American Society of Naval Engineers 22, no. 3 (1910): 999; Philip R. Alger, 
“Professional Notes,” Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute 36, no. 3 (1910): 858–59; “Trials of the Sao 
Paulo,” Times (London), 3 June 1910, 7c; “Gun Trials of the Sao Paulo,” Times (London), 4 June 1910, 9b. For 
more about the Brazilian naval commission, see “The Brazilian Battleship ‘Minas Geraes’,” Engineering 89 (21 
January 1910): 69. 
270 “The Brazilian Scout-Cruisers,” Engineer 109 (20 May 1910): 514–16; “Launch of a Brazilian Scout,” Times 
(London), 21 January 1909, 7a; “Launch of a Brazilian Scout,” Times (London), 21 April 1909, 6b. A detailed line 
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be the fastest warships of their type in the world, with both making over twenty-seven knots in 
their trials, and under simulated combat conditions their main guns could fire at a maximum rate 
of nine aimed rounds per minute. The cruisers were delivered to the Brazilian Navy in 1910, with 
Bahia leaving the United Kingdom on 16 April and Rio Grande do Sul expected to depart by the 
end of the following month.271 
Figure 3.7: Sailors aboard Minas Geraes, probably in 1913. 
 
Source: George Grantham Bain collection, Library of Congress. Public domain. 
https://hdl.loc.gov/loc.pnp/ggbain.13338. 
 
drawing from Armstrong is provided in Engineer. Scheina, “Brazil,” in Gardiner and Grey, Conway’s 1906–21, 405 
inaccurately reverses the launching dates for these two ships.  
271 “The Brazilian Scout-Cruisers,” Engineer 109 (20 May 1910): 514–16. 
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Revolta da Chibata (Revolt of the Lash) 
The vexing questions surrounding Brazil’s dreadnoughts eventually quieted and were 
rendered moot when the ships were handed over to and arrived in Brazil in 1910, with Minas 
Geraes and São Paulo docking in Rio de Janeiro on 17 April and 25 October, respectively.272 
However, the government’s dreams of remaking the country into an international power on the 
backs of the new warships were soon crushed by a racially motivated revolt on board the new 
vessels. Black and mixed-race enlisted sailors, primarily motivated by the latter’s persistent use 
of traditional corporal discipline, took up arms against their white officers in an action which one 
contemporary magazine called “the most extraordinary event in naval history since the mutiny of 
the Russian war-ships in the Black Sea.”273 
On the night of 22 November, shouts and gunfire rang out aboard Minas Geraes. Fighting 
did not last long; when the gunsmoke settled, several officers and loyal crewmen laid dead on the 
wooden decks. The fighting marked the beginning of several successful mutinies aboard three of 
the four largest and most powerful warships in the Brazilian Navy; within a short period, both 
Minas Geraes and São Paulo, the new scout cruiser Bahia, and the older Deodoro were in rebel 
hands, along with the crews onboard smaller warships like the minelayer República, training 
ship Benjamin Constant, and torpedo boats Tamoio and Timbira. The majority of República's 
crew left the ship to bolster São Paulo and Deodoro; those aboard the other ships either joined 
with the rebels or fled ashore.274 
 
272 “The Brazilian Battleship ‘Minas Geraes’.” Scientific American 102, no. 12 (19 March 1910): 240–41; Topliss, 
“Brazilian Dreadnoughts,” 289. 
273 “A Navy on Strike,” Outlook 96 (10 December 1910): 800. This refers to the Potemkin mutiny of 1905. 
274 Morgan, Legacy, 200–01; Love, Revolt, 20, 28–31, 35–36. Deodoro, one of the two small coast-defense ships 
constructed just before the turn of the century, was older than the other three but had recently been refitted. Love, 
Revolt, 20. One of the officers killed was João Batista das Neves, Minas Geraes’ captain. “Revolt of Brazilian 
Warships,” Independent 69 (1 December 1910): 1179. 
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The mutineers were led by João Cândido Felisberto, an enlisted man whose parents had 
enrolled him into a naval school at the age of fourteen.275 Felisberto was described by an 
American military attaché as possessing “unusual intelligence” and the “natural characteristics of 
a leader of men.”276 Key warships that remained in government hands included Bahia’s 
sister Rio Grande do Sul, the aging cruiser Barroso, and eight new destroyers of the Pará class. 
Their potential effectiveness, however, were tempered by the officers’ distrust of the black and 
mixed-race crewmen under their command, and severely diminished by problems in fitting 
proper weapons to their ships: the destroyer’s torpedoes, their primary weapon against 
dreadnoughts, were unusable until two days after the revolt began.277 
 This widespread mutiny would become known as the Revolta da Chibata, or Revolt of 
the Lash, after the frequently employed use of whipping that led one newspaper to bluntly call 
the sailors “tortured.”278 This was likely not far from the truth: a Brazilian government observer, 
former navy captain José Carlos de Carvalho, was allowed to board several rebel ships and 
examine one sailor that had been whipped not long before. He vividly testified that this 
individual’s back looked like “a mullet sliced open for salting.”279 Such practices were common 
in the Brazilian Navy, whose crewmen were frequently impressed from what a later legal scholar 
once called “the dregs of our urban centers, the most worthless lumpen … Ex-slaves and the sons 
of slaves make up our ships' crews, most of them dark-skinned or dark-skinned mulattos.”280  
 
275 Morgan, Legacy, 114. 
276 John S. Hammond, “Mutiny of the Brazilian sailors,” 5, in “Brazilian Naval Revolt, 1910,” RG 38, Box 760, SC 
E-9-d, reg. no. 799, NARA.  
277 Love, Revolt, 30–31, 35–36; Morgan, Legacy, 220. Of the ten destroyers ordered by the Brazilian Navy, only 
eight had been arrived in Brazil by the time of the revolt. 
278 “Brazilian Sailors Had Been Tortured,” New York Times, 28 November 1910, 3. 
279 Morgan, Legacy, 195. 
280 Morgan has given two different attributions for this quote. In his “The Revolt of the Lash, 1910,” in Naval 
Mutinies of the Twentieth Century, eds. Christopher M. Bell and Bruce A. Elleman (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 37, 
he says that it was the Baron of Rio Branco, citing Edmar Morel, A Revolta da Chibata, 4th ed. (Rio de Janeiro: 
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Lashing had continued in the navy despite an 1889 ban on the practice because it was not 
enforced and Brazilian naval officers were in strong accordance that their broadly black crews 
required such discipline. One Brazilian admiral wrote decades later that “our seamen of that 
time, lacking the moral and intellectual requirements for appreciating the debasing aspects of the 
punishment [whipping], accepted it naturally, as an opportunity to show their physical and moral 
superiority.” He added that it was an “understandable” tradition “in the face of the backward 
mentality and ignorance of the personnel that composed the ship's crews.”281 
The lash, however, was not the only contributing cause to the mutiny. These revolting 
sailors wrote to their political leaders that they wanted an end to what they called the “slavery” 
being practiced by the navy; the granting of “sacred rights guaranteed us by the laws of the 
Republic,” referring to the use of lash; higher pay; better education; and a limit on daily service 
time.282 The demands were, according to contemporary observers and the Brazilian government, 
directed at the navy’s officer core and were not intended to be political.283 Indeed, several 
contemporary sources remark on the extremely low salary given to even experienced enlisted 
sailors.284 The mutineers threatened that should they not be granted their demands, they would 
bombard Rio de Janeiro with the heavy weaponry they carried. Many well-off families heeded 
 
Edições Graal, 1986 [1959]), 13. In Morgan, Legacy, 46, published in 2014, he says that it was written by legal 
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this warning and hurriedly left the city in the expectation that the rebels would fire on the city. 
Indeed, the mutineers fired several shots at the city from their dreadnoughts’ secondary weapons, 
intending to demonstrate their resolve; these killed three people, including two children.285 
A disorganized executive branch, under the newly elected Hermes Rodrigues da Fonseca, 
and military considered attacking the rebels—who da Fonseca called “rough and uncultured”— 
with the remaining warships under their command, but all the potential results from such an 
action were extremely unpalatable. A victorious attack would end in the Pyrrhic destruction of 
some or all the new and astoundingly expensive warships, symbols that had recently received a 
substantial amount of attention and were still viewed by Brazil’s elites as a vital cog in 
refashioning Brazil into a serious international power. It could also kill Armstrong employees, all 
British citizens, on board São Paulo to ensure that everything performed as designed in the first 
months after it was delivered from the constructors. Yet even if the president and his military 
officials could stomach those potential losses, the prospect of being defeated by the rebels was a 
significantly worse and more probable outcome. Even if the government’s warships went into 
battle at full strength, which in and of itself was unlikely, the dreadnoughts’ power dwarfed that 
of the government’s warships; each alone outgunned all the loyal warships.286 
Faced with these circumstances, da Fonseca folded and granted the mutineers full 
amnesty through a bill passed by the legislature.287 This action struck a fearsome blow to Brazil’s 
international prestige and the perceived honor of the country’s naval elites. The role reversal that 
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these admirals found themselves in, and the way that they were forced to fold and give in to the 
mutineer’s list of demands—demands from underclass, broadly black naval crews—the elites 
suffered a significant embarrassment on both the domestic and international fronts. Moreover, 
while having any revolt was problematic for the navy, as it would in any military branch around 
the globe, the symbolic rejection stung worse in Brazil. Its officers had been forced from their 
dreadnoughts, which suddenly represented a weak nation-state which had embarked on a path of 
technological modernization without accompanying social changes.288 
The world took notice of the concessions granted to the mutineers. New York’s Outlook 
journal stated that “the humiliation and mortification of the Brazilian Government must be 
complete,” and the British minister to Brazil concluded that revolt ended in a “dramatic exposure 
of [Brazil’s] impotence.”289 Viscount James Bryce, a former British politician and ambassador 
who was traveling through Rio de Janeiro when the mutiny broke out, questioned if the Brazilian 
people were “worthy” enough to inherit their country.290 John S. Hammond, the United States’ 
military attaché in Brazil, believed that the mutiny’s success would prove to “be an everlasting 
humiliation to Brazil.”291 David Lambuth, an instructor at Brazil’s Granberry College, wrote in 
the American weekly magazine The Independent that Brazil had made “a fool of itself,” calling 
the entire episode a “naval comedy.”292 
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Figure 3.8: Minas Geraes seen from the bow, c. 1909–10. The photo was featured on Scientific 
American’s cover on 19 March 1910, two months after the ship was delivered. 
 
 
Source: “The Brazilian Battleship ‘Minas Geraes’,” Scientific American 102, no. 12 (19 
March 1910): 233. Public domain. 
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At home, the political stage became heated: Rui Barbosa, a prominent senator and the 
losing candidate in the recent 1910 presidential election, led the amnesty effort in the Senate and 
ensured it passed with a veto-proof majority.293 After the revolt’s conclusion, he used the 
occasion to attack the government’s naval policy: 
International war has not yet come to the doors of our republic. Civil war has come many 
times, armed by these very weapons which we have so vainly prepared for our defense 
against a foreign enemy. Let us do away with these ridiculous and perilous great 
armaments, securing international peace by means rather of just and equitable relations 
with our neighbors. On the American continent, at least, it is not necessary to maintain a 
‘peace armada’; that hideous cancer which is devouring continuously the vitals of the 
nations of Europe.294 
 
The mutineers did not fare well after the Revolt of the Lash, as a second and unrelated 
revolt by marines in December 1910 was used as an excuse to round up the amnestied mutineers. 
Those sailors that did not get away were put in prison, where sixteen died in a crowded prison 
cell not long after. Others were sent to far-flung regions of Brazil to help construct the Madeira–
Mamore Railroad or work on the Amazon rubber plantations, for examples. The British minister 
to Brazil described the former’s conditions as “dangerously unhealthy,” while Barbosa said of 
the latter that it was “a place where one only dies.”295 Felisberto, the leader of the Revolt of the 
Lash and one of only two people to survive that crowded prison cell, was put on trial and 
acquitted eighteen months later.296 Barbosa fled to his home region for a time, fearing that he 
would be imprisoned under newly granted emergency powers.297 
After the revolt’s conclusion, Brazil’s new warships, the cornerstone on which the 
country’s dreams of international power rested, were deliberately neglected by the government 
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for a time. Minas Geraes and São Paulo’s main weapons were effectively disarmed by the 
removal of their breechblocks, the ships were frequently kept at anchor, and the majority of their 
already undermanned crews needed to be replaced.298 In fact, a minimum of eighteen hundred 
seamen were discharged in the aftermath of the revolt.299 
These were all points that W.H.D. Haggard, the British minister to Brazil and often 
extremely critical of his posting’s naval expenditures, was all too happy to harp on in his reports 
home. In December 1910, shortly after the mutiny, Haggard said that the Brazilian Navy had 
found itself in a “curious condition” with “magnificent ships and no crews.”300 One month later, 
he added that ships had been “reduced … to … sheer hulks without any crews to man them.” 
From Haggard’s vantage point, the mutiny had made clear the “utter uselessness to Brazil of 
these ships,” so much so that he speculated that if the Brazilian government sold the 
dreadnoughts—and there was some support within the country and its politicians for that—
Argentina would sell the dreadnoughts they have under construction, making the “best of a bad 
bargain and get[ting] back the money that they have spent on them, or at least as much as 
possible.”301 By the time of his 1912 annual report, submitted in June 1913, Haggard relayed an 
estimate from Armstrong of £700,000 to return the ships to active service, adding a lengthy 
tangent on his assessment of the ships: 
These ships are absolutely useless to Brazil, the officers and the crews do not know how 
to work the machinery and, even if they know how to fire the big guns, they are afraid to 
do so. At this moment, after they have been lying for years in Rio Harbour, the only men 
who know anything about the mechanism of the ships, and do what they can to keep them 
in order, are the so-called “guarantee men” supplied by Messrs. Armstrong. They have 
been lying in the harbor ever since their arrival, with the exception of one or two trips to 
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Ilha Grande, the quarantine station 50 or 60 miles down the coast. … It really is an 
exemplification of the frog swelling himself out until he bursts, for not only has Brazil 
had to pay about 5,000,000l for the purchase of the two ships, but their upkeep comes to 
several hundreds of thousands a-year, for vessels which, even if they could be worked or 
their guns fired, would be perfect useless for the purpose for which they are intended, as 
they draw so much water that they could not go up the River Plate [the estuary adjacent 
to Argentina’s capital], while for blockading purposes they would not be so useful as 
torpedo-destroyers for instance. It really was on all fours with the obsolete Chinese 
method of trying to frighten the enemy with masks and by making faces.302 
 
As Latin American historian Zachary Morgan would later write, “The ships were saved, but at 
what cost?”303 
Even had the revolt not occurred, there is some evidence to suggest that Brazil would 
have found severe problems in employing its dreadnoughts had they found themselves in any 
external conflict. In 1908, a Brazilian journal made “uncomplimentary remarks” about the 
country’s preparations for the dreadnoughts, especially with regards to training its crewmen, and 
Milne Cheetham, another British diplomat, gave credence to these claims.304 Once the ships 
arrived in Brazil, they were chronically undermanned, making do with less than a third of their 
designed complements.305 This led to the remaining crewmen being severely overworked, which 
became a complaint during the mutiny; near its conclusion, they requested that “the internal 
service of the ships … be attended to by increasing the number of men without further sacrifice 
on our part.”306 
Furthermore, an individual identified only as “the daughter of a diplomat” reported that 
Minas Geraes had been heavily damaged on its maiden voyage from the United Kingdom after 
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British firemen deserted the ship during a stop in the United States. By the time the dreadnought 
reached Brazil, two boilers had been disabled and the ship required some $500,000 in repairs. 
(This claim is not echoed in other sources.) “Brazil is a young republic,” the author wrote, and 
advocated that the country “learn to spend more time and money in … personnel rather than in 
big ships,” which served only as a “big show” rather than benefiting the country.307 A separate 
and proven incident was the mutineer’s fouling of the hydraulic system which trained São 
Paulo’s main battery, making the guns nearly useless. The fix for this required British engineers 
from Armstrong, what Haggard called the “guarantee men.”308 
Finally, Haggard expressed many concerns about the Brazilian Navy’s preparations for 
the new dreadnoughts: he believed that Brazil may have shelled out the money to purchase the 
warships but had not equipped themselves to be able to properly employ them. In his view, 
which he had expressed as early as March 1907, soon after the dreadnoughts were ordered, the 
navy suffered from officers and sailors that lacked adequate training.309 Haggard does not state 
whether he thought that the broadly black and mulatto crews could ever be adequately trained, 
and later emphasized his belief that non-white people were incapable of operating a dreadnought: 
[Without] foreign instructors, it will always be impossible for Brazil to have an effective 
fleet under modern conditions. You cannot wash a blackamore white, and it would, in my 
belief, be impossible to drill into the crews of these ships which are, officers and men, of 
mixed blood—though the latter are, of course, generally darker than the former—habits 
of discipline, care, attention, accuracy, all the qualities in fact necessary for the safe 
management of the numbers of delicate machines that go to make up the means of 
managing and fighting modern ironclads. To arrive at the mental condition necessary for 
this purpose would be simply impossible for men of their racial caliber and instinct. A 
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Brazilian navy under modern conditions never can and never could exist as a fighting 
factor.310 
 
That the Brazilian crews were unable to utilize their dreadnoughts is not a universal view. 
Eyewitness accounts from several onshore foreign observers emphasize that the ships were 
extremely well-handled during the revolt even though they had no officers and were controlled 
by broadly black enlisted sailors, a fact that surprised some of the observers. This impressive feat 
was attributed to the crewmen’s training in the United Kingdom.311 Moreover, discipline was 
tightly maintained during the mutiny, and liquor on board the ships was thrown overboard to 
avoid any problems with drunk sailors. Hammond, the United States’ military attaché to Brazil, 
was particularly effusive in his admiration for the mutineers. On the morning after the revolt, he 
noted that the four main rebel ships left Rio de Janeiro’s harbor through “a very difficult 
channel,” conducted a naval review, and practiced battle maneuvers without incident. They then 
returned to the harbor, being “handled in a manner that was nothing short of wonderful, 
considering that the commanders … were seamen.” By the end of the revolt, Hammond wrote 
with that Felisberto and his men had “excited universal respect”—an overstatement—“and 
proved that there is excellent ability in the Brazilian ranks.”312 
The years following the revolt hold some ammunition for both sides of the debate over 
the true potential effectiveness of Brazil’s dreadnoughts, but it seems clear that at least some 
level of foreign support was required to keep the dreadnoughts operational and fully functional 
for extended periods of time. On the one hand, the New York Times reported no problems with 
Minas Geraes when it was dispatched to the United States in 1913 with Lauro Müller, Brazil’s 
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foreign minister and the replacement for Rio Branco after his death, embarked.313 On the other, 
much of the Brazilian Navy was reportedly in poor condition when the country entered the First 
World War, and so both dreadnoughts were sent to the United States to be modernized. São 
Paulo went first, with the intention of docking in the United States in time for its 1918 
Independence Day celebrations, but fourteen of its eighteen boilers broke down during the 
journey. The crew was forced to make for Bahia for emergency repairs, which were completed 
not by its own crewmen but ninety sailors from the American battleship Nebraska, which was 
visiting Bahia at the time. Escorted by that ship and Raleigh, an American protected cruiser, São 
Paulo would eventually make it to New York nearly a month and a half after leaving Rio de 
Janeiro. It remained there until 1920, long after the war’s conclusion.314 
Having been restored by American shipwrights and engineers, São Paulo was sent abroad 
twice soon after its refit was complete. Its first trip brought Belgium’s sovereign king and queen 
to Brazil in September 1920, reciprocating a visit from Brazil’s president in the preceding 
year.315 The second, made only months later, repatriated the bodies of Brazil’s former emperor 
Pedro II and his wife Teresa Cristina.316 In 1922, the crews on board São Paulo and Minas 
Geraes, recently returned from its own refit, were drilled often and headed out on several 
excursions for target practice. São Paulo’s gunners performed especially well in a January 
exercise, hitting eighty-five percent of their targets at a range of two thousand meters.317 In the 
same year, the dreadnoughts stayed loyal during the Tenente revolts and fired salvos at the rebel-
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held Fort Copacabana in Rio de Janeiro’s harbor.318 By 1924, however, São Paulo’s condensers 
were in disrepair, which ironically helped derail another mutiny on board the ship.319 
Figure 3.9: Artist’s impression of the final Rio de Janeiro design, 1913. 
 
Source: Oscar Parkes, “The Brazilian Battleship ‘Rio de Janeiro’,” Scientific American 
108, no. 22 (31 May 1913): 493. Public domain. 
 
The long saga of Brazil’s third dreadnought 
While Brazil would never take possession of another battleship, the 1907 naval 
program’s third proposed dreadnought, Rio de Janeiro, was subjected to what one naval 
historian’s publisher called a “hilarious, melancholy and extraordinary” tale of being 
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constructed, torn down, and re-constructed—all of which happened multiple times. It was then 
sold and finally forcibly transferred after the beginning of the First World War.320 
The roots of all this begin with the problems with Brazil’s 1908 coffee crop, when the 
Brazilian federal government had to step in and give the state of São Paulo a £15 million loan to 
cover its failed attempt to buy up a coffee surplus and wait for its market price to rise. At the 
same time, Argentina was nearing a decision to counter Brazil’s dreadnoughts with dreadnoughts 
of their own. These factors led the Brazilian government to reconsider its decision to order three 
dreadnoughts, rather than just two.321 
Perhaps understandably, Armstrong was not keen on potentially losing millions of 
pounds from a cancelled dreadnought. In September 1908, less than a week after Minas Geraes 
was launched, Sir Andrew Noble, Armstrong’s chairman, wrote to Admiral Bacelar, the head of 
the Brazilian naval commission in the United Kingdom, to push the Brazilians into proceeding 
with the order it signed:  
I need not emphasize the arguments as to the desirability of the Brazilian Government 
proceeding with the naval programme in its entirety—a program which is certainly not 
more than sufficient for the needs and interests of the Country … I trust that the Minister 
of Marine will be able to give you instructions for proceeding with the laying of the keel 
of the third ship, on the slip just vacated by the Minas Geraes.322 
 
On 16 September, two days after Noble sent his letter, two directors from Armstrong and two 
representatives of the Brazilian government met to discuss the matter. The former convinced the 
latter to agree to only a few contract revisions, including a maximum of a three-year delay in 
construction, future payments in cash (as opposed to government bonds), and counting €350,000 
of previous payments as going towards the first two dreadnoughts, rather than the third. 
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However, they also began preparing alternative (and far smaller) designs. With these, the 
Armstrong directors were able to overcome a Brazilian counter-proposal—that the original 
contract would remain in force even while the third ship’s construction would be indefinitely 
delayed—but not resistance from the company’s board, which vetoed the deal on 8 October at 
the insistence of Stuart Rendel, a fellow Armstrong director. Rendel did not believe that the 
Brazilians were seeking contractual changes due to financial reasons, and he did not sympathize 
with the arguments made by John Meade Falkner, who would eventually rise to become 
chairman of Armstrong. Falkner had written to Rendel to say that he: 
[Felt] a distinct, and probably foolish quixotic sympathy with these people, who have 
given us a contract at which the world of business stood stupefied—who by this order 
have immensely strengthened our prestige—who have out-Heroded Herod [i.e. in its 
level of extravagance], and by these gigantic ships, have set all the navies of the world to 
follow Elswick’s lead.323 
 
In the face of additional economic obstacles, the Brazilian government tried to delay Rio 
de Janeiro again in July 1909, just weeks after its Minister of Marine struck an agreement with 
Armstrong’s staff to hurry the completion of Minas Geraes for the price of committing to laying 
down the third dreadnought as soon as Minas Geraes was finished. Armstrong’s board again 
refused to countenance this change, but the Brazilians were bailed out by global banks’ 
increasing willingness to loan them the required money. The third dreadnought’s keel was laid 
down for the first time on 16 March 1910, about two months after Minas Geraes had been 
delivered to the Brazilian Navy.324 
It did not take long for the Brazilians to reconsider their order yet again. In an era of rapid 
naval technological developments, the Minas Geraes class’ design was not up to the standard of 
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the newest foreign battleships. “One of the most appalling things to the economist in fiscal 
affairs,” one 1909 article in International Marine Engineering began, “is the rapidity with which 
costly warships become obsolete and have to be scrapped.”325 The new designs, called “super-
dreadnoughts,” displaced far more and carried heavier armament; the first, the United Kingdom’s 
Orion, was laid down in November 1909.326  
Figure 3.10: Growth in dreadnought displacement, 1905–22, spanning the eponymous 
Dreadnought to Britain’s treaty-limited Nelson class. The graph includes the first dreadnought or 
battlecruiser in each ship class that was either laid down or was close to being laid down, even if 
construction was later canceled. Ships of note include Brazil’s Minas Geraes (April 1907), 
Argentina’s Rivadavia (May 1910), Brazil’s final keel laying for Rio de Janeiro (September 
1911), and Chile’s Almirante Latorre (November 1911).327 
 
Source: Author’s work. Data gathered from Breyer, Battleships. 
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Figure 3.10 shows the rapid growth in dreadnought displacement between 1905 and 
1922. Critically for the development of Rio de Janeiro, Argentina’s first 27,500-ton Rivadavia-
class battleship was laid down in May 1910, the same month in which the Brazilians asked for 
Armstrong to halt all work on the new dreadnought and submit new designs.328 
On 7 May 1910, Bacelar, the head of the Brazilian naval commission, directed Armstrong 
to halt all work on Rio de Janeiro and to propose new and more powerful designs. They moved 
rapidly to comply with this request and came up with three designs by 12 May, two of which 
were submitted to Bacelar, and one of which was selected and refined in Armstrong design 653. 
In a meeting between Noble, Bacelar, and now-Chief Designer J.R. Perret, Bacelar approved 
detailed design work on 653, a 31,600-ton ship with twelve fourteen-inch guns arranged in a 
similar fashion to Minas Geraes. Armstrong dispatched Eustace Tennyson D’Eyncourt, its chief 
salesman, to Brazil in August 1910 to hammer out the final design particulars. Weeks of small 
work followed, with the Brazilians sending in what one historian said “what must have seemed 
[like] an endless stream of requests and criticisms” to D’Eyncourt. Finally, by October 
D’Eyncourt was able to secure an agreed-upon design that he submitted to Alexandrino Faria de 
Alencar, the Minister of Marine and a leader in the 1907 revisions to Brazil’s naval program. 
With his signature, the Brazilians committed themselves to a £2.864 million ship, and its keel 
was laid down again in the same month.329 
Once again, headlines around the world blared that Brazil would “lead all navies with its 
latest dreadnought,” and that it would “be the largest and most powerful warship in the 
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world.”330 Tables created by the press charted the displacements of the world’s new capital ships, 
completed or under construction, put Brazil at the top of the list.331 
An important qualifier, however, is that Alencar was the outgoing minister of marine—
and buried in the official contract was a stipulation that the next minister of marine had to 
approve of the new design. Admiral Margues Leao, appointed as Alencar’s replacement by the 
new presidential administration, did not. Assuming his office in November 1910, Leao had been 
heavily influenced by the designs of new German dreadnoughts, which mounted twelve-inch 
guns, and the president he served under would go on to state that the new dreadnought should 
“not be built on exaggerated lines such as have not yet stood the test of experience.”332 Bacelar, 
however, was of the opposite opinion and believed that Brazil needed the most powerful 
dreadnought it could purchase. Accordingly, he was able to convince Armstrong to sketch out 
designs that were actually larger, featuring up to a main battery of 16-inch guns and secondary 
9.4-inch guns—a design that was Bacelar’s own brainchild and “probably the most outrageous 
Dreadnought ever proposed,” according to economic and naval historian David Topliss. 
Unfortunately for Armstrong and D’Eyncourt, who found himself headed back to Brazil in 
March 1911, they quickly discovered that Leao’s views would carry the day. By the time 
D’Eyncourt arrived in Brazil, Armstrong had been told that Leao had “practically convinced the 
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president [of Brazil] to cancel the Rio de Janeiro and replace her with an improved Minas 
Geraes.” With the winds having shifted so decisively in favor of a smaller dreadnought, 
D’Eyncourt likely only proposed twelve-inch gunned battleships upon his arrival in Brazil.333 
The classic account of D’Eyncourt’s negotiations in Brazil, found in maritime historian 
Richard Hough’s The Big Battleship, acclaims D’Eyncourt as a masterfully flexible negotiator 
who was surprised by the shift to 12-inch guns. In this telling, upon discovering the shift in naval 
philosophy, D’Eyncourt immediately dropped the designs he had brought with him to the 
country, all of which were armed with guns of at least 13.5 inches, and improvised a 12-inch 
gunned solution over the course of one night’s work.334 Topliss, however, demonstrates that this 
tale is “totally contradicted by the evidence” contained in the Armstrong’s archives. 
D’Eyncourt’s flexibility was indeed masterful, something he proved in dealing with all the 
requests for small design alterations both before and after the new desire for 12-inch guns, but 
Armstrong was only “briefly” misled by Bacelar’s proposals and was “well aware” of the change 
in dominant naval philosophy. D’Eyncourt was informed of this shift via shipboard telegraph 
before he even landed in Brazil, and he had brought several twelve-inch designs with him, 
including several modernized variations on the basic design of the Minas Geraes class.335 
Once D’Eycourt landed in Brazil, discussions with Leao and the country’s naval 
authorities quickly focused on Design 690, the largest applicable design D’Eycourt had brought 
with him. It called for no less than fourteen twelve-inch guns, a total that would be the most guns 
in a main battery that the world had ever seen. Topliss speculates that the reasoning for this was 
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nakedly political and stemmed from Leao’s desire for the twelve-inch gun. Under Rio de 
Janeiro’s revised contract from the previous October, any alterations required that the Brazilian 
government spend at least as much—and that total was already greater than what they had paid 
for Minas Geraes, which carried twelve twelve-inch guns. Topliss suspects that Leao was 
worried that if he settled for a new dreadnought with only ten or twelve twelve-inch guns, he 
would be criticized for ordering a ship that was, on paper at least, less capable yet more 
expensive. Without the option of fourteen-inch guns, the only remaining option was to make sure 
that the number of twelve-inch guns in the new design was more than that of the preceding 
Minas Geraes.336 
By June 1911, Leao chose to move ahead with the fourteen-gun design, signing a contract 
for £2.675 million.337 The new ship would also carry a maximum of nine-inch belt armor, three 
separate armored decks, steam at a maximum of twenty-two knots, and carry over three thousand 
tons of coal plus oil, which according to one contemporary naval analyst was an “exceptional 
amount” of fuel when compared to the other South American dreadnoughts.338 
Curiously, the Revolt of the Lash seems to have had little impact on Rio de Janeiro; for 
example, the mutiny is left entirely unmentioned in Topliss’ comprehensive account of Rio de 
Janeiro’s design history. This is despite a unanimous, if also brief, determination by Brazilian 
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president Hermes Rodrigues da Fonseca and his cabinet to sell the two Minas Geraes-class 
dreadnoughts before the ships were made obsolete in three to four years. Surprisingly, the 
supporting ministers included Rio Branco, leading Haggard to exclaim that “this is indeed a 
wonderful surrender on the part of the man who was answerable for the purchase and who 
looked upon them as the most cherished offspring of his policy.” The Brazilian politicians, 
however, eventually decided that the potential negative effects such a deal could have in the 
country’s politics outweighed the desire to rid themselves of the warships.339 
Armstrong laid down Rio de Janeiro’s keel on 14 September 1911, but by the following 
year, the Brazilian government was once again reconsidering their purchase.340 This happened 
even as the ship received more press calling it the world’s “biggest battleship” after its launch on 
22 January 1913, although this was inaccurate as the Argentine dreadnoughts were slightly 
larger.341 Contemporary foreign dreadnoughts outside Germany were all opting for fourteen-inch 
guns, including the Chileans, whose second super-dreadnought Almirante Cochrane was laid 
down in the slip vacated by Rio de Janeiro on the same day the latter ship was launched. Inside 
Brazil, prominent newspapers were comparing their dreadnought to Nevada, a super-
dreadnought being built for the United States, which could fire a heavier broadside with four 
fewer guns in its main battery thanks to the use of fourteen-inch guns and two triple-gun turrets. 
In short, the Brazilian government was confronting the dilemma that had caused it to reorder Rio 
de Janeiro in the first place—the ship would be wholly outclassed soon after it was completed, 
both on paper and reality.342 
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Military strength and international prestige were not the only obstacles the Brazilian 
government was confronting, as their finances were becoming increasingly problematic. In 1912, 
the government was facing external and internal debts totaling over $800 million and a yearly 
deficit that neared $50 million per year.343 By the following year, a financial crunch caused by an 
increase in government expenditures was looming, and their international credit was suffering 
under the weight of internal public debt.344 Meanwhile, Brazil’s rubber industry, a key source of 
government revenue, was declining in the face of intense competition from the United 
Kingdom’s colonies in Southeast Asia.345 In May 1913, the Brazilian government was unable to 
obtain a desired 11 million (presumably pounds sterling, but not specified) in loans, and by 
October 1913, Brazil was facing an economic depression fueled by the decline of coffee and 
rubber.346 In the same month, Haggard, close to departing his office as the British minister to 
Brazil, said that “I must state that [the country] is … in a worse condition than it was when I 
arrived here in 1906.”347 
Armstrong mounted a strange attempt to rescue Rio de Janeiro in September 1913, 
suggesting that all fourteen twelve-inch guns be replaced by seven fifteen-inch guns, one per 
turret. This armament arrangement would have been completely without precedent; no 
dreadnought ever built, before or after, utilized single gun turrets.348 The Brazilians, however, 
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had already asked Rothchilds, their British financial backers, to seek buyers willing to pay £2 
million for their vessel.349  
There was no shortage of countries captivated by the soon-to-be-former Rio de Janeiro. 
Russia, Greece, the Ottoman Empire, and Italy were all interested in acquiring it for themselves, 
and France wanted to steer it to Greece, which would ensure that it could not fall into Italy’s 
hands. Slowly, some of these nations dropped out. The Russians, who had reportedly been 
interested in the ship as early as January 1913, decided against a purchase on 5 November of the 
same year, stating that the ship’s construction was so far advanced that the cost of altering its 
armament to Russia’s desired arrangement was prohibitive. Italy also took itself out of the 
running later that month, although an inaccurate report in the Daily Telegraph reported that they 
had bought the ship; in any case the French government continued assisting its Greek counterpart 
in their acquisition efforts.350  
Throughout November and most of December, the Greek government looked for a 
financial backer to fulfill their 27 November offer of the ship’s total contract price plus an 
additional £50,000, as the Brazilians were demanding that they receive the cash up front.351 
Throughout the end of November and most of December, the French, Greeks, and then-First 
Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill tried to line up all the financial dominoes, but these 
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efforts came to a crashing halt on 29 December.352 On that day, the Ottomans announced that 
they had taken formal control of the still-incomplete battleship with a deposit of £1.25 million 
and an additional £940,000 to be paid within six weeks.353 The offer had been backed by the 
French Périer bank, something which gave its country’s government a black eye.354 The total 
reported purchase price was £2.34 million.355 The Ottomans were required to pay for the 
remainder of the ship’s construction, which would be renamed Sultan Osman I.356 Publicly, the 
Brazilian Navy stated its reasoning in the Daily Telegraph as wanting a “better class” of 
battleship, with which the navy could form two separate divisions: one with two fifteen-inch-
armed super-dreadnoughts, and the other with the two Minas Geraes class ships.357 
Ironically, the purchase fulfilled some of the fears expressed by naval commentators 
when the two Minas Geraes-class dreadnoughts were under construction. “The purchase [of Rio 
de Janeiro] must be regarded by naval powers as a disconcerting incident if enormously 
powerful ships built for one country are to be sold at the last moment to another,” the Christian 
Science Monitor’s European Bureau wrote at the end of 1913. “The building programs of 
European dockyards will be subject to hopeless fluctuation and a dangerous factor of a new 
description will be introduced to naval competition.”358 Conversely, Bacelar, the now-former 
head of the Brazilian naval commission in the United Kingdom, blasted his government in a 
published letter for “weakening the power and prestige of Brazil in the eyes of the world.” The 
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Brazilian government countered his claims by stating that Rio de Janeiro was not suitable for 
“the new scheme of the navy,” and put Bacelar under arrest.359 
The truncated end to Brazil’s naval dreams 
Having disposed of Rio de Janeiro, there was unfounded speculation that Brazil was 
content with its two Minas Geraes-class dreadnoughts.360 This was not the case, and in fact 
ignored the previously stated intentions of the Brazilian government. Advocacy efforts 
supporting an order for what was then going to be a fourth dreadnought extended back at least as 
far as 1910, when Bacelar vocalized his belief that the-then just announced Rio de Janeiro 
“could not be left alone … and similar ships will have to be built to accompany her in the 
Brazilian fleet.”361 Perhaps more importantly, however, the Navy League of Brazil mobilized to 
support the effort. Described by Fiennes, the British naval expert, as “strong and aggressive” 
with a “real influence on public opinion,” the league started collecting public subscriptions for a 
fourth dreadnought starting in 1910, setting quotas for each state and major city in the country in 
the process. Such a ship would have been in addition to the originally planned Minas Geraes, 
São Paulo, and Rio de Janeiro.362 This effort was evidently quite successful, as in 1912 one 
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chronicler stated that the Navy League’s forty thousand members were “working might and 
main” for an additional two dreadnoughts, and that an order for the first was “almost a certainty, 
as a great deal of money is already subscribed.”363 
In October 1913, the Brazilian government publicly announced its intention to sell the 
ship and use the funds to construct a new and larger super-dreadnought. Design proposals from 
Armstrong and Vickers quickly followed.364 These early pitches show large variations in 
armament, which could indicate that the Brazilians were uncertain as to what they were looking 
for in their new capital warship, but they eventually settled on the fifteen-inch gun.365 By January 
1914, mere days after Rio de Janeiro was sold, reports stated that they had signed an agreement 
with Armstrong to construct another dreadnought at no additional cost.366 Another naval 
commission was sent abroad in the following month.367  
Armstrong submitted four designs that October, the most detailed of which was an 
enlarged Almirante Latorre-class battleship, then being built by Armstrong for Chile. This 
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proposal would have displaced three thousand tons more than the Chilean super-dreadnoughts, 
which would accommodate lengthening the ship to carry a sixth fourteen-inch gun turret, adding 
heavier armor, and a more powerful power plant to ensure that it could steam at approximately 
the same top speed (twenty-three knots). The other three proposals were for larger vessels: a 
32,500-ton ship mounting ten fifteen-inch guns, essentially a faster and up-gunned variant of 
Britain’s Iron Duke class, or a 36,000-ton sketch that used the same hull design to carry a main 
armament of either ten sixteen-inch guns or twelve fifteen-inch guns.368 
In December through March, Vickers offered a wide range of designs that featured either 
fifteen- or sixteen-inch guns on displacements that varied from 26,000 to 30,500 tons. All gave 
the Brazilians the option of using “mixed” firing—that is, coal sprayed with oil—or oil-only 
firing, of which the latter’s better thermal efficiency would give a faster speed on approximately 
the same displacement. The final two designs, submitted in March, called for eight or ten fifteen-
inch guns, the latter design lengthened to fit an extra turret and additional machinery to keep the 
top speed above twenty-two knots.369 
Armstrong, on the other hand, came back to the Brazilian government with eight broadly 
similar hull designs in February 1914, two of which carried eight fifteen-inch guns, and two 
longer proposals which carried ten. Within these, the ships varied primarily in their speed, fuel, 
and (presumably) propulsion machinery, although the differences in horsepower are not 
included. All of Armstrong’s designs called for fifteen-inch guns, possibly the same guns that 
were used on the United Kingdom’s Queen Elizabeth class, then under construction.370 
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In fact, Armstrong’s Design 781 bore a strong resemblance and would have drawn 
favorable comparisons to the Queen Elizabeth class. In comparing Design 781 and Queen 
Elizabeth, both ship classes were armed with eight fifteen-inch guns, but the former would have 
used its additional three thousand tons of displacement to carry additional armor at the cost of a 
slightly lower top speed. In all, Design 781 would have displaced 30,500 tons with a hull that 
was 660 feet long overall and carried belt armor that was a maximum of 13.5 inches thick. The 
machinery would have used mixed firing and geared turbines to achieve a speed of 22.5 knots, 
even though Armstrong offered oil-only firing in two of its eight proposals; the lower thermal 
efficiency of mixed firing lowered the design’s potential top speed.371 
The Brazilian government ordered one super-dreadnought of this design in May 1914, 
although reports of a provisional order with Armstrong emerged as early as February.372 
Preliminarily named Riachuelo, it was given the yard number 879, and its keel was to be laid in a 
berth next to Malaya, a super-dreadnought then under construction for the United Kingdom.373 
For one final time, press outlets heralded Brazil as the owner of the strongest warship in the 
world. The Christian Science Monitor, for example, called it the “world’s greatest [planned] 
dreadnought,” adding that it was “expected to exceed in size and power any other man-of-war 
afloat.”374 
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Brazil’s dreadnought dreams finally came to a crashing halt in August 1914 with the 
beginning of the First World War. The British government could not let foreign countries order 
warships from British shipyards, as the effort would use up valuable materials, building slips, 
and men that could be better used in contributing towards their own war effort. Construction of 
Riachuelo, whose projected keel laying date was in September 1914, was quietly and 
unceremoniously suspended in January 1915 and formally canceled in May.375 “Had it not been 
for the crisis and the war,” one author would write in 1919, “there is no doubt the Navy League 
… would have carried out its plans for the addition of two more first-class battleships to the 
fleet.”376 The former Rio de Janeiro also fell victim to the conflict, as the British took over the 
nearly complete ship shortly after the war began and commissioned it into their navy as 
Agincourt.377
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Countering the threat: Argentina and Chile 
In the years after the Pacts of May, Argentina and Chile remained true to the treaty they signed, 
which in part restricted each country’s warship purchases until 1907. Their resolve, however, 
began to fray as the Brazilian naval program of 1904 took shape. By 1906, the countries were 
inclined to abrogate the pacts so that they could respond to the Brazilian Navy’s planned 
expansion, with both making that determination before Brazil changed its order the 
dreadnoughts.378 
Argentina’s path 
Politicians in Argentina were particularly distressed at the prospect of a revived Brazilian 
Navy. The foundation of their country’s prosperity was situated upon the ability to export 
agricultural products, including wheat, corn, grain, and beef—in fact, eighty percent of the grain 
and beef produced in Argentina was shipped abroad. Compounding the lack of a diversified 
economy, most of Argentina’s exports went through the River Plate, the estuary on which the 
Argentine capital of Buenos Aires had been constructed. Strategically speaking, the choke point 
this created meant that a blockade of just the River Plate’s entrance, requiring only a small fleet 
of warships could significantly destabilize Argentina’s economy. As such, the Argentine 
government and its navy were keenly aware of the need to ensure that this scenario never came 
to pass. In the words of an Argentine admiral speaking to an American reporter in 1910: 
[Exports] must pass out of the Plate River [River Plate], which is our only channel to the 
outer world. If a hostile neighbor could blockade the Plate’s mouth, and keep shipping 
away from us, it could nearly destroy us. We should be choked, strangled, deprived of 
strength, and forced into submission. Therefore we have a navy, so that we can say to the 
world: ‘Send your ships for our grain and beef, and you shall have a free track up La 
Plata and back again to the high seas.’ It is really very simple. If you had to store a large 
amount of money in a public square you would want to have some policemen to guard 
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your hoard. Perhaps no one would try to steal it, even if it were not guarded. But you 
don’t want to take the risk of tempting your neighbors with an unprotected treasure.379 
 
These concerns help explain why the Argentine governments throughout the first half of 
the twentieth century believed that upholding a regional balance of power, especially on the high 
seas, was an integral part of maintaining their sovereignty.380 
With so much at stake, the United States saw the potential for an arms race within its 
perceived sphere of influence and attempted to head it off before it began. Lloyd C. Griscom, 
their ambassador to Brazil, wrote to his superiors that a naval arms race in the region could end 
in potentially ruinous results. At the Pan American Conference, held in Rio de Janeiro in 1906, 
the administration of United States President Theodore Roosevelt attempted to convince the 
Brazilian government to halt their naval construction program and forestall the possibility of an 
arms race. The Baron of Rio Branco, in a response that Griscom cabled home, baldly stated that 
acquiescing to such a request would reduce Brazil to the status of a mere puppet, matching the 
relationship Cuba had with the United States.381 
Similarly, the British had worries about the potential effects of an arms race in the region, 
namely that any resulting conflict would affect the United Kingdom’s extensive commercial 
interests in the region. Haggard, their ambassador to Argentina, wearily wrote in 1906 that “of 
course I am being constantly reminded that England is the country which will chiefly lose by any 
check on the prosperity of the Argentine Republic.”382 Brazil’s Baron of Rio Branco recognized 
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this as well, as he told Milne Cheetham, Britain’s chargés d'affaires in Rio de Janeiro during 
Haggard’s absences, in 1908 that a regional war would cause a “disaster to [Britain’s] trade and 
finances.”383 Some of these reminders came straight from the elites of Argentine society, as in 
September of that year Haggard wrote that Ernesto Tornquist, one of—if not the—most 
successful businessmen in Argentina, had quietly approached him to emphasize that “it would 
really be British interests that world chiefly suffer in the case of a war.”384 
Meanwhile, the Argentines paid close attention to the evolving designs of Brazil’s 
ordered warships. When the Brazilian government went ahead with an order for three 13,000 ton 
battleships, the Argentine Foreign Minister Manuel Augusto Montes de Oca stated in November 
1906 that any one of the new warships could “destroy the entire Argentine and Chilean fleets.”385 
That any one of these ships could accomplish this feat was likely an exaggeration, as both 
Argentina and Chile still possessed the ships obtained during their arms race that ended only a 
few years before, but the former’s navy had suffered from being starved of funds, which 
included skeleton crews, neglecting maintenance and upkeep, and a lack of at-sea training.386 
With that said, de Oca’s statement was certainly not hyperbolic: on an individual basis, Brazil’s 
three battleships would displace enough to nearly double any one of Argentina’s armored 
cruisers, still only a decade old. They would also each mount twelve ten-inch guns, as opposed to 
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six total ten-inch guns spread across three of Argentina’s cruisers.387 Moreover, the Argentine 
Navy was acutely aware of the Brazilian battleship’s designed draft—how far the ship’s hull 
would extend beneath the surface of the water at a given load. At twenty-four feet, uncommonly 
limited for warships of this size, Brazil’s new ships would measure in right at the River Plate’s 
maximum permitted draft.388  
Given these dangers and what Haggard called the Argentine government’s “seriously 
mistrustful” attitude towards Brazil, the Argentines planned to order at least two major warships 
of its own to counter Brazil’s planned vessels.389 Their preference, however, would first be to 
have no one ordering warships at all. “The Argentine Government will have the ships at their 
command if Brazil holds to hers,” Haggard wrote, “and will get rid of them if Brazil gets rid of 
them.” If that could not happen, Tornquist, the Argentine businessman, hoped to convince Brazil 
to agree to sell two of their three ships to Argentina and Chile. This would split the vessels 
equally among the three countries, who were the major powers in the region.390 This proposal 
was shot down almost as soon as it was proposed to the Baron of Rio Branco, as well as by 
Montes de Oca, the Argentine foreign minister, and the Argentine president.391 Tornquist, 
however, was unfazed and continued trying to build support for this idea, and Haggard would 
later credit Tornquist with building a credible opposition within the Argentine legislature to the 
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idea of ordering warships to counter Brazil’s. Shortly before Haggard was reassigned to Brazil, 
he wrote that Tornquist’s “common sense and cleverness” was behind the new-found movement, 
“for certainly three months back the Congress would have voted in its favor [i.e. to purchase new 
warships] almost unanimously.”392 By January 1907, Tornquist was at least briefly victorious: 
the Argentine legislature’s session ended without a vote on the proposal to order new battleships 
for the country’s navy.393 
The Brazilian government’s reaction to its Argentine counterpart was conciliatory yet 
unyielding. As summarized by and filtered through the lens of William I. Buchanan, a former 
American ambassador to Argentina, recent delegate to the Pan-American Exposition, and 
authorized representative of the Roosevelt administration, the Brazilian government was 
adamant that it was only striving to reconstruct its navy after the domestic conflicts of the 1890s: 
In the matter of Brazil’s present moves in connection with her navy, the following 
reflects exactly the views and expressions of facts and opinions I have secured: That for 
many years, Brazil was the first naval Power in South America; that during her civil war 
the major portion of her fleet, together with her marine arsenals, was either destroyed or 
greatly damaged; that following this an attempt was made to rebuild her fleet, but this 
was wholly abandoned owing to  the strong opposition made by the army, which had no 
faith in the loyalty of the navy; that since then nothing has been done in the matter 
beyond the purchase of one—possibly two—small ships, and that as a result Brazil finds 
herself with obsolete or out-of-repair ships and a run-down marine arsenal; that when 
Argentina bought ships and built a great naval port Brazil saw no cause for questioning 
her plans, and ergo that now Brazil feels that she is bound, in justice to her own place as 
a country and to her proper individual interests, to rebuild and refit what she has had and 
lost she cannot understand why Argentina should question her motives or presume that in 
this procedure on her part something lay hidden dangerous to Argentina.394 
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Remarkably, these claims were echoed only a few months later by Jose Carlos Rodriguez, the 
director of Jornal do Commercio, a leading newspaper in Brazil, in statements made to Walter 
Beaupré Townley, Britain’s new minister to Argentina.395 
By 1907, when the Brazilian government modified its program to feature multiple 
dreadnoughts, the requirements of an adequate response from Argentina and Chile became clear: 
under the Mahanian school of naval strategy, dreadnoughts would be required if one was to 
attain naval supremacy and, if needed, beat another nation’s dreadnoughts in a decisive battle—
or fight off a blockade.396 This major change in cost and capability, representing a tonnage 
increase of nearly fifty percent, was recommended by a commission of naval officers, which 
issued a study to the Argentine legislature in July 1907.397 Estanislao Zeballos, de Oca’s 
successor as foreign minister, eventually adopted a short-lived plan similar to Tornquist’s 
proposal: to split the capital warships among the powers of South America. Zeballos asked the 
Argentine legislature in July 1908 to approve a plan where they would demand Brazil hand over 
one of its dreadnoughts or face an Argentine invasion. This proposal was quickly scuttled after it 
was leaked to the media, and Zeballos—who had already been facing severe headwinds in the 
Argentine press and had been described as “étourdi,” French for “scatterbrained” or 
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“thoughtless,” by Julio Argentino Roca, the former president of Argentina—was forced to resign 
from his position.398 
The failure of this scheme meant that the Argentine government quickly began the 
process of acquiring their own dreadnoughts. In August 1908, the country’s Chamber of 
Deputies, the lower house in their bicameral legislature, passed a bill by a wide margin (seventy-
two to thirteen) that would fund the construction of a new fleet that would include the all-
important dreadnoughts and several destroyers, which would serve as escorts for the far larger 
dreadnoughts. The Argentine legislators took this action in the face of legislative and public 
opposition, which was generally against being dragged into a conflict or committing the country 
to spending a large chuck of their annual budget for new warships, rather than in a category like 
internal infrastructure (i.e. railroads). This opposition was, however, weakened with a barrage of 
newspaper editorials in La Prensa—a leading newspaper in Argentina and a loud voice in the 
debate—and the revival of several border disputes.399 Still, the Argentine Senate voted down the 
bill in November, possibly because it had hopes that a last-ditch effort to purchase one of 
Brazil’s dreadnoughts would finally succeed.400 It did not, however, and the bill was approved by 
the Argentine Senate by a large margin on 17 December 1908.401 It allocated $55 million to the 
navy, $22 million more than the amount recommended by the 1907 committee.402 An Argentine 
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naval commission charged with evaluating and approving final warship designs was set up in 
London not long after.403 
Figure 4.1: Line drawing of the Argentine dreadnoughts 
 
Source: Sydney Walker Barnaby, published in John Leyland, ed., Brassey’s Naval Annual, 1915 
(London: William Clowes and Sons, 1915), plate 18, via Wikimedia Commons. Public domain. 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Rivadavia-class_battleships.jpg. 
 
A controversial ordering process 
Soon after the Argentine legislature apportioned money for naval expansion, the 
country’s naval commission in London began soliciting tenders for two dreadnoughts and a 
number of destroyers and smaller warships.404 For the dreadnoughts, the commission issued a set 
of vague requirements designed to encourage the companies to present the best and most modern 
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ideas they had.405 These included a maximum cost of $10 million each, a figure which included 
armament, armor, and equipment; a trial displacement of at least 19,000 to 20,000 tons, the 
quantity of guns, and a secondary armament of “sufficient” size, which the bemused author of an 
article in the New York Times stated was a precise translation of the original Spanish used in the 
naval commission’s call for bids. “They can hardly be called specifications at all, so general are 
their terms,” the writer added. “The consequence is that a greater number of shipbuilding firms 
have come forward with bids probably than ever before took part in such a contest [sic].”406 
Thirty-eight firms responded with one hundred thirty-four tenders, of which sixty-seven 
were for the dreadnoughts; one naval architect later estimated that the combined cost of 
preparing these was at least £20,000.407 The bids, due to be opened on 8 March 1909, came from 
shipbuilders located in five of the eight naval powers of the world: France, Germany, Italy, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States.408 With the exception of the United States, all these 
nations had a track record of purchases from militaries in the region. The Italians, for example, 
had provided all four of Argentina’s armored cruisers, the cornerstone on which the Argentine 
government had leaned on during their naval arms race with Chile, and as a result Italian 
shipbuilders were reportedly anticipating that the dreadnought order would be placed with one of 
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Contracts,” Washington Post, 11 April 1909, 14; “Cramps Bid on Battleships,” New York Times, 9 March 1909, 4.  
The other naval powers—Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Japan, as defined by Gardiner and Gray, Conway’s 1906–
21—did not bid to construct Argentina’s dreadnoughts. 
   
111 
 
their yards.409 The Argentine Navy, however, believed that the Italian cruisers had not aged as 
well as comparable British warships, having had more problems since entering service.410 In 
addition, most of these countries, again apart from the United States, had proved that they were 
willing to deploy their diplomatic representatives to obtain warship contracts for their own 
shipyards.411 
As might be surmised, then, this was new territory for the Americans. Under the 
administration of Theodore Roosevelt, president from 1901 to 1909, the United States’ 
government had expended little effort in seeking armament contracts from Latin American 
countries, providing little more than letters of introduction to competing armament firms when 
needed. This changed quickly under the administration of William Howard Taft, who took office 
in 1909 and quickly instituted a policy of so-called “dollar diplomacy” in concert with his new 
secretary of state, Philander C. Knox.412 Taft characterized the shift as being part of an overdue 
modernization of American diplomacy and its State Department, which was responsible for 
international diplomacy. “It is an effort frankly directed at the increase of American trade,” Taft 
would later tell the American legislature, based “upon the axiomatic principle that the 
Government of the United States shall extend all proper support to every legitimate and 
beneficial American enterprise abroad.”413 As part of these efforts, the State Department created 
a new Division of Latin American Affairs, and Taft appointed Charles Sherrill as the United 
States’ minister to Argentina, both in 1909. Sherrill, a New York lawyer and personal friend of 
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Taft’s, was explicitly charged with bringing the contracts to a United States shipbuilder.414 While 
the policy was targeted at South America and East Asia, American representatives in countries as 
far afield as Spain, Russia, Turkey, Greece, and China were involved in attempts to steer 
contracts for naval armament to shipbuilders in the United States during this time.415 
Despite this new-found diplomatic assistance, provided without cost, the American 
shipbuilders involved in the competition remained skeptical that they would be able to beat out 
the European firms and win the contracts.416 For one, the European diplomats in the country 
were not resting on their laurels; promoting the commercial enterprises of one’s own country, 
including France and especially Germany, was part of the job.417 “The political influence of 
foreign powers is being exerted in a very forceful manner,” the head of the Newport News 
Shipbuilding and Drydock Company wrote several months after Taft’s inauguration to Ormsby 
McHarg, the assistant secretary at the United States’ Department of Commerce and Labor. He 
protested that American shipbuilders would be given “little consideration” if the government was 
unwilling to “exert powerful influence,” as the Italians, Germany, and British were already 
making good use of their own diplomatic and political pressure points.418 Haggard, and later 
Townley, the British ministers to Argentina, were two of those envoys exerting influence. In a 
meeting with Zeballos in April 1907, for example, Townley quietly reminded the Argentine 
politician that their predecessors had met in the preceding August, and that the former foreign 
minister had given his word that the largest two ships planned would “certainly be ordered in 
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England” should the naval program be funded.419 Meanwhile, the German government was 
allegedly offering shipyards in its country a fifteen percent bonus so that they could underbid the 
other competitors and get the contract.420 
Figure 4.2: Rivadavia’s launch, 26 August 1911 
 
Source: Library of Congress via Wikimedia Commons. Public domain. 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:ARA_Rivadavia_launch.jpg. 
 
Diplomats were not the only obstacle to the United States, as resistance to them from 
within Argentina was “formidable,” as Livermore would later write: “The naval commission was 
pro-British; the vice-president of the republic, Roque Sáenz Peña, favored Italy, where he had 
been the Argentine envoy for many years; and the minister of war wanted the contracts to go to 
Germany, so as to standardize the military and naval equipment of the country.” They were not 
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the only Argentine politicians and officials predisposed to one side: early in the process, the 
Argentine minister of marine actively sought to and successfully disqualified American 
shipbuilders from the contract competition, a maneuver that was reversed only after Sherrill’s 
fierce opposition.421  
Finally, all the shipbuilders—not just American—were challenged by the wholly 
unexpected Argentine decision to change their required dreadnought specifications, thereby 
moving the goalposts, in early October 1909.422 Publicly, the decision was prompted by the 
emergence of details on the new ‘super-dreadnought’ type, heralded by the British Orion. 
However, as a reporter for the New York Times added, it was also a happy aftereffect of the 
initial requirements even though the Argentine naval commission had been “very much at sea as 
to just what they really want.”423 The nebulous specifications had enticed the constructors into 
proposing some of their newest and even secret features, including the United States Navy’s 
brand-new and still secret fire control and torpedo arrangements—an action which later proved 
controversial.424 
Unfortunately for the shipbuilders, in addition to seeking super-dreadnoughts, the 
commission took what they viewed as the best features found on the submitted bids—including 
cage masts and a main battery with both superfiring and wing turrets—and recast their 
specifications around those. They then sent these back to all the shipbuilders, no matter how 
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unique the features had been.425 New bids were due quickly, as they were opened by November 
at the latest.426 
Finally, the commission took these new tenders, having been enlarged by several 
thousand tons to meet the super-dreadnought requirement, and proceeded to again call for new 
designs based on the best features of those already received.427 Details on what happened next 
are difficult to tell apart, but Townley, the British minister to Argentina, stated that these new 
specifications were given to six of the bidding firms: Armstrong and Vickers from the United 
Kingdom, Fore River from the United States, Ansaldo from Italy, Forges and Chantiers from 
France, and Blohm and Voss from Germany. Each were asked how fast they would be able to 
build such a ship, measuring in at 27,500 tons and not to cost more than £2.2 million.428 Fore 
River, which had consistently submitted the lowest bids, asserted that they would be able to build 
such a ship in twenty-four months; Armstrong stated that they would need both more money and 
at least an additional nine months.429 
When the British learned of this development, they immediately pressed the naval 
commission to allow Armstrong to lower its bid by $570,000, bringing it below Fore River. 
Sherrill immediately cabled home with what Livermore described as an “anguished appeal” to 
the State Department to find a way around this “chicanery,” and the Division of Latin American 
Affairs responded with a list of six points which Sherrill could bring to the Argentines. These 
included a mix of prestige-based declarations and tangible action items, such as funds for the Pan 
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American Conference of 1910, due to be held in Buenos Aires, and the State Department’s 
official discouragement of any Brazilian or Uruguayan questions over the jurisdiction of the 
River Plate. These successfully convinced enough of the Argentine Naval Commission to give 
the contract to Fore River on a vote of 7–6 on 21 January 1910, with the deciding vote being cast 
by the minister of marine.430 As agreed upon by Fore River and the New York Shipbuilding 
Company prior to any bids being opened, one dreadnought was subcontracted to the latter.431 The 
news of the dreadnought contract’s destination evidently leaked to the papers before the winners 
were officially announced and notified, as the head of New York Shipbuilding was exceedingly 
cautious in response to questions from a New York Times correspondent. “If correct,” he said, “it 
is the greatest testimony to American shipbuilders, seeing that all the famous yards of the world 
are competing for the business.”432 The destroyer contracts had previously been split between 
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom to soften any political and diplomatic fallout.433 
The shenanigans surrounding the dreadnought bidding process infuriated the shipbuilders 
involved.434 John H. Biles, a well-regarded British professor of naval architecture at Glasgow 
University who was a former Admiralty and commercial naval architect, wrote a letter to the 
editor of the Times to express his contempt for the way this process had been conducted:435 
We may assume that the British battleships embody good ideas and good practice—in all 
probability the very best. These cannot fail, in a greater or less degree, to become part of 
the design which the British shipbuilder first submits to the Argentine Government. In the 
second inquiry it may be presumed that everything that was good in the first proposals 
had been seized upon by the Argentine authorities and asked for in the new design. This 
second request went not only to British builders but to all the builders of the world, and in 
this way it is exceedingly probable that a serious leakage of ideas and practice of our 
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ships was disseminated through the world by the Argentine government. The British 
builders, in replying to this second inquiry, would, in all probability, point out that some 
of the things are impractical, or have been tried and found undesirable in the British 
Navy, and the Argentine authorities would be informed on additional matters which have 
come under the builders’ knowledge by their acquaintance with British practice. 
 
The third inquiry that was issued showed to all the builders of the world what has been 
eliminated or modified in the second inquiry; and so the process of leakage went merrily 
on, and with it that of the education of foreign builders and the Argentine government.436 
 
Biles additionally decried the “cheap and pleasant method of education” the “generosity” of the 
shipbuilders had given the Argentine government and estimated that the final cost of putting all 
the bids together was a combined £80,000–100,000. It is perhaps notable, however, that Biles 
only sent his letter after Fore River won the contract.437  
Townley was frustrated by the decision, which he attributed to Sherrill’s exuberance in 
bringing the contract to the United States. “Hardly a day passed that he did not find some excuse 
to go to the Government House and press the claims of his countrymen,” Townley wrote, adding: 
There is good reason to believe that the American Minister resorted to every sort of 
political pressure, and that a promise was given that if the ships were built in the United 
States Brazil should give no trouble until they have been delivered. It is hard to say what 
Argentina will do with these big ships when she gets them, as she has no port into which 
she can take them, and even were the money forthcoming for the construction of a new 
port, or for the enlargement of an old one, there would hardly be time for such works to 
be completed before the ships are delivered, if the two years limit is strictly adhered to. 
British naval constructors say that it is quite impossible that the ships can be ready in the 
time.438 
 
British media outlets joined in crediting American diplomacy, calling it “a triumph of the Pan-
American idea.”439 Sherill carefully guarded his achievement, writing Fore River’s president to 
admonish him for not giving credit to the State Department in media interviews he had given. On 
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the other hand, Charles Schwab, whose Bethlehem Steel would be supplying the armament and 
armor for the dreadnoughts, wrote to the secretary of statement with profuse thanks. “We are 
glad to say that our success is due entirely to the great interest manifest by your Department,” 
Schwab wrote. “It is, to my mind, the best step ever made towards the further development of 
America’s commercial relations with foreign countries.”440  
The British were not the only ones annoyed at the Argentine government’s decision. The 
Italian government declared that it would no longer send a naval squadron to commemorate 
Argentina’s centennial celebrations, and German press outlets would later charge Fore River 
with corporate espionage, believing that they had been able to see the bids from opposing 
shipbuilders and tailor their own to suit, and the American government with secretly 
guaranteeing to defend Argentina until the battleships were completed.441 This last point had 
some basis in fact. Prior to the dreadnought contract being awarded, Sherill had indeed been 
asked by Argentina’s foreign minister if the United States would join Argentina should it find 
itself in a war with one of its neighboring countries. Sherill replied that he could offer no 
guarantees about formal support, but that their new capital ships being under construction in the 
United States would “tend to restrain any power desirous of our friendship from making war 
upon Argentina during the time of the construction of these vessels in American yards.”442 
The dreadnought sale raised hackles in the United States’ domestic politics as well. 
Robert M. La Follette, a senator from Wisconsin, championed two resolutions in February 1911. 
One would require the release of all the Argentine dreadnought-related communiques which had 
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involved the state department, including those passed between it and the Argentine government. 
The other demanded that the United States’ navy department furnish the same information, along 
with answering several questions about the extent of any aid given to the design and construction 
of the Argentine dreadnoughts.443 Both passed, but over the objections of La Follette the 
resolution targeting the state department was amended on a vote of 44–28 to give the department 
discretion over releasing the correspondence.444 The two secretaries of these departments 
responded in April, stating that their diplomatic and technical support was furnished as part of 
the Dollar Diplomacy policy instituted in 1909. “It was apparent that if the American 
competitors in the shipbuilding trade were to offer bids on a footing of equality with their foreign 
rivals,” George von Lengerke Meyer, Taft’s secretary of the navy, said, “it was essential that 
they receive from their government the same assistance and support as that which the great 
ordnance manufacturers of Europe obtain from their governments.”445 Knox, the secretary of 
state, took full advantage of the resolution as amended and refused to release any of the 
communications from his department, fearing possible detrimental effects on relations between 
the two countries or to American shipbuilders.446 The navy department was given no such 
leeway, and the report it gave to the Senate was entered into and published in the Congressional 
Record. It included a lengthy list of the naval technologies given to the Argentine Navy since 
1907 and a declaration that the United States Navy would indeed be installing a fire control 
system on the Argentine dreadnoughts.447 
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Outside the political and diplomatic realms, press in the United Kingdom and its 
Commonwealth were surprised that British shipbuilders lost out on the dreadnoughts. As the 
Evening Standard of London put it, the United Kingdom was “Argentina's greatest creditor and 
greatest client and had a right to expect the naval contract.”448 Indeed, in 1909, Argentina’s trade 
balance with the United Kingdom was $500 million, while its equivalent figure with the United 
States was a mere $22.573 million.449 However, the United States possessed a decisive advantage 
over the British: the secretary of the Argentine Naval Commission would later credit the 
“manipulations of the Steel Trust” as being able to produce steel at a far lower price than 
comparable British steel mills despite higher labor costs.450 This meant that Fore River had large 
advantages in both the basic building material used to construct a dreadnought and the expensive 
and thick armor plating it needed to survive in combat.451 Specifically, this disparity allowed 
Fore River to submit a bid that was more than £7 cheaper per ton than the next closest tender and 
exactly £8 lower per ton than the British, representing a nearly ten percent cost advantage.452 
There were also allegations from several sources that Fore River offered such a low contract 
price because the shipyard was short on work and in need of a large contract which could help 
keep it open and its staff employed. This was, however, not the case, as the yard launched fifty-
three ships between 1905 and 1910 and had “a lucrative and very diversified shipbuilding 
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operation,” according to a history of the shipyard.453 This included building steam turbines, 
something which would later cause them much trouble prior to the delivery of the Argentine 
dreadnoughts.454 
Construction and trials of the Argentine dreadnoughts 
Construction on the two dreadnoughts, which would be named Rivadavia and Moreno 
after two political figures from Argentine history, started several months after the contract was 
awarded.455 Rivadavia, being constructed by Fore River in Quincy, Massachusetts, was laid 
down on 25 May 1910 and launched on 26 August 1911.456 The launching ceremony was filmed 
by the Edison Company and, like Minas Geraes, full of pageantry.457 Rivadavia, weighing in at a 
bit under eleven thousand tons, was decorated with flags and bunting in the national colors of 
Argentina (blue and white), and the ship was sponsored by Rosa Isidora González Delgado, the 
wife of the Argentine president Roque Sáenz Peña. As Delgado did not make the trip, the wife of 
the Argentine minister to the United States served as her proxy and shattered the traditional 
bottle of champagne over Rivadavia’s bow. Among the one thousand people in attendance at the 
event were representatives from the Argentine Navy and the country’s diplomatic contingent to 
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the United States, and they stood alongside many American government and industry officials, 
including the assistant chief of the State Department’s Division of Latin-American Affairs, 
officers from the United States Navy, political figures from both the national and state 
legislatures, the president of Cramps Shipbuilding, and Charles Schwab from Bethlehem Steel.458 
The actual launch of the hull sliding into the water was delayed by nearly one and a half 
hours, as according to the New York Times, “more and heavier blocking had been built around 
the massive hull than in the case of any vessel previously launched at the Fore River yards, and 
the builders failed to realize how long it would take to remove it.”459 To stop the ship once it 
made it into the water, they employed twenty-four thousand pounds of nine-inch manila cable, 
and they ended up breaking all of them in the span of about ten seconds; the ship came to a halt 
some ten feet beyond the final stop.460 Finally, the company hosted a dinner with the listed 
speakers including Onofre Betbeder, head of the Argentine naval commission; Captain Aguirre 
of the Argentine Navy; Francis T. Bowles, Fore River’s president; William T. Shea, mayor of 
Quincy, Massachusetts; and James Michael Curley, a member of the House of Representatives in 
Massachusetts’ tenth congressional district.461 Taft, the president of the United States, cabled the 
Argentine minister to his country to convey his congratulations and his “hope” that Argentina 
will find their new dreadnought “useful only for the peace she insures and never in hostile 
engagement.”462 
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Figure 4.3: An Argentine dreadnought under construction, 2 December 1912 
 
Source: George Grantham Bain collection, Library of Congress. Public domain. 
https://hdl.loc.gov/loc.pnp/ggbain.11004. 
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Neither Rivadavia or Moreno came anywhere near the guaranteed delivery time of 
twenty-four months, as delays with both ship’s Bethlehem-made guns and problems with their 
turbine propulsion significantly delayed their completion. By March 1913, a full ten months after 
the ships were supposed to be completed, only six of Rivadavia’s twelve guns had been delivered 
to the shipyard. Even though the ship was otherwise ninety-seven percent complete, this delay 
meant that the turrets meant to hold the guns were also behind schedule, and Rivadavia was 
consequently not expected to undergo trials until the middle of 1913, nor be completed and 
handed over to the Argentine Navy before 1914. Moreno was suffering from similar delays.463 
Rivadavia’s main armament was mostly fitted by the end of June 1913.464 It finally put to 
sea in August when it sailed from the Fore River shipyard for New York’s Brooklyn Navy Yard, 
where it would be docked at the United States Navy facility’s drydock so that its bottom could be 
scraped and painted.465 It was, however, then towed into the city by eight tugs, leading to rumors 
that it had stripped a turbine.466 This issue proved minor enough that the ship could be repaired 
with only a two-week delay for its speed trials on 14–16 September, which would test the ship’s 
ability to make a contractually guaranteed 22.5 knots. Rivadavia did so, traveling at a maximum 
of 22.567 knots over the United States Navy’s official measured mile off Rockland, Maine. This 
speed made it the fastest battleship built in the United States, exceeding that of Wyoming by 
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about half a knot.467 This was a prestigious-sounding honor which excited the constructors and 
inspired press headlines, but the speed had previously been exceeded in capital ships abroad. In 
addition, newspapers expected that the ship would undergo gun, endurance, and economy trials 
starting on the following day.468 These were, however, halted to make a fix to the boilers in 
Rivadavia’s starboard turbine, as it was producing too much pressure when the ship traveled at 
high speeds.469 This was a recurrence of the problem which had caused it to be towed into New 
York, and the ship was originally expected to head back out to sea after only a few days of 
repairs, though this was quickly revised in subsequent reporting to about a month.470 
The endurance run was, however, not accomplished for several months.471 In late 
December, the trials were delayed once more for what the Christian Science Monitor bluntly 
called the “inability of her builders to make her ready in time for today’s high tide.”472 This time, 
there was an issue with the center turbine which reportedly required only simple and quick 
repairs, yet the trials were delayed yet another time in mid-January, implying that the problem 
was more serious than originally thought.473 
It was only in February and March 1914 that the endurance and gun trials were 
completed. The ship departed Boston on 3 or 4 February for ten days of endurance trials, which 
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were successfully run at twenty knots for thirty hours.474 On 17 February, the ship was coaled up 
for an economy run, testing the ship’s fuel consumption when running at fifteen knots, and in 
March hit a 22.56-knot top speed once more.475 Rivadavia’s gun trials, like those of Minas 
Geraes several years earlier, granted the Argentine ship the record for heaviest broadside ever 
fired from a warship.476 
The trials were completed by the middle of March, at which time the Argentine 
government preliminarily accepted the ship; the ship reportedly only required two to three 
months of minor finishing work.477 By the end of June, the families of two Argentine naval 
officers overseeing Rivadavia’s construction departed for home in the expectation that the 
officers would be heading home soon on the dreadnought.478 Around the same time, the ship was 
expected to depart Boston in the following month for a final trial trip before docking in the 
Charlestown Navy Yard, where it would pick up its Argentine crew.479 There was, however, yet 
another delay, this one to the end of August.480 On 10 August, nine hundred officers and seamen 
of the Argentine Navy boarded two transport ships, bound for Massachusetts.481 They reached 
the navy yard within two weeks, shortly before the official handover ceremony from Fore River 
to the Argentine Navy was to occur.482 This was briefly delayed when it was discovered that 
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there was yet another problem with the starboard turbine and its forty-ton casing, which had been 
damaged in July after being dropped ten feet by a crane.483 The Argentines evidently decided to 
move ahead nonetheless, however, as the ship was commissioned on 27 August to an audience of 
six hundred Argentine naval personnel.484 After the turbine was repaired, the ship left 
Massachusetts in November, bound for New York where its bottom would once again be scraped 
and painted.485 On 21 December, more than three years after the ship had been launched, 
Rivadavia finally departed for Argentina.486 It arrived there in January 1915.487 
Moreno was subjected to similarly lengthy delays as its sister ship. The dreadnought, 
being constructed by New York Shipbuilding in Camden, New Jersey, was laid down on 10 July 
1910 and launched on 23 September 1911.488 The launching ceremony hit many of the same 
points as Rivadavia’s. It was sponsored by Josefa Julia María Bouquet Roldán, the wife of José 
Figueroa Alcorta, the previous president of Argentina, although she did not attend the launch and 
was represented by Isabel Betbeder, the wife of the head of the Argentine Naval Commission. 
Other Argentine and American representatives, again from the government, military, and 
industry of both countries, were in attendance as well. Moreno was approximately seventy 
percent complete and weighed 12,500 tons at launch; a full 13 tons of tallow were required to 
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grease the ways and help ease the ship into the water. After the event ended, various dignitaries 
were invited to a New York Shipbuilding-hosted luncheon in New York City.489 
Figure 4.4: Rivadavia, probably on its trials, c. 1913–14 
 
Source: George Grantham Bain collection, Library of Congress. Public domain. 
https://hdl.loc.gov/loc.pnp/ggbain.14781. 
 
Like Rivadavia, Bowles, the president of Fore River, stated in January 1913 that 
Moreno’s trials would not be run until at least mid-1913, having faced delays in getting the guns 
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delivered from Bethlehem.490 Construction lagged behind Rivadavia, however, and the ship’s 
trials were delayed until October 1914.491 Late that month, the ship sailed for the Brooklyn Naval 
Yard for a pre-trials bottom scraping and painting, even though its interior was only partly 
furnished.492 During the time it was docked, a reporter for the New York Times toured the ship 
and wrote an entire article about the ship’s bar, which openly served alcohol. They called it “the 
cutest little bar on any of the seven seas.”493 Moreno set out for trial runs off Rockland, Maine, 
on 25 October, but on 2 November news reports emerged that painted a picture of severe engine 
trouble: 
Men who were aboard the big battleship state that engine trouble was experienced almost 
from the beginning of the trip. First the port engine went bad and repairs to this were 
made while at sea. The starboard engine caused a day’s delay. No sooner had this been 
repaired and made ready for the speed trial than the centre engine broke down 
completely. Efforts to put the big turbine back in commission failed and a quick run for 
the coast was made.494 
 
Worryingly, despite New York Shipbuilding president Samuel Knox’s assurance that the 
problems were not serious and that the ship had slowly proceeded to Fore River only because 
that was the company which built the turbines, the observers sent aboard by the company to 
observe the trials were instructed to proceed home via train while the “crippled” ship, using the 
descriptor in the New York Times, remained in Quincy.495 
Fortunately for Fore River and New York Shipbuilding, the repairs did prove 
manageable. A few days after the propulsion failure, the ship went out for gun trials, an activity 
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which did not require fast steaming.496 By 16 November, the ship left Quincy once more for 
additional trials before traveling back to Camden for finishing work and minor repairs. At this 
time, the shipyard expected that the Argentine government would be able to take over the ship in 
about three months.497 This might have proven accurate but for a dispute over who should pay 
for the year-long delay in delivering the warships. Blame for this went to both the Argentine 
government and New York Shipbuilding, depending on the specific issue, and according to the 
New York Times, “the contractors have been unwilling to make the delivery until some method of 
settling the claims … has been devised.” Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the American assistant 
secretary of the navy and future president, served as a mediator in the dispute.498 This was 
successfully resolved on 20 February 1915, on which date New York Shipbuilding officially 
handed control of the ship to the Argentine Navy.499 
In late February and early March, Moreno was supposed to represent Argentina at the 
official opening of the Panama Canal, one of only a few foreign nations planning to take part 
now that the First World War had broken out in Europe.500 The celebration was, however, 
postponed due to landslides.501 Instead, in the middle of the same month, Moreno left Camden 
for the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, where it picked up a crew of Argentine Navy personnel 
which had been quartered at the United States Navy facility while the dispute was adjudicated.502 
It then traveled to Hampton Roads, Virginia, but was hindered overnight after colliding with and 
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sinking a barge on the Delaware River near Newcastle, Delaware, running itself aground in the 
process. In the end, Moreno was undamaged.503 While at Hampton Roads, Woodrow Wilson, the 
president of the United States, attended a luncheon and tour on board Moreno at the invitation of 
Rómulo Sebastián Naón, the Argentine minister to the United States.504 As a battleship 
commissioned into the Argentine Navy, Wilson was technically on foreign soil while onboard 
even though it had been constructed in the United States. At the luncheon, he spoke to the 
gathering about the growing ties between the United States and Latin America: 
I am particularly glad that this great vessel, which I have so much admired, should 
represent some part of the reciprocity and connection between the United States of 
American and the great republic of Argentine [sic]. … there is a growing warmth of 
affection as well as understanding for the other countries of the great American 
hemisphere which we are coming daily to understand better … I want to congratulate you 
upon the completion of this ship and upon all that she stands for in the way of reciprocity 
between ourselves and the great country you represent, and I want to express my feeling 
as President of the United States that we are rapidly approaching a day when the 
Americans will draw together as they have never drawn together before, and that it will 
be a union, not of political ties, but of understanding and of mutual helpfulness.505 
 
After Wilson’s speech, Naón rose to express the Argentine government’s gratitude. 
It is probably the first time that a President of the United States of America has set foot 
on a piece of foreign soil, which like this battleship, springs from the industrial capacity 
and ability of this great country. … may the ties which have always bound our two 
countries together daily grow stronger and stronger until they constitute the expression of 
the most perfect international friendship.506 
 
Moreno returned to the Philadelphia Navy Yard after Wilson departed on the presidential 
yacht Mayflower. In April, it left the yard bound once again for Hampton Roads, this time to coal 
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up for its first trip to Argentina. However, it once again ran aground on the Delaware River, this 
time on the Dan Bake Shoal near Reedy Island. The ship was floated off on the next day, and no 
damage was done.507 
Figure 4.5: Moreno in the Brooklyn Navy Yard’s drydock, October 1914 
 
Source: George Grantham Bain collection, Library of Congress. Public domain. 
https://hdl.loc.gov/loc.pnp/ggbain.17604. 
 
Both Rivadavia and Moreno were officially accepted into the Argentine Navy in 
February 1916. The contract called for both needing to complete a year of service before their 
final acceptance.508 By 1917, the sea wall at Puerto Militar, the Argentine Navy’s primary naval 
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base, had been greatly expanded by almost one thousand feet and a new dry dock had been 
constructed, allowing them to do routine maintenance on the dreadnoughts. This work took three 
years and cost them over $8 million.509 This resolved concerns a British naval officer had about 
the port in 1908, who worried about the shallowness of the base’s water, the space available for 
safe anchoring (“there is no room for a ship to lie at anchor,” he wrote), and the size of the base’s 
drydock, which was in “excellent” condition but not large enough to handle a dreadnought.510 
Rumored sale possibilities 
Construction delays were not the only obstacle faced by the Argentine dreadnoughts. 
Like their counterparts in Brazil, Rivadavia and Moreno were subjected to a slew of rumors that 
the ships would be sold. Unlike Brazil, however, the Argentine rumors had some basis in fact 
and were the product of entirely different motivation. At the very beginning of 1914, shortly 
after the Brazilian government sold Rio de Janeiro to the Ottoman Empire, rumors that the 
Argentine government was considering the sale of its own dreadnoughts began. Should they 
choose to do so, finding a suitor would have been the least of their concerns. Amid naval arms 
races heating up all around Europe, several countries would have been happy to welcome a new 
dreadnought or two into their fleets. The United States, however, was not keen on this idea. First, 
it would give away several of the unique features that they possessed on their own dreadnoughts 
to an unknown country. Second, having anticipated this, a clause in the purchase contract gave 
the Americans the right of first refusal, but the United States Navy was not thrilled at this idea. 
Rapid advances in naval technology meant that the navy could see that these ships were already 
going to be obsolescent as new ships already under construction came into service. The State 
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Department concurred with its navy colleagues, and on 13 April 1914 William Jennings Bryan, 
the brand-new secretary of state, sent instructions to that effect to his chargés d'affaires in 
Buenos Aires—Sherill had left the post in 1911 due to health problems he said were fueled by 
being overworked.511 
In March 1914, the Argentine government denied that there were any truth to the rumors 
that they might sell their dreadnoughts, and stated that they “had decided to take no action which 
might tend to modify the status of the forces of the powers.”512 They were perhaps reassured in 
this stance by the public support for these capital ships. The Christian Science Monitor reported 
in at the end of 1913 that Rivadavia was likely “to receive a welcome such as is unprecedented in 
the naval affairs of this republic” upon its arrival in the country, and in August 1914 this 
prediction was realized in the form of 50,000 people lining the shore to see off the officers and 
seamen departing to crew Rivadavia and bring the ship home.513 
Yet days after the March statement, the possibility of a sale was given a lifeline. In 
legislative elections held that month, socialist parties made large gains, and the new members of 
government brought with them a desire to put their dreadnoughts on the market and use the 
windfall to fund improvements in education around the country.514 “Argentina has made great 
advances in educational matters, but it appears that the better placed people have been chiefly the 
ones to process,” said the Christian Science Monitor in April 1914. “There still is room for much 
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good work in the capital … with its … ever-increasing cosmopolitan population. The public 
school is a ‘melting pot,’ in Argentina as in the United States.”515 
Three bills that would have mandated the dreadnought’s sale were put forward in May 
and were debated in secret sessions, but all were defeated by June.516  The Argentines then 
publicly stated that would oppose any purchase offers made for their dreadnoughts.517 The 
American chargés d'affaires cabled home to express the importance of ensuring that there were 
no further delays in finishing the dreadnoughts, as the lengthy process had allegedly cooled Latin 
American attitudes towards trade with the United States.518  
In August 1914, the First World War began in Europe, throwing another wrench into the 
diplomatic backdrop to Argentina’s dreadnoughts. The ambassadors of the United Kingdom and 
Germany to the United States were both insistent that the Americans enforce their neutral status 
and ensure that the dreadnoughts would not be sold to the other power. From the industrial side, 
French bankers were retained by the Russian government to offer twice the contract price of the 
ships, which would then be turned over to Greece, who shared a natural enemy in the Ottoman 
Empire.519 Separately, the Greeks had expressed their own interest in purchasing the ship, likely 
as a counter to the Ottoman acquisition of Rio de Janeiro, and the Italians and Ottomans were 
reportedly curious as well.520 All were denied, despite the “splendid prices” being offered.521 
A contractual option for a third dreadnought was allowed to lapse in 1910, after the 
Revolt of the Lash in neighboring Brazil, and support for a third from a segment of the Argentine 
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senate in October 1912 amounted to nothing.522 Of the twelve destroyers, the Argentine Navy 
only accepted the four constructed by the German shipbuilders Krupp and Schichau. The four 
from the British Laird and four contracted to the French Brosse et Fouché were rejected for not 
meeting the required specifications, the latter in their speed or coal consumption in addition to 
delays in construction.523 The Laird-built destroyers were later sold to Greece, becoming their 
Aetos class, while the others were incorporated into the French Navy after the beginning of the 
First World War, becoming their Aventurier class.524 
Figure 4.6: Almirante Latorre, 1921 
 
Source: Library of Congress. Public domain. https://hdl.loc.gov/loc.pnp/cph.3c03269. 
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In Chile, meanwhile, a movement to re-arm the Chilean navy began as early as February 
or March 1906, shortly after Peru began adding units to its fleet for the first time in many 
years.525 It did not, however, come to fruition until 1910–11, after the time the Argentine 
dreadnoughts were ordered and laid down.526 This is not an unconscionably long period of time; 
even Argentina moved to acquire dreadnoughts only after construction began on Brazil’s 
dreadnoughts. However, several sources call out the Chilean government for an alleged delay in 
ordering their own battleships, and in doing so introduce errors into the narrative that require 
explanation. Specifically, these sources point to a massive earthquake and the subsequent costs 
of rebuilding as reasons why Chile ordered its dreadnoughts so long after Brazil and Argentina. 
In January 1909, The Engineer specifically called it the “Valparaíso earthquake,” which would 
presumably refer to the earthquake that hit just off the coast of the Valparaíso region in August 
1906, which killed nearly 4,000 people and severely damaged the Chilean city of the same 
name.527 Strangely, however, some of those sources pinpoint what one called a “disastrous 
earthquake” in 1908—not 1906.528 These could stem from the Encyclopedia Britannica’s famed 
eleventh edition, published in 1910–11, which explicitly and inaccurately refers to a 1908 
earthquake.529 Historian Seward Livermore, however, writing in the 1940s, makes no connection 
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in his footnotes.530 In any case, there is no evidence to suggest that a major earthquake struck 
Chile in 1908, much less one that was centered on Valparaiso and, in the words of the 
Encyclopedia Britannica, “caused the destruction of a large part of the city.”531 
The source of Livermore’s error is difficult to pin down. It may have been typographical, 
accidentally entering a different year, but the order of Livermore’s sentence (“the collapse of the 
nitrate market in 1907, and a disastrous earthquake in 1908 had brought on a severe financial 
depression”) would imply otherwise, and both may be inaccurate.532 Moreover, while Chilean 
warship acquisition plans were possibly halted in the immediate aftermath of the 1906 
earthquake, the theory is broadly contradicted by primary accounts from British diplomats in 
Chile, who wrote in separate 1906 and 1907 retrospectives that the country’s finances were little 
affected by the earthquake.533 Any delay was perhaps caused by Pedro Montt, the new Chilean 
president, who preferred that the proposed naval expenditure go instead to “improving internal 
communications.”534 
In August 1907 the Chilean legislature voted to allocate £5 million to acquire new naval 
units, just one year after the devastating earthquake.535 The 1906 diplomatic report, submitted six 
months after the disaster, noted: 
It is, of course, impossible to give an approximate estimate of the damage caused [by the 
earthquake], and ten years is a sanguine estimate of the period required for Valparaiso to 
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recover fully from the disaster. It is, however, generally conceded that the Chilean nation 
has shown great courage in this time of trouble, and in the opinion of the majority, the 
general progress of the country has not been checked to any very great extent, and that 
commercial activity has possibly been stimulated rather than otherwise by the disaster.536 
 
Livermore’s other stated reasoning is a drastic decline in demand for nitrates in 1907, Chile’s top 
export. A 1907 report from Henry Crofton Lowther, a British diplomat in Chile, would seem to 
correlate with Livermore, referring to a “bursting of [an economic] bubble” that was followed by 
a parade of companies going into liquidation, causing “great financial distress” in the country, 
and a British naval officer remarked upon Chile’s openly professed and “visible indications of 
poverty.” Lowther, however, goes on to state that the economic panic had been managed by the 
end of 1908, at which time they had been able to obtain a foreign loan without much trouble, and 
the naval officer added that any financial concerns had not prevented the country from 
meticulously maintaining its navy nor “spending money freely to attain this object.”537 
What financial volatility there was in the Chilean government’s finances occurred four  
years later, when another British diplomat cabled home to say that the country’s finances were in 
a “chaotic state” even though there was “little justification” for it, as “Chile is not insolvent.” 
The culprit seems to have been the country’s excessive issuing of paper currency.538 By this 
time, however, the Chilean legislature had allocated funds for naval expansion and 
modernization, a dreadnought design had been chosen, and the ships had been ordered.539 
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Figure 4.7: Front view of Almirante Latorre 
 
Source: National Archives and Records Administration via Wikimedia Commons. Public 
domain. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Almirante_Latorre_from_bow.jpg. 
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In any case, the quest to acquire dreadnoughts began in 1908, when a trial balloon floated 
by the navy was shot down by the legislature and by the indifference of the president, who 
preferred to put discretionary funds towards improving the country’s infrastructure.540 In August 
1909, an official naval council in Chile endorsed a plan for two dreadnoughts.541 It was only in 
1909 that the Chilean legislature allocated $14 million for a naval expansion, followed in 1910 
with granting authority to the president to finance one a dreadnought by entering into a £4.48 
million loan, with payments to be spread over five years, and to raise government revenue by 
£400,000 per year. Beyond the outlay for new warships, £1 million was to go towards bolstering 
the country’s sea-facing decisions and another £80,000 for improving the navy’s arsenals.542 
Like in Argentina, international armament firms began lining up to try to win the contract 
for this massive new vessel, for which bids were called for in July 1910.543 Unlike them, 
however, the Chilean Navy’s preference for the United Kingdom was abundantly clear. The 
Chilean and British navies had been closely aligned since at least the 1830s, when Chilean naval 
officers were billeted onboard British vessels to gain experience in the much larger navy. More 
recently, Chile was close to accepting a British-led naval mission, which would arrive in 1911.544 
Moreover, the Chilean Navy was particularly fond of Armstrong, with whom they had a good 
relationship after purchasing eight ships from the company during the naval arms race with 
Argentina less than a decade prior.545 
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The United States and the Taft administration, fresh off their victory in the Argentine 
dreadnought contracts, was keen on the challenge. “The outlook for desirable contractions is 
encouraging at present in Turkey, Brazil [i.e. the ship that eventually became Rio de Janeiro], 
and Chile,” the assistant secretary of state wrote in July 1910, “and there is a probability that 
similar opportunities will soon be offered in China.” The state and navy departments worked 
together in these goals, and the former convinced the latter in May to send A.P. Black, an 
ordnance expert, to South America as a naval attaché to the legations there. When the 
dreadnought competition began, Knox, the secretary of state, quickly installed Henry P. Fletcher, 
a career diplomat, as the United States’ new minister to Chile. Fletcher had previously been 
posted to China, where as chargés d'affaires he had bought into Taft’s dollar diplomacy policy 
and was able to open a proposed Chinese railway construction loan to American banks.546 
After spending time in Chile, however, both Fletcher and Black, the new naval attaché, 
were disillusioned at their prospects. “I do not believe that the Chilean Government wants, 
intends, or can order its ships elsewhere than in England,” the attaché wrote. When it came time 
to tender for the warships in October, the Chilean Navy’s required specifications mirrored British 
practices so closely, including the condition that British-made armament be fitted, that Fletcher 
raised a formal protest.547 “The opinion is generally expressed here [in London] that foreigners 
would not be likely to arrange terms with English manufacturers, which would enable the 
foreigners to compete,” the New York Times stated, adding in its headline that the United States 
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was likely being “frozen out” of the contract.548 Unlike Sherill in Argentina, Fletcher was not 
able to secure any changes to the requirements, but he was able to get the deadline extended from 
the end of October—already once extended from 15 September—to the end of December so that 
American shipbuilders could properly accommodate.549 The United States would also later 
indicate that it would be willing to provide a $25 million loan to facilitate the ordering of a 
battleship in the country.550 
Tenders came in from the United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom, and each 
country’s navies were deployed to support their shipbuilding industries. Each country dispatched 
naval vessels on South American cruises to show the flag, demonstrate the potential power of 
their warships, and garner more trade for their country’s firms.551 The Germans moved first, 
announcing that they would be sending their newly commissioned Von der Tann, the fastest 
operational capital ship in the world, on a two-and-a-half-month-long trip to Brazil, Argentina, 
and Chile. American newspapers noted that the Germans were frank about acknowledging the 
purpose of this voyage: “the main purpose of the cruiser is to serve as an advertisement for the 
German warship building industry.” Von der Tann left Germany in February 1911.552 The United 
States responded with a magnanimous gesture to return the body of the recently deceased 
Chilean minister to the country.553 The ship selected for this duty was Delaware, a new 
dreadnought commissioned only a year earlier. Despite suffering from a boiler explosion on 17 
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January, killing at least eight people, the vessel was quickly repaired for departure by 31 
January.554 Delaware reached Valparaiso, Chile, on 11 March, and its captain was ordered to 
allow the Chileans access to the entire ship save for its fire-control system: 
You and your officers will endeavor to show the good points of the Delaware and to 
make a good impression upon said officials as to the excellent character of the ships built 
in this country. The Department has adopted this policy in order to aid the shipbuilding 
interests of the country to make contracts for the building of men-of-war for foreign 
countries. This authority to allow inspection without limitation is to hold good both going 
and returning from Chile.555 
 
Specifically, the captain was to carefully toe a line between revealing too much about the fire-
control system, which one historian called “one of the most carefully guarded secrets in any 
navy,” while not appearing to be secretive. This restriction, rather than outright ban on, revealing 
information about the fire-control system demonstrates how far the United States government 
was willing to go to sell ships to foreign countries. Finally, to counter these new warships, the 
British dispatched its Fourth Cruiser Squadron to South America.556 
Eventually, the extensive efforts of the United States and Germany came to naught. Irked 
at the pressure being placed on them by the German government and viewing the United States’ 
bids as being overpriced, the Chileans went with financing from Rothschilds and the low bid—
some $1 million less per ship than those the United States—from Armstrong.557 Once again, the 
largest and most powerful battleship in the world would be under construction for a South 
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American country.558 Contracts for six large destroyers, escorts for the new dreadnoughts, went 
to J.S. White in the United Kingdom.559 As a sort of consolation prize, contracts for $2 million of 
coastal artillery and a smaller separate order of two submarines were given to Bethlehem Steel 
and Electric Boat, respectively.560 To expand its docking facilities for the new warship, the 
government called for tenders for the construction of a drydock at Talcahuano that would be over 
eight hundred feet long and over one hundred feet wide.561 
The Chilean government moved ahead with a contract for a second dreadnought in 1912 
and exercised their contractual option with Armstrong for it in May or June. In contrast with the 
first bid, there was very little competition, although at least one news cable held that Bethlehem 
Steel worked with Fletcher for at least two months to try to sway the Chilean Navy.562 Fletcher 
“made a routine protest,” one historian would later write, “but by this time even Knox had been 
convinced of Chilean indifference to the United States, and the award was allowed to go almost 
by default.”563 A total of £7 million later, the Chileans had a new fleet being built for them.564 
The first dreadnought, which would be named Almirante Latorre, was designed by 
Armstrong’s J.R. Perret, ordered on 2 November 1911, and laid down a few weeks after, on 27 
November.565 A late design alteration increased the ship’s secondary armament from 4.7 to 6-
inch guns, increasing the displacement, decreasing its maximum speed, and submerging its 
armor best when the ship was at full load.566 The ship would be the largest ever constructed by 
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Armstrong.567 Due to the large amount of warship construction happening in the United 
Kingdom during this time, construction proceeded slowly due to delays in acquiring materials.568 
Its sister ship, to be named Almirante Cochrane, was ordered on 29 July 1912 and laid down in 
January or February 1913, the delay being caused by the need for Rio de Janeiro to clear 
Armstrong’s second slipway in Elswick.569 Armstrong launched Almirante Latorre on 27 
November 1913, exactly two years to the day after it had been laid down.570 
In November 1912, a Turkish proposal to buy the first Chilean dreadnought emerged in 
the press.571 Fourteen months later, reports came out of Vienna that the Greek government was 
making a serious attempt to purchase the same dreadnought.572 This came on the heels of losing 
out on Rio de Janeiro to the Ottomans, Greece’s primary rival, and they were willing to offer a 
“fantastic amount” for the ship.573 Greece’s aspirations were, however, immediately quashed by 
the Chilean government, which issued a public statement saying that their ships were not on the 
market and would not be sold.574 A few months later, the principal conservative party in Chile 
came out in favor of such a sale. Their official paper questioned why the country was purchasing 
a dreadnought when it enjoyed warm relations with both Brazil and Chile, and at a time when the 
country was working to right its economy.575 
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Figure 4.8: Line drawing of Almirante Latorre as Canada, 1915 
 
Source: Sydney Walker Barnaby, published in John Leyland, ed., Brassey’s Naval Annual, 1915 
(London: William Clowes and Sons, 1915), plate 2, via Wikimedia Commons. Public domain. 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Brassey%27s_HMS_Canada_Plan_(1915).jpg. 
 
Any movement towards this was superseded with the beginning of the First World War in 
Europe. As recommended by the British Cabinet, Almirante Latorre was formally purchased 
from the Chileans on 9 September 1914 for completion and use in the war as Canada.576 In this 
capacity, the British completed its trials on 13 September 1915 commissioned it into the Royal 
Navy on the following 15 October.577 The ship was not seized like two other Ottoman capital 
ships, including the ex-Rio de Janeiro, because of the friendly relations enjoyed between the 
 
576 Burt, British Battleships of World War One, 231, 240. 
577 Ibid., 240; Brook, Warships, 147. 
   
148 
 
British and Chileans.578 Almirante Cochrane, far less complete, languished for several years 
before being purchased in 1917 for conversion to an aircraft carrier, Eagle.579 The Chileans also 
lost four of the six destroyers that were on order, with two having been delivered prior to the 
war’s beginning. In partial compensation for the seized ships, Chilean Navy was given five 
Holland-class submarines in July 1917 which had been prevented from being delivered from the 
United States to the United Kingdom due to the war. They also purchased a sixth.580
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The legacy of the dreadnought race 
While the First World War raged in Europe, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile found 
themselves unable to acquire additional warships as the major powers, and their shipyards, 
marched to war.581 In the years after the conflict, Argentina and Chile purchased a small number 
of warships while Brazil acquired almost none. The warships acquired during the dreadnought 
naval arms race were, despite modernizations, rapidly outpaced by advancing naval 
technology— as newer and more powerful ships and armament were developed and deployed, 
wing turrets and triple-expansion engines went out of favor and armor dispositions all radically 
changed in the wartime and inter-war period. This meant that for all the volume generated by the 
South American dreadnoughts prior to the First World War, in the years during and after the 
conflict they were comparatively silent. Still, the battleships of Brazil, Argentina, and, 
eventually, Chile all soldiered on for several decades and remained in service through the Second 
World War. 
Brazil 
During the First World War, the Brazilian Navy found that even patrolling its own coasts 
was difficult, given that it possessed only a limited number of warships suited for the task, and 
by the time of the country’s entrance into the conflict on the side of the Allies in October 1917, 
many of the warships it had acquired less than a decade earlier were unfit for active wartime 
service.582 With the exception of three submarines and an accompanying tender, one historian 
would later write that the Brazilian Navy’s ships were either “run-down or hopelessly obsolete,” 
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referring to the ships acquired under the 1904–07 naval program and everything older, 
respectively.583 Both dreadnoughts needed to be modernized, particularly their fire control 
systems, before the Brazilian Navy could send them abroad for service in the United Kingdom’s 
Grand Fleet. The condensers and boilers on the scout cruisers, Bahia and Rio Grande do Sul, 
were in such poor condition that they could make no more than eighteen knots, two-thirds the 
speed they achieved on their trial runs. Finally, some of the Pará-class destroyers had 
particularly troublesome engines or had problems with their hulls.584 
Nonetheless, the Brazilian Navy forged ahead. It ordered new boilers and condenser 
tubes in the United States and agreed to begin full patrols of the green waters of its coastline on 1 
September, once they were delivered and installed. The British, French, and American navies 
would patrol the blue-water territory of the South Atlantic, with each handling a particular sector 
off Brazil’s coasts.585 The Brazilians would similarly be divided into three divisions, with 
primarily older ships handling the north; the dreadnoughts handling the center, ranging from 
Bahia to Rio de Janeiro, and scout cruisers the south. The Pará class ships were distributed 
within all of them.586 Separately, in August 1917 the Brazilian Navy ordered rangefinders for all 
its major warships, along with various aircraft and equipment.587 
The patrolling arrangement was altered in December 1917, after Brazil’s entrance into 
the war and at the request of the British Admiralty. Instead, the Brazilian Navy would send its 
two scout cruisers and four destroyers abroad for service in European waters. This raised a few 
problems. First, the Brazilian Navy was wholly unprepared to support a fleet based far from its 
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shores. For instance, sailing charts for the coast of West Africa, important for ensuring that a 
ship could find its destination and would not strike any hidden objects, had to be taken from 
German merchant ships interned in Brazilian harbors, and once the small naval force departed 
Brazil, it was entirely dependent on the British for its supplies. Second, the new boilers and 
condensers had not been delivered yet, and so the Brazilian ships were to be based out of 
Gibraltar, where there was a British yard that could overhaul the ships. After several months of 
preparation, training, and repairs, the ships went abroad in May 1918, proceeding first to west 
Africa to act as convoy escorts. They were accompanied for part of the journey by the old cruiser 
Barroso, in case Rio Grande do Sul’s condensers broke; the latter ship would later be forced to 
stay in Dakar with a destroyer escort due to the troublesome equipment. The other four ships 
proceeded to Gibraltar in November 1918, arriving one day before the armistice which ended the 
war was signed.588 
The dreadnoughts were sent separately to United States shipyards for their refits. The first 
to depart was São Paulo, whose planned departure date of 6 June 1918 was delayed by alleged 
sightings of nearby German submarines. The Americans offered two protected cruisers as 
escorts, Cincinnati and Raleigh, but the latter needed to be repaired before sailing. The three 
eventually left on 17 June, but on the next day fourteen of São Paulo’s eighteen boilers broke. 
The dreadnought’s boilers received jury-rigged repairs in Bahia from the crew of the American 
battleship Nebraska, which was in the port while returning home after repatriating the body of 
the Uruguayan ambassador to the United States. São Paulo would eventually reach the Brooklyn 
Naval Yard forty-two days after it first departed Brazil.589 Its refit was estimated as needing six 
 
588 Ibid. 




months to complete, but the ship remained in New York until January 1920.590 Given Brazil’s 
allied status during the war, several officers on the ship were placed onboard American warships 
for training and experience. On its way back to Brazil, São Paulo loaded up on ammunition and 
conducted firing trials near the American naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.591 Months later, 
in August 1920, São Paulo briefly served as a royal yacht for the Belgian king and queen when it 
brought them to Brazil for an official state visit. It also brought them home, and returned to 
Brazil in January 1921.592 Minas Geraes underwent its own refit in 1920–21, departing Rio de 
Janeiro in July 1920, arriving in August, and departing New York on 4 October 1921.593 Both 
modernizations were completed at the cost price of labor and material.594  
During this time, the Brazilian government considered or was offered the chance to 
expand itself but declined to do so. In 1921, for instance, the British offered to sell Agincourt, the 
ship that was once intended to be Rio de Janeiro, to the Brazilian Navy. The British were flush 
with a number of older warships, including dreadnoughts, which would soon be limited by the 
Washington Naval Treaty. This offer was declined, and the ship was sold for scrap in 1922.595 
Various other naval expansion plans were proposed; for example, around the same time the 
Brazilian government turned down the ex-Rio de Janeiro, its president advocated for adding light 
cruisers, destroyers, and submarines to the fleet.596 In 1924, the United States naval mission in 
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the country, which replaced a British naval mission two years earlier, recommended that the 
country undertake a ten-year naval rearmament program. The proposed ships included two 
thirty-five-thousand-ton battleships, for a total of seventy thousand tons; sixty thousand tons of 
cruisers; fifteen thousand tons of destroyers; and six thousand tons of submarines. Most of these 
ships would represent expansions of Brazil’s navy; not counting the battleships, which would 
replace Minas Geraes and São Paulo, only sixteen thousand tons of these ships would replace 
older vessels. The American State Department was vehemently against this proposal, fearing that 
it would cause a new naval arms race in the region.597 Charles Evans Hughes, the secretary of 
state, wrote to his chargé d'affaires in Rio de Janeiro: 
The Brazilian building program is spoken of as a program of defense. The department 
does not know by what power Brazil is threatened that she should need such a large 
defensive fleet. 
 
… the new program instead of putting Brazil on a footing of equality with those countries 
will place her in a very superior position, which will necessitate new naval construction 
for the same reason which now moves Brazil to desire new construction; namely, the 
desire not to be left in a position of inferiority. 
 
Any such result as this would be most unfortunate and there would be brought about a 
condition of rivalry in armaments in this hemisphere which up to the present has happily 
not existed. 
 
The department’s feeling about this matter is so strong that it would rather recall the 
naval mission than assume the responsibility for the naval program that the mission has 
proposed.598 
 
While the plan was withdrawn, the mission was still requesting battleship design sketches from 
the United State Navy’s Bureau of Construction and Repair as late as 1928.599 
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Figure 5.1: Minas Geraes, c. 1942 
 




Meanwhile, the dreadnoughts were employed or caught up in domestic conflicts. In 1922, 
the dreadnoughts were used to put down the first Tenente revolt, with São Paulo bombarding 
Fort Copacabana in Rio de Janeiro to induce the insurgents to surrender.600 Two years later, 
crewmen about São Paulo were the ones to mutiny. Finding little support from other warships in 
the Brazilian Navy, unable to link up with revolutionaries in Rio Grande do Sul, short of food 
 




and water, and with the ship’s condensers acting up, the mutineers left Rio de Janeiro, trading 
shots with the forts guarding the entrance, and sailed to Uruguay to seek asylum.601 
By this time, much of the Brazilian Navy was showing its age. Hughes had written in 
1924 that the navy’s dreadnoughts were “practically obsolete,” and the Associated Press wrote in 
1930 that Brazil’s fleet was “composed of obsolete ships” and that only one of its eleven 
destroyers was in good condition.602 To address this, in 1935 the Brazilian government allocated 
$20 million to its navy for new construction.603 They had previously considered ordering 
cruisers, possibly modeled on either the Italian Zara, Japanese Kinugasa, British York, or the 
French Duquesne classes, but did not end up acquiring any.604 They did, however, order 
submarines from Italy and six destroyers from the United Kingdom, began domestic construction 
on three destroyers with a design very similar to that of the American Mahan class, and 
attempted to lease six destroyers from the United States, only to back down after a furious 
Argentine response.605 That Mahan-like destroyers were being built in Brazil was possible only 
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after recent investments in and the expansion of the navy’s shipyard in Rio de Janeiro, part of 
what New York Times military reporter Hanson W. Baldwin called Brazil’s “naval 
renaissance.”606 
Minas Geraes benefited from the shipyard’s new capacity, as it was modernized in Rio 
de Janeiro beginning in June 1931. It ran sea trials in April and May 1938 and returned to service 
in June of the same year, though it was not until 1940 that the modernization was complete—a 
lengthy amount of time for such an operation.607 The changes included a conversion to burning 
fuel oil, which allowed the ship’s two funnels to be combined into one large funnel; new 
turbogenerators; and mounting two new anti-aircraft guns.608 São Paulo would have been given 
comparable treatment, but the ship’s hull and machinery was in such a dilapidated state that a 
modernization would have been uneconomical.609 
Neither ship was fit for active overseas duty in the Second World War, and so after 
Brazil’s declaration of war in 1942, both dreadnoughts were used as harbor defense ships. São 
Paulo was assigned to Recife, the capital of the state of Pernambuco, and Minas Geraes was sent 
to Salvador, the capital of the state of Bahia.610 Beyond their capital ships, the conflict cost the 
navy the six destroyers ordered in the United Kingdom, lost to seizure after the beginning of the 
war, and the old scout cruiser Bahia, which exploded and sank in July 1945 after what the United 
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Press called “one of the worst disasters in Brazil’s naval history.”611 However, they 
commissioned the three homebuilt but long-delayed Mahan-class destroyers in 1943 and 1944 
and added several American-built destroyer escorts and subchasers transferred under the United 
States’ lend-lease program.612 
Argentina 
The dominant Argentine naval philosophy, which remained neutral in the First World 
War, in the aftermath of the conflict continued to call for the country to maintain a navy that 
would be both greater than any one of its neighbors and capable of ensuring that multiple 
country’s navies were not able to combine with each other. A proposed naval construction bill 
was, however, turned back by the legislature in 1918. By 1922, the navy and the newly installed 
navy minister agreed that the Argentine Navy was inferior to the Brazilian and Chilean fleets. 
The accuracy of that statement could be debated, but the bulk of Argentina’s fleet was composed 
of the ships acquired during the arms race with Chile around the turn of the century, and after the 
modernization of the Brazilian dreadnoughts and the Chilean acquisition of a super-dreadnought 
and four destroyers in 1920, the materiel gap was at worst worryingly close.613 
On 20 September 1923, the Argentine legislature allocated 9.5 million gold pesos, or 
approximately a bit more than $9 million dollars, for the modernization of the country’s two 
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dreadnoughts and the four destroyers they had managed to acquire before the First World War.614 
Arguing in favor of this outlay, Marcelo Torcuato de Alvear, the president of Argentina, called 
attention to the Brazilian and Chilean naval upgrades along with the modernizations of similar 
American battleships, and advocated that Argentina “follow the example of European and South 
American navies.”615 For the dreadnoughts, this meant that they received new boilers and 
turbines, transitioning from coal to fuel oil firing, an improved fire control system, and a new 
mainmast.616 Work on Rivadavia was completed by the Fore River Shipyard, and the ship 
departed in March 1926.617 
 The new navy minister commissioned a study in 1922 which came back with three tiered 
proposals, representing the navy’s minimum, acceptable, and desirable expansion plans. Three 
years later, the government submitted a bill that would allocate £15 million to the navy, a figure 
which represented a full quarter of the typical naval budgets of the naval powers of the United 
Kingdom and United States and was more than three times the typical yearly Argentine naval 
budget. It called for the purchase of three cruisers, six destroyers, six submarines, and two other 
ships alongside infrastructure improvements for the navy’s facilities. Despite strong opposition 
from socialist representatives, causing a lengthy delay, the bill was passed in late 1926 after the 
navy was able to win the support of Hipólito Yrigoyen, the former two-time president of 
Argentina.618 
Figure 5.2: Minas Geraes- and Rivadavia-class dreadnoughts in Rio de Janeiro, c. 1918 
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Beginning in the late 1920s, the navy purchased two cruisers and three submarines from 
Italy, three destroyers from the United Kingdom, and two similar destroyers from Spain. 
Residual funds allowed the navy to add an additional cruiser and seven destroyers from the 
United Kingdom, along with nine Argentine-built minelayers and minesweepers, in the 1930s. 
With these additions to the Argentine Navy, the country could theoretically deploy a battle force 
comprised of two modernized, if aging, battleships, escorted by three modern cruisers, and 




against any one nation.619 As Argentina remained neutral for nearly all of the Second World 
War, however, none of these ships were tested in battle.620 
Chile 
The First World War severely disrupted the Chilean Navy’s reconstruction plans, as the 
two gems in the order—its two super-dreadnoughts—were purchased by the United Kingdom 
after the conflict broke out. At the end of the conflict, the navy began to piece its program back 
together, and it was a good time to do it; the United Kingdom possessed a large surplus of 
warships which would eventually be scrapped as part of the terms of the Washington Naval 
Treaty. The Chilean Navy took advantage in April 1920 by purchasing five warships it had 
ordered and were under construction before the war’s intervention: Canada, the ship which 
would have become Almirante Latorre, and three large destroyers. They were able to do this at 
comparatively cut-rate prices; Canada was given away from £1 million, less than half of what it 
had cost to build it.621 The Chileans formally regained control of the ship on 27 November 
1920.622 
The other battleship it had ordered, what would have been named Almirante Cochrane, 
had been converted during the war into an aircraft carrier and renamed Eagle. The Chilean 
government asked about the possibility of re-converting it back to a battleship, but the cost of 
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doing so turned out to be prohibitive.623 The British instead offered the two remaining 
obsolescent Invincible-class battlecruisers.624 This was briefly contemplated, and the Maritime 
League of Chile came out strongly in favor of acquiring a second battleship, but in the end 
monetary concerns took precedence over naval expansion. Still, when the possibility of 
purchasing the Invincible class became public knowledge, it turned out to be highly controversial 
among a contingent of new-guard middle-ranking naval officers who believed that the war had 
proven that military aircraft and submarines were more affordable and better suited to Chile’s 
naval requirements.625 
In the inter-war years, the Chilean government continued its naval expansion, albeit 
slowly. They added six Serrano-class destroyers and three Capitan O’Brien-class submarines in 
the late 1920s, perhaps in reaction to Argentina’s naval buildup, and sent Latorre to the United 
Kingdom for a modernization at the Royal Navy’s Devonport Dockyard from 1929 to 1931.626 
They also considered, but did not go through with, acquiring an 8,600-ton cruiser or two smaller 
cruisers, with the latter option being closed off by the beginning of the Second World War.627 
During the 1930s, the Chilean Navy went through its own naval mutiny which Latorre 
participated in. During the Great Depression, in which demand for nitrates fell precipitously, the 
Chilean government’s economic minister cut the salaries of government employees making over 
$3,000 pesos by up to thirty percent. This included naval personnel, who had already had their 
salaries cuts and overseas bonuses removed. A reactionary mutiny developed quickly, and 
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Latorre was taken over by a group of enlisted men (led by petty officers) early on the morning of 
1 September 1931. Most of the rest of the northern fleet—at this time, the Chilean Navy was 
divided into a northern fleet at Coquimbo and a smaller southern fleet at Talcahuano—followed 
Latorre’s example. The demands they sent to the government ranged widely. On a professional 
level, they included restoring their salaries, better rations, the provisioning of free clothing, 
changes in retirement and promotion policies, the closure of several naval schools, and ceasing 
the use of contracted pilots. However, a more radical faction within the mutiny, influenced by 
Communism, added political goals as well, including demands of action with Chile’s foreign 
debt, bank interest rates, and subdividing land, financed by new taxes and seizures from wealthy 
individuals and families. After these initial demands, several land installations and the southern 
fleet rebelled as well; the latter sailed north to join with the other rebel ships, carrying sailors 
who were more radical the most of their compatriots in the north. The mutiny fell apart soon 
after this thanks to a confluence of factors, including worsening disagreements within the 
mutineer contingent between professional and political demands, the use of troops to rush the 
land-based rebels, and—importantly—the use of air power to strike the combined fleets. While 
this strike did little damage, it shook several of the mutineers who began to slip away, bound for 
ports to surrender. The first to depart were the Serrano-class destroyers Hyatt and Riquelme, and 
the rest of the fleet followed quickly.628 Like the aftermath of the Brazilian Navy’s similar action 
in 1910, the mutiny severely damaged the Chilean Navy’s prestige and public confidence.629 
Despite the depression-fueled economic problems, Latorre was in good-enough condition 
by 1941 to be the subject of a purchase offer from the United States, along with two destroyers 
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and a submarine tender, in the wake of the attack on Pearl Harbor.630 Chile refused the entreaty, 
and Latorre was used for neutrality patrols during the war.631 
The aftermath of the Second World War 
South America’s dreadnoughts, already obsolescent prior to the war, were thoroughly 
obsolete by its conclusion. The war had demonstrated the immense superiority of modern aircraft 
carriers which could sink battleships from far beyond the range of their main armament. In the 
immediate years after the Second World War, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile began seeking 
cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. Though none were initially successful in acquiring anything 
larger than frigates, the United States’ Mutual Defense Assistance Act allowed for six modern 
light cruisers to be sold to the three countries, with two going to each country. This gave each 
navy an acceptable parity in the new warship type and therefore did not begin a new major arms 
race.632 
The dreadnoughts continued in service into the 1950s, though all deployed to sea less and 
less as time when on. São Paulo would last leave Rio de Janeiro under its own power in 1946 
and was drydocked for the last time in 1948, by which time São Paulo had been 
decommissioned—likely a result of the substandard condition it had been in since the 1930s, 
along with the scout cruiser Rio Grande do Sul.633 São Paulo was unsurprisingly also the first to 
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be sold for scrap, departing the country under tow in 1951. The tow line parted during a storm 
north of the Azores, however, and the ship was never seen again.634 Minas Geraes was sold in 
1953 to a New York company for $556,500, and was towed to Italy in 1954.635 Argentina’s 
dreadnoughts were both sold for scrap in February 1957, with Moreno going to Japan and 
Rivadavia to Italy. The former was “the longest tow ever undertaken of such a heavy ship,” 
according to the firm hired to move the ship.636 Latorre was given a “complete repair” and had 
been used for training new enlisted personnel as late as 1948, but a boiler explosion in 1951 was 
never fully repaired.637 It was the final dreadnought to depart South American waters. Having 
been formally decommissioned in October 1958, Latorre was sold for scrap to a Japanese firm in 
early 1959 for $881,000 and towed across the Pacific, arriving on 28 August.638 
With the departure of South America’s dreadnoughts, the governments of Argentina, 
Brazil, and Chile each made the decision to acquire new capital warships in the form of six light 
cruisers, divided two each between Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. These ships were supplied by 
the United States, the clear dominant power in the Americas after the conclusion of the Second 
World War, under separate bilateral agreements reached in January 1951. The United States 
deliberately distributed the warships equally between the South American countries to codify a 
newly balanced level of naval power between the three, but this effort was not entirely 
successful: before the end of the decade, both Brazil and Argentina each purchased a Colossus-
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class light aircraft carrier from the United Kingdom. Two aircraft carriers and six cruisers would 
thusly serve as the capital ships of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile into the 1980s and 1990s.639 All 
but one cruiser would eventually be sold for scrap—the notable exception being Argentina’s 
Belgrano, sunk by torpedoes during the Falklands War—and today, the sole remaining 
traditional capital ship in South America is Brazil’s Atlântico. A former British helicopter 
carrier, the Brazilian government acquired Atlântico in 2018 to replace the country’s second 
aircraft carrier, which despite frequent and expensive refits proved to be unable to stay in service 
for sustained periods.640  
Appraising the dreadnought race 
By ordering three dreadnoughts in 1907, Brazil became the third country in the world to 
have this innovative warship class on order. Dreadnoughts were now a symbol of national 
prestige and a cornerstone upon which a country’s maritime defenses could be constructed 
around. The Brazilian government and its societal elites believed that their own dreadnoughts 
would provide the first step towards achieving the Brazilian government’s goal of moving up in 
the world’s ranks, help them become the dominant regional power, and ensure that no nations 
outside the continent could come metaphorically knocking on Brazil’s door, weapons in hand. 
All these goals began with Brazil’s naval power, and Brazil’s dreadnoughts would become “the 
role of totems of an ascending and powerful” nation, in the perceptive words of one present-day 
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expert in international relations with Brazil’s Ministry of External Affairs.641 Such a progression 
was a natural result of the country’s growing wealth and population. 
With their order, however, the nation became the talk of the naval world, much of it 
questioning their reason for acquiring such ships, stemming from a sense that Brazil was only a 
minor nation with no immediate military use for dreadnoughts. Amidst as rash of conspiracy 
theories claiming that Brazil was planning to sell the ships to another nation, these views 
primarily coalesced around on Brazil’s lack of standing among the great powers or the world and 
the dreadnought ship type’s lack of usefulness in maintaining Brazil’s territorial integrity over 
the entirety of its lengthy coastline. However, these commentators glossed over the potential of 
the purchases for international ‘soft’ diplomatic power, especially in regional politics. 
 Brazil’s diplomats spent much time shooting down these rumors, perhaps fearing that if 
Brazil’s dreadnought ambitions were not taken seriously, the prestige acquired at their delivery 
would be lessened. In any case, the hopes of the country’s elites were dashed by these 
dreadnought’s potential for misuse, something which was emphatically demonstrated to the 
capital in November 1910. This event caused the influential Naval Annual to remark that “these 
events suggest the reflection that great armaments are valueless to a State unless that State 
possesses also trained and disciplined officers and men.”642 
Looking south, the calculations of Argentina were comparatively simple: under the 
pervading naval doctrines of the day, only dreadnoughts could counter other dreadnoughts, and 
the Argentines needed to respond to the Brazilian acquisition of such ships, which threatened to 
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alter the balance of power in the River Plate. As the Navy League of the United States opined in 
early 1909: 
The Argentine Republic is coming to the front as a formidable rival of Brazil in naval 
development … The Argentine government is following the example of Brazil by making 
statutory provision for a building program. 
 
… If Argentina seriously aspires to compete with Brazil she must build at least three 
large battleships equally as good as the Minas Geraes and not make the mistake of 
creating a coast-defense navy—a policy which has given France a lower place than she 
formerly occupied among the world’s leading navies.643 
 
Despite a controversial bidding process which saw shipbuilders furious at the dissemination of 
some of their unique designs, Argentina’s dreadnoughts were constructed in the United States 
and delivered before that country’s entry into the First World War. Like falling dominoes, this 
course of action by Chile’s chief rival, a country with which they had unresolved border 
disputes, induced the Chilean Navy to seek their own dreadnoughts. They ordered theirs in the 
United Kingdom, a country and navy with which they had long-standing ties, over the bids of the 
United States and Germany. 
Even before the completion of the Brazilian and Argentine dreadnoughts, however, they 
were set to be outclassed on an individual basis with ships being constructed elsewhere in the 
world. In April 1910, the New-York Tribune praised Brazil’s Minas Geraes as “a ship whose 
fighting power is superior to that of any other fully armed vessel afloat.”644 Three years later, the 
president of Fore River Shipbuilding acclaimed the speed of Argentina’s dreadnoughts as “a 
record … never equaled by any battleship of this country, and only slightly exceeded by any of 
the powers.”645 The qualifiers in both statements are telling: naval technology was advancing so 
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rapidly that the designs of Minas Geraes and Rivadavia were already being rendered outmoded 
by ships under construction and obsolescent by ships being designed. As newer and more 
powerful ships and armament were developed and deployed in Europe, the United States, and 
Japan, features like wing turrets and triple-expansion engines went out of favor and armor 
disposition would radically change.646 
Moreover, the dreadnoughts of South America were built as part of a naval arms race 
which paled in comparison to the output of the dreadnought and super-dreadnought arms races 
raging across Europe, much less naval construction in the United States and Japan. “Nearly every 
great power in the world now has in commission or is building or is plan[ing] one or more 
warships of the Dreadnought class,” the New-York Tribune intoned in same article which praised 
Minas Geraes and unintentionally foreshadowed its fate.647 The sheer weight of numbers ensured 
that the question of a South American dreadnought sale would become a largely moot point. 
Once the traditional naval powers were able to construct and maintain large and more 
technologically advanced dreadnoughts, the addition of one or two no longer had the capability 
of swinging the perceived balance of naval power in entire oceans.648 Therefore, crushed under 
the weight of time, technology, and numbers, the “curious anomaly” of their dreadnoughts 
remained just that—a curiosity in the footnotes of history.649 
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With the benefit of hindsight, the Argentine, Brazilian, and Chilean decisions to purchase 
dreadnoughts might be categorized as another entry in a long tradition of countries purchasing 
military hardware beyond their means or strategic requirements, much like Thailand’s aircraft 
carrier Chakri Naruebet, commissioned in 1997, or Angola’s and Uganda’s Su-30 fighter jets, 
delivered in the 2010s.650 Yet an examination of these examples shows that each were purchased 
at least in part as part of broader military and diplomatic strategies, even if each country’s ability 
to maintain their equipment has been or could be subsequently degraded.651 This is similar to the 
South American dreadnoughts, which were purchased for their potential use in regional 
diplomacy (Brazil) and regional defense (Argentina and Chile).652 Moreover, regardless of the 
South American dreadnought race’s scale or long-term impact, it can be viewed as a microcosm 
of the changes in international power and politics wrought by the introduction of dreadnoughts 
into the world's fleets.
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